Greetings all, Next Monday, August 25 1.00-2.30 in the philosophy common room our own Nick Smith will give a paper 'Subjective Probabilities, Degrees of Belief and Degrees of Truth'.
Abstract A number of authors have noted that if we have degrees of truth, then we should have corresponding degrees of belief---but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief? I argue that we cannot coherently do so, and present instead a formal framework in which there is a single notion of degree of belief, which in certain circumstances behaves like a subjective probability assignment, and in other circumstances does not. The framework is surprisingly neat and uncomplicated, and affords a clear picture of the relationship between subjective probabilities, degrees of truth and degrees of belief. See you all there.... Dr. Kristie Miller Australian Research Council Post-doctoral Fellow School of Philosophical and Historical Inquiry and The Centre for Time The University of Sydney Sydney, Australia Room 411, A18 Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Ph: (work) 02 9036 9663 Ph: (mobile) 0432 275 286 http://homepage.mac.com/centre.for.time/KristieMiller/Kristie/Home%20Page.html _______________________________________________ SydPhil mailing list [email protected] List Info: http://lists.arts.usyd.edu.au/mailman/listinfo/sydphil NEW LIST ARCHIVE: http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/
