Thursday November 7 2013 Robert Mclaughlin Minds, Bats and Nagel's Dualism
A central issue in the philosophy of mind is whether a complete account of mental processes, consciousness in particular, could be given in terms of physical processes This reductionist program or 'physicalism' has enjoyed considerable currency among philosophers in recent times. In "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", Thomas Nagel advanced an iconoclastic argument purporting to refute physicalism. As he put it, there is something about an organism's having conscious experience -which he called the 'subjective character of experience' which is distinct from the 'objective' matters with which physical science deals. The 'subjective' cannot be reduced to the 'objective'. If Nagel is right, reductionist programs aimed at giving a complete account in terms of 'the physical' are doomed from the outset..But is he right? Robert McLaughlin. was a member of the philosophy department at Macquarie University for some thirty years working mainly in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. He now teaches courses at Sydney University and the WEA Peter Bowden ( Dr.) [email protected] [Ed.} <http://www.tup.net.au/publications-new/Applied_Ethics.aspx> Applied Ethics <http://www.tup.net.au/publications-new/Applied_Ethics.aspx> http://www.tup.net.au/publications-new/Applied_Ethics.aspx
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