You can keep these poor security modes in your downstream product if you want, but don't put them in the tree.
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 8:28 AM, Simon J. Gerraty <s...@juniper.net> wrote: > Benjamin Kaduk <bjkf...@gmail.com> wrote: >> With all due respect, NIST is hardly the sole authority on this topic. > > True, unless of course you sell to US govt. > >> With my IETF Security Area Director hat on, any greenfield proposal coming >> in >> to the IESG that included sha1 support would get extremely strong pushback, >> and I don't expect that "reducing boot time" would be seen as sufficiently >> compelling. > > Well that's unfortunate, because reality (and sales teams) can be a > pain. The number of customers who would trade boot time for improved > security is depressingly small. > _______________________________________________ svn-src-head@freebsd.org mailing list https://lists.freebsd.org/mailman/listinfo/svn-src-head To unsubscribe, send any mail to "svn-src-head-unsubscr...@freebsd.org"
