This is a reminder for:
Title: Alison Fernandes
Realism, Response-Dependence and the Importance of Epistemology
In a series of papers beginning with ‘Realism and Response-Dependence’
(1991), Philip Pettit argues that a plausible account of
response-dependence is in fact compatible with realism. Acknowledging that
many of our concepts are tied closely to our responses does not compromise
the core tenets of realism. After considering Pettit’s account of realism,
I will distinguish three different strategies he could use to achieve this
aim. I will argue that the first two strategies fail, because they make the
compatibility with realism too easy—even concepts that are not responsive
to the world come out as realist. I will argue that the third strategy
succeeds, but that it involves recasting realism as an epistemic rather
than metaphysical thesis.
When: Mon Aug 9 1pm – 2:30pm Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: University of Sydney philosophy common room
Calendar: Current Projects
Who:
* [email protected] - creator
Event details:
https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzZwMTM4aDFuNmgzNDZiYTQ4Z3FqZWI5azcxMGs2YjlvOGNxamliOW44Y3NqY2M5bzZnbzNpZDIzNjggZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw
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