[https://gallery.mailchimp.com/ce2b24ac496198804ce9e22c5/images/d0fa81eb-1916-4dc3-9f0d-8b71c5c93ba0.jpg] Layers of Collective Intentionality: From the Genus to the Species (and back) Hosted by the School of Humanities & Languages (Philosophy) Abstract: There are many forms of shared activity, e.g. those pursued by informal groups spontaneously, actions performed by highly coordinated dyads of individuals in face-to-face situations, and institutional actions spread cross individuals in space and time. Following some recent accounts of shared intentionality, in the first part of the talk, I argue that the ‘sharedness’ in shared intentionality is best exemplified in cases of joint action informed by joint practical reasoning, in which agents deliberate together about the best means to pursue an action and then act upon such deliberation. I argue that joint activities of the relevant sort share a normative structure given by practical, means-end structures, that are commonly known by plural agents ‘we’. By analyzing a larger set of examples of shared activities, I argue that these structures are exemplified in various different species of joint activity when no explicit deliberation is involved. Those range from intersubjective spontaneous coordinated activities that involve mutual tracking, mutual responses and mutual attunement - joint improvised dance falls under this category - to more complex joint activities as the ones scaffolded by instructions or specialized background knowledge and social norms and institutions, e.g. when playing chess, paying a check at the Bank Cashier, or driving through a crowded street. I propose a methodology that allows to capture the key elements of shared intentionality, while leaving room to include under these characterizations cases that do not exhibit some of the features of the core instances or do so only in an approximate manner. In the second part of the talk I argue that these ‘species' can be thought to unfold in ontogeny and phylogeny, providing a graded account of evolving collective intentionality that breaks into several developmental stages. Bio: Glenda Satne is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong. She specializes in Philosophy of Mind and Social Ontology, especially on questions regarding Collective Intentionality, the Second-Person, Normativity and the role played by culture in human evolution. https://scholars.uow.edu.au/display/glenda_satne [cid:[email protected]] Speaker: Glenda Satne, University of Wollongong Event Details: Tuesday, 2 July 2019 12:30 – 2:00 pm Room 209, Morven Brown Kensington Campus, UNSW No RSVP required. Map reference: C20<http://fmtoolbox.unsw.edu.au/comms/KensingtonCampus.pdf> Contact: Heikki Ikaheimo e: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> UNSW Arts & Social Sciences UNSW Sydney, NSW 2052 Australia arts.unsw.edu.au<https://www.arts.unsw.edu.au/> CRICOS Provider Code 00098G, ABN 57 195 873 179 [Facebook]<https://www.facebook.com/UNSWArtsandSocialSciences> [Twitter]<https://twitter.com/UNSWArts> [Linked In]<https://www.linkedin.com/groups/7071691>
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