This is a reminder for:
Title: PG WIP: Emma Wood
USYD Philosophy Postgraduate Work-in-Progress Seminar
Emma Wood: 'Against Joyce’s Moral Error Theory'
ABSTRACT:
Error theory about morality, put simply, is the view that moral
obligations, facts, or properties do not exist. In this presentation I
discuss a most recent and influential argument for moral error theory: that
of Richard Joyce’s presented in The Myth of Morality. Joyce argues that
belief in the existence of moral obligations (the belief that one can be
under a moral obligation) commits us to belief in strong categorical
imperatives: imperatives which give us all-things-considered reasons for
action that are independent of our desires, interests, or motivational
set. Joyce argues that little sense can be made of reasons of this kind,
and concludes therefore that moral obligations do not exist (one is never
under a moral obligation).
There are two main ways of objecting to Joyce’s argument. One can disagree
with the first stage of Joyce’s argument, and maintain that belief in moral
obligations need not commit us to belief in strong categorical
imperatives. Or one can object to the second stage of Joyce’s argument and
defend the legitimacy of strong categorical imperatives as providing real
reasons for action. In my paper, I opt for the former route and take
Foot’s view that moral imperatives are weak categorical imperatives, not
strong categorical imperatives. Importantly, and in contrast to Joyce, I
argue that conceiving of moral imperatives as weak categorical imperatives
does not sacrifice or render unfounded the essential ‘inescapability’ of
moral imperatives, nor their forcefulness or felt ‘authority’.
The aim of this paper is to show that Joyce’s argument gives insufficient
grounds for a moral error theory.
Everyone is welcome to attend.
If you would like to present or require further information, please contact
Nick Malpas at [email protected]
The format is 30 minutes for presentations followed by 1 hour of
discussion. Since the primary aim of this seminar is to generate
discussion, presentations need not be particularly polished or formal.
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When: Mon Mar 14 3:30pm – 5pm Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: Philosophy Common Room (Main Quad, University of Sydney)
Calendar: Postgraduate Events
Who:
* [email protected] - creator
Event details:
https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NWx2Z2M5OGQydW44ODRiMGc3ZXA3aDY0M2MgMmJlcm9za3ZqcjJnMjRyam50cWxxZWdzNm9AZw
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