This is a reminder for:
Title: Paul Redding, Sydney
"Hegel's weakly inferentialist, pluralist logic"
With his "inferentialist" approach to semantics, Robert Brandom has shed
light on one dimension of Hegel's strangely sounding claim that the
syllogism is the "truth" of the judgment: we cannot have a conception of
what is actually said in a judgment without understanding its relations to
other judgments in patterns of inference. In this paper I argue that on
examination Hegel's inferentialism is weaker than Brandom's own, in that
for Hegel inferential relations are necessary but not sufficient for a
judgment to have content. This in turn, I suggest, is linked to the
pluralist nature of his logic--that is, that Hegel employs two distinct
senses of logical consequence. Finally, I suggest an alternative way of
thinking of the dynamics of Hegel's logic by weakening what Brandom
discusses in terms of the notion of "doxastic commitment" to include the
role of the attitude of presupposition.
When: Wed 17 Sep 2014 15:30 - 17:00 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: Muniment Room, Main Quad, Univ of Sydney
Calendar: Seminars
Who:
* Dalia Nassar- creator
Event details:
https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=dGRmZGQzZmdua2k4cWdvcWxzNmY2ajFkdnMgMm1lN2M3ZnIzb21wbDRyaHZrcG1sYTUzNjhAZw
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