This is a reminder for:

Title: Patrice Philie
Pre-talk at 2PM in the Philosophy Common Room. All honours and graduate students are expected to attend the pre-talk; all others are welcome.

Title: McDowell and Wittgenstein on Content.

Abstract: The notion of content figures at the heart of John McDowell’s account of intentionality, as discussed, for instance, in his Woodbridge Lectures. This presentation aims at gaining a better understanding of McDowell’s account of intentionality by comparing McDowell’s notion of content with that of the later Wittgenstein. This comparison should, in addition, uncover some perplexing problems in McDowell’s account of intentionality. I will proceed as follows: after characterising McDowell’s notion of content, the relevance of mental states for explaining content will be discussed. This will allow us to evaluate the status of a philosophy of mind in McDowell and to point to a tension between his claim to be engaged in a ‘quietist’ enterprise and what he actually seems to be doing, if my analysis is correct. An attempt to find the roots of this tension concludes the presentation.


When: Wed Sep 15 3:30pm – 5:30pm Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: The Refectory
Calendar: Seminars
Who:
    * [email protected] - creator

Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NnR1YmFrcm1yaDhiZ2FzaW5qMHZocGc4cDQgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw

Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/

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