> well, technically, they (UCEProtect) are correct.

Sure, if I shoehorn my own rules, I can almost guarantee that _I_ will be 
compliant.
That doesn't make them any more relevant though.

> If an IP sends a mail with the From: header indicating a domain for 
> which an SPF record exists, and the sending IP is not supposed to send 
> it, then it is a misconfiguration and that IP should not be trying to 
> send such a mail at all.

But SPF is supposed to be applied to the SMTP envelope address, NOT whatever 
happens to be put into any header lines... For headers you got your other 
voodoo,
like DKIM. And I'm also not so sure that this is a misconfiguration, since that 
would assume I'd give SPF the same kind of authority as I give basic SMTP 
relaying, 
which I don't. I'll repeat myself: SPF is broken by design.

But, I'll actually consider putting in an option into our mail configuration 
pannels,
that lets customers who are forwarding mail to 3rd party servers, reject 
inbound mails
if their forwarding would violate the sender policy. After all, it's our 
customers who
pay us to handle their mail, not external mail senders, and thus customers 
should have
the last word in this decision. Given though how many mail delivery errors 
never make
it back to the sender, I wonder if this added complexity would really be 
beneficial.
My gut feeling is: nope.

The reply of UCEProtect fits my impression I got of them, and it confirms to me 
that
I can't take them seriously. I'll let them throw tantrums in their playpen and 
move on.

Cheers,
Markus


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