Author: sef
Date: Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019
New Revision: 344140
URL: https://svnweb.freebsd.org/changeset/base/344140

Log:
  Add CBC-MAC authentication.
  
  This adds the CBC-MAC code to the kernel, but does not hook it up to
  anything (that comes in the next commit).
  
  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3610 describes the algorithm.
  
  Note that this is a software-only implementation, which means it is
  fairly slow.
  
  Sponsored by:   iXsystems Inc
  Differential Revision:  https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18592

Added:
  head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c   (contents, props changed)
  head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h   (contents, props changed)
  head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c   (contents, props changed)
Modified:
  head/sys/conf/files
  head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile
  head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h

Modified: head/sys/conf/files
==============================================================================
--- head/sys/conf/files Fri Feb 15 00:29:44 2019        (r344139)
+++ head/sys/conf/files Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019        (r344140)
@@ -4847,6 +4847,8 @@ crypto/libsodium/randombytes.c    optional crypto \
        compile-with "${NORMAL_C} -I$S/contrib/libsodium/src/libsodium/include 
-I$S/crypto/libsodium"
 crypto/libsodium/utils.c       optional crypto \
        compile-with "${NORMAL_C} -I$S/contrib/libsodium/src/libsodium/include 
-I$S/crypto/libsodium"
+opencrypto/cbc_mac.c           optional crypto
+opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c     optional crypto
 rpc/auth_none.c                        optional krpc | nfslockd | nfscl | nfsd
 rpc/auth_unix.c                        optional krpc | nfslockd | nfscl | nfsd
 rpc/authunix_prot.c            optional krpc | nfslockd | nfscl | nfsd

Modified: head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile
==============================================================================
--- head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile    Fri Feb 15 00:29:44 2019        
(r344139)
+++ head/sys/modules/crypto/Makefile    Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019        
(r344140)
@@ -68,5 +68,7 @@ CFLAGS.utils.c                        += -I${LIBSODIUM_INC} 
-I${LIBSODIUM_C
 
 SRCS   += opt_param.h cryptodev_if.h bus_if.h device_if.h
 SRCS   += opt_ddb.h
+SRCS   += cbc_mac.c
+SRCS   += xform_cbc_mac.c
 
