Dear philosophers,
the next HPS Research Seminar will be held this coming Monday, Oct. 27, at 6pm in Carslaw 450, the Faculty of Science meeting room. Are delusions beliefs? Lisa Bortolotti Philosophy, University of Birmingham and MACCS, Macquarie University Some philosophers argue that delusions are doxastic states, and that for all relevant purposes we should treat them as beliefs. Others deny that delusions are beliefs, and propose alternative analyses. For instance, they argue that delusions are acts of imagination instead, or empty speech acts with no intentional content. One popular objection to the doxastic account derives from the application of the rationality constraint on belief ascription to the case of delusions. If delusions are irrational (in the relevant sense), then they cannot be beliefs. I shall consider three examples of this strategy, and argue that they are not successful. However, I shall suggest that there is a serious threat to the doxastic account of some delusions which derives from considerations about ownership and authorship of thoughts. All are welcome! Dominic Murphy Unit for History and Philosophy of Science Carslaw FO7, University of Sydney NSW 2006 Australia
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