This is a reminder for:
Title: Matthew Chrisman
Ought and Must
Ethical theorists (normative ethicists, applied ethicists, metaethicists,
and even deontic logicians) tend to assume that the word 'ought' indicates
a moral obligation or duty of some sort or another. However, this practice
is problematic for three related reasons. First, in many ordinary moral
contexts, ‘ought’ is used to indicate something which is in some way
favored by morality but which may still fall short of a duty or obligation.
Second, ethical theory has all but ignored all of the non-moral uses of
‘ought’. Third, in all of its uses, ‘ought’ is intuitively weaker than
correlative uses of ‘must’. There is almost no attempt at a systematic
explanation of the semantic difference between 'ought' and 'must' in
ethical theory.
Theoretical semanticists (such as Kratzer, von Fintel and Iatridou,
Portner, and Hacquard) are, in my opinion, on the right track for
explaining the semantic difference between these terms by classifying both
of them as modal verbs and then seeking to explain all of their different
“flavors” as contextually determined projections of some semantic core.
However, when we bring these semantic ideas about modal auxiliaries into
contact with the way 'ought' is used in ethical theory, I believe we
continue to lack a compelling explanation of the general semantic
distinction between ‘ought’ and ‘must’.
In this paper, a relatively simple account of the semantic difference
between ‘ought’ and ‘must’ is floated. This account turns on the
difference between recommendations and requirements; and it is interactive
both with metaethical debate about the meaning of normative terms and the
semantic debate about the representation of the content of modal
auxiliaries.
When: Mon Mar 7 1pm – 2:30pm Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: University of Sydney philosophy common room
Calendar: Current Projects
Who:
* [email protected] - creator
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