This is a reminder for:
Title: Chris Pinnock
Mathematical Knowledge is A Priori, Though Not Conceptual
Jenkins has recently argued that mathematical concepts must be properly
grounded if they are to provide the basis for a priori knowledge of
mathematics. She uses this argument to undermine Peacocke’s account of a
priori knowledge in mathematics. After reviewing this argument, I explain
how it involves the claim that the evidence for our mathematical beliefs is
conceptual. I then develop an alternative approach which allows for
evidence for mathematical beliefs which is a priori, but not based on
features of our mathematical concepts. A central instance of this sort of
evidence is explanatory power. Inference to the best explanation within
pure mathematics permits mathematicians to extend their knowledge to new
domains or to arrive at the appropriate setting for a traditional domain.
When: Mon Aug 23 1pm – 2:30pm Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: University of Sydney philosophy common room
Calendar: Current Projects
Who:
* [email protected] - creator
Event details:
https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=XzZrcTQ4ZHExNnAzNGFiYTQ4OHAzaWI5azg4bzNlYmExNjRvamFiYTM4ZDJqMmhhNjYwcDNlY3BsODggZmV2MWxkcjRsa2h2MDM2b2U0aW4yanR0ZGdAZw
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