 .include <bsd.kmod.mk>

Added: head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null   00:00:00 1970   (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.c       Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019        
(r344140)
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018-2019 iXsystems Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$);
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/endian.h>
+#include <opencrypto/cbc_mac.h>
+#include <opencrypto/xform_auth.h>
+
+/*
+ * Given two CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN blocks, xor
+ * them into dst, and then encrypt dst.
+ */
+static void
+xor_and_encrypt(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx,
+               const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst)
+{
+       const uint64_t *b1;
+       uint64_t *b2;
+       uint64_t temp_block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t)];
+
+       b1 = (const uint64_t*)src;
+       b2 = (uint64_t*)dst;
+
+       for (size_t count = 0;
+            count < CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN/sizeof(uint64_t);
+            count++) {
+               temp_block[count] = b1[count] ^ b2[count];
+       }
+       rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, (void*)temp_block, dst);
+}
+
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Init(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+       bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *key, uint16_t 
klen)
+{
+       ctx->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->keysched, key, klen * 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to set the nonce, aka IV.
+ * Before this call, the authDataLength and cryptDataLength fields
+ * MUST have been set.  Sadly, there's no way to return an error.
+ *
+ * The CBC-MAC algorithm requires that the first block contain the
+ * nonce, as well as information about the sizes and lengths involved.
+ */
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *nonce, uint16_t 
nonceLen)
+{
+       uint8_t b0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
+       uint8_t *bp = b0, flags = 0;
+       uint8_t L = 0;
+       uint64_t dataLength = ctx->cryptDataLength;
+       
+       KASSERT(ctx->authDataLength != 0 || ctx->cryptDataLength != 0,
+           ("Auth Data and Data lengths cannot both be 0"));
+
+       KASSERT(nonceLen >= 7 && nonceLen <= 13,
+           ("nonceLen must be between 7 and 13 bytes"));
+
+       ctx->nonce = nonce;
+       ctx->nonceLength = nonceLen;
+       
+       ctx->authDataCount = 0;
+       ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+       explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+       
+       /*
+        * Need to determine the L field value.  This is the number of
+        * bytes needed to specify the length of the message; the length
+        * is whatever is left in the 16 bytes after specifying flags and
+        * the nonce.
+        */
+       L = 15 - nonceLen;
+       
+       flags = ((ctx->authDataLength > 0) << 6) +
+           (((AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN - 2) / 2) << 3) +
+           L - 1;
+       /*
+        * Now we need to set up the first block, which has flags, nonce,
+        * and the message length.
+        */
+       b0[0] = flags;
+       bcopy(nonce, b0 + 1, nonceLen);
+       bp = b0 + 1 + nonceLen;
+
+       /* Need to copy L' [aka L-1] bytes of cryptDataLength */
+       for (uint8_t *dst = b0 + sizeof(b0) - 1; dst >= bp; dst--) {
+               *dst = dataLength;
+               dataLength >>= 8;
+       }
+       /* Now need to encrypt b0 */
+       rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, b0, ctx->block);
+       /* If there is auth data, we need to set up the staging block */
+       if (ctx->authDataLength) {
+               if (ctx->authDataLength < ((1<<16) - (1<<8))) {
+                       uint16_t sizeVal = htobe16(ctx->authDataLength);
+                       bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block, sizeof(sizeVal));
+                       ctx->blockIndex = sizeof(sizeVal);
+               } else if (ctx->authDataLength < (1UL<<32)) {
+                       uint32_t sizeVal = htobe32(ctx->authDataLength);
+                       ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff;
+                       ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xfe;
+                       bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal));
+                       ctx->blockIndex = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal);
+               } else {
+                       uint64_t sizeVal = htobe64(ctx->authDataLength);
+                       ctx->staging_block[0] = 0xff;
+                       ctx->staging_block[1] = 0xff;
+                       bcopy(&sizeVal, ctx->staging_block+2, sizeof(sizeVal));
+                       ctx->blockIndex = 2 + sizeof(sizeVal);
+               }
+       }
+}
+
+int
+AES_CBC_MAC_Update(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx, const uint8_t *data,
+    uint16_t length)
+{
+       size_t copy_amt;
+       
+       /*
+        * This will be called in one of two phases:
+        * (1)  Applying authentication data, or
+        * (2)  Applying the payload data.
+        *
+        * Because CBC-MAC puts the authentication data size before the
+        * data, subsequent calls won't be block-size-aligned.  Which
+        * complicates things a fair bit.
+        *
+        * The payload data doesn't have that problem.
+        */
+                               
+       if (ctx->authDataCount < ctx->authDataLength) {
+               /*
+                * We need to process data as authentication data.
+                * Since we may be out of sync, we may also need
+                * to pad out the staging block.
+                */
+               const uint8_t *ptr = data;
+               while (length > 0) {
+
+                       copy_amt = MIN(length,
+                           sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex);
+
+                       bcopy(ptr, ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex,
+                           copy_amt);
+                       ptr += copy_amt;
+                       length -= copy_amt;
+                       ctx->authDataCount += copy_amt;
+                       ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt;
+                       ctx->blockIndex %= sizeof(ctx->staging_block);
+                       if (ctx->authDataCount == ctx->authDataLength)
+                               length = 0;
+                       if (ctx->blockIndex == 0 ||
+                           ctx->authDataCount >= ctx->authDataLength) {
+                               /*
+                                * We're done with this block, so we
+                                * xor staging_block with block, and then
+                                * encrypt it.
+                                */
+                               xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, 
ctx->block);
+                               bzero(ctx->staging_block, 
sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+                               ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+                       }
+               }
+               return (0);
+       }
+       /*
+        * If we're here, then we're encoding payload data.
+        * This is marginally easier, except that _Update can
+        * be called with non-aligned update lengths. As a result,
+        * we still need to use the staging block.
+        */
+       KASSERT((length + ctx->cryptDataCount) <= ctx->cryptDataLength,
+           ("More encryption data than allowed"));
+
+       while (length) {
+               uint8_t *ptr;
+               
+               copy_amt = MIN(sizeof(ctx->staging_block) - ctx->blockIndex,
+                   length);
+               ptr = ctx->staging_block + ctx->blockIndex;
+               bcopy(data, ptr, copy_amt);
+               data += copy_amt;
+               ctx->blockIndex += copy_amt;
+               ctx->cryptDataCount += copy_amt;
+               length -= copy_amt;
+               if (ctx->blockIndex == sizeof(ctx->staging_block)) {
+                       /* We've got a full block */
+                       xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
+                       ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+                       bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+               }
+       }
+       return (0);
+}
+
+void
+AES_CBC_MAC_Final(uint8_t *buf, struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+       uint8_t s0[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
+       
+       /*
+        * We first need to check to see if we've got any data
+        * left over to encrypt.
+        */
+       if (ctx->blockIndex != 0) {
+               xor_and_encrypt(ctx, ctx->staging_block, ctx->block);
+               ctx->cryptDataCount += ctx->blockIndex;
+               ctx->blockIndex = 0;
+               explicit_bzero(ctx->staging_block, sizeof(ctx->staging_block));
+       }
+       bzero(s0, sizeof(s0));
+       s0[0] = (15 - ctx->nonceLength) - 1;
+       bcopy(ctx->nonce, s0 + 1, ctx->nonceLength);
+       rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->keysched, ctx->rounds, s0, s0);
+       for (size_t indx = 0; indx < AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN; indx++)
+               buf[indx] = ctx->block[indx] ^ s0[indx];
+       explicit_bzero(s0, sizeof(s0));
+}

