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Title: Carlo Martini
A puzzle about belief updating
Abstract:
Recent epistemological literature has been concerned with the problem of
disagreement and it counterpart, consensus. According to most of that
literature disagreement constitutes evidence, on the basis of which one
should change her beliefs accordingly. Some authors have argued that
disagreement is impossible under certain conditions (Aumann, 1976; Lehrer
1976; Lehrer and Wagner, 1981). Several other authors have, more recently,
advocated weaker possibility-of-agreement claims: among many, the
split-the-difference view (Elga, 2007) and the Hegselmann-Krause theory of
consensus (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002).
There has been little analysis, however, about the meaning of consensus,
whether consensus is possible at all from an externalist or an internalist
point of view, and about the difference between consensus and compromise,
with the exception of the analyses in Regan, Colyvan and
Markovchick-Nicholls (2006) and Steele et al. (2007). In this paper I
attempt an analysis of the core issues concerning disagreement and its
counterpart, consensus, from the point of view belief updating.
I show that, under very reasonable requirements for belief updating (see
Dietrich and List, forthcoming), disagreement turns out to be an impossible
outcome, at least from an internalist perspective. The only viable
externalist route, however, cannot truly be called a consensus, but rather
a compromise. In other words, there cannot be what Lehrer (1976) calls
rational consensus. Moreover, the analysis and results from the argument
raise a puzzle about belief updating, namely, the fact that we cannot
update our belief on the basis of an external source of evidence such as
disagreement. This latter result is in contrast with a certain version of
epistemic voluntarism (see van Fraassen 1984).
When: Mon Aug 2 1pm – 2:30pm Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: University of Sydney philosophy common room
Calendar: Current Projects
Who:
* [email protected] - creator
Event details:
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