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Title: William Dunaway, Michigan
Two Routes to Constructivist Knowledge
Constructivism constitutes a distinctive thesis about the nature of
normative facts. Roughly, what is distinctive about it is the claim that
the facts about what we ought to do, what is wrong, or what is just, are
grounded in facts about what we would believe or accept if we were to
reflect appropriately. This is a metaphysical thesis. Constructivists often
advertise their view as one which enjoys certain epistemological benefits.
It has been said that only constructivism explains why moral beliefs
survive evolutionary debunking, or can be retained in the face of
disagreement, among other things. This paper asks the question of whether
the Constructivist metaphysics supports these epistemological claims. I
first consider two arguments for an affirmative answer to this question,
which I call the Closure and Constitution Arguments. Given a natural set of
assumptions, both arguments fail. Then I close by exploring whether the
Closure and Constitution arguments might be supplemented with additional
assumptions to yield a non-trivial case that knowledge of the normative is
possible according to Constructivism.
When: Wed 25 Mar 2015 13:00 - 14:30 Eastern Time - Melbourne, Sydney
Where: Muniment Room, Main Quad, Univ of Sydney
Calendar: Seminars
Who:
* Dalia Nassar- creator
Event details:
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