Added: head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null   00:00:00 1970   (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/sys/opencrypto/cbc_mac.h       Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019        
(r344140)
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 The FreeBSD Foundation
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, iXsystems Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed by Sean Eric Fagan, with lots of references
+ * to existing AES-CCM (gmac) code.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1.  Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2.  Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *     notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *     documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *     $FreeBSD$
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CBC_CCM_H
+# define _CBC_CCM_H
+
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h>
+
+# define CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN     16      /* 128 bits */
+# define CCM_CBC_MAX_DIGEST_LEN        16
+# define CCM_CBC_MIN_DIGEST_LEN        4
+
+/*
+ * This is the authentication context structure;
+ * the encryption one is similar.
+ */
+struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx {
+       uint64_t        authDataLength, authDataCount;
+       uint64_t        cryptDataLength, cryptDataCount;
+       int             blockIndex;
+       uint8_t         staging_block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
+       uint8_t         block[CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN];
+       const uint8_t   *nonce;
+       int             nonceLength;    /* This one is in bytes, not bits! */
+       /* AES state data */
+       int             rounds;
+       uint32_t        keysched[4*(RIJNDAEL_MAXNR+1)];
+};
+
+void AES_CBC_MAC_Init(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *);
+void AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t);
+void AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t);
+int AES_CBC_MAC_Update(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *, const uint8_t *, uint16_t);
+void AES_CBC_MAC_Final(uint8_t *, struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx *);
+
+#endif /* _CBC_CCM_H */

Modified: head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h
==============================================================================
--- head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h     Fri Feb 15 00:29:44 2019        
(r344139)
+++ head/sys/opencrypto/cryptodev.h     Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019        
(r344140)
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@
 #define        SHA1_KPDK_HASH_LEN      20
 #define        AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN       16
 #define        POLY1305_HASH_LEN       16
+#define        AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN    16
 /* Maximum hash algorithm result length */
 #define        HASH_MAX_LEN            SHA2_512_HASH_LEN /* Keep this updated 
*/
 
@@ -107,6 +108,9 @@
 #define        AES_128_GMAC_KEY_LEN            16
 #define        AES_192_GMAC_KEY_LEN            24
 #define        AES_256_GMAC_KEY_LEN            32
+#define        AES_128_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN         16
+#define        AES_192_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN         24
+#define        AES_256_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN         32
 
 #define        POLY1305_KEY_LEN                32
 
@@ -199,7 +203,8 @@
 #define        CRYPTO_SHA2_384         36
 #define        CRYPTO_SHA2_512         37
 #define        CRYPTO_POLY1305         38
-#define        CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX    38 /* Keep updated - see below */
+#define        CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC  39      /* auth side */
+#define        CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX    39 /* Keep updated - see below */
 
 #define        CRYPTO_ALGO_VALID(x)    ((x) >= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MIN && \
                                 (x) <= CRYPTO_ALGORITHM_MAX)

Added: head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c
==============================================================================
--- /dev/null   00:00:00 1970   (empty, because file is newly added)
+++ head/sys/opencrypto/xform_cbc_mac.c Fri Feb 15 03:46:39 2019        
(r344140)
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
+
+#include <opencrypto/cbc_mac.h>
+#include <opencrypto/xform_auth.h>
+
+/* Authentication instances */
+struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_128 = {
+       .type = CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC,
+       .name = "CBC-CCM-AES-128",
+       .keysize = AES_128_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN,
+       .hashsize = AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN,
+       .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx),
+       .blocksize = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN,
+       .Init = (void (*)(void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Init,
+       .Setkey =
+           (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t))AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey,
+       .Reinit =
+           (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit,
+       .Update =
+           (int  (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Update,
+       .Final = (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Final,
+};
+struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_192 = {
+       .type = CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC,
+       .name = "CBC-CCM-AES-192",
+       .keysize = AES_192_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN,
+       .hashsize = AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN,
+       .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx),
+       .blocksize = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN,
+       .Init = (void (*)(void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Init,
+       .Setkey =
+           (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey,
+       .Reinit =
+           (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit,
+       .Update =
+           (int  (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Update,
+       .Final = (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Final,
+};
+struct auth_hash auth_hash_ccm_cbc_mac_256 = {
+       .type = CRYPTO_AES_CCM_CBC_MAC,
+       .name = "CBC-CCM-AES-256",
+       .keysize = AES_256_CBC_MAC_KEY_LEN,
+       .hashsize = AES_CBC_MAC_HASH_LEN,
+       .ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_cbc_mac_ctx),
+       .blocksize = CCM_CBC_BLOCK_LEN,
+       .Init = (void (*)(void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Init,
+       .Setkey =
+           (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Setkey,
+       .Reinit =
+           (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Reinit,
+       .Update =
+           (int  (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t)) AES_CBC_MAC_Update,
+       .Final = (void (*)(u_int8_t *, void *)) AES_CBC_MAC_Final,
+};
_______________________________________________
svn-src-all@freebsd.org mailing list
https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/svn-src-all
To unsubscribe, send any mail to "svn-src-all-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"

Reply via email to