Hi everyone, This week there will be two talks in the University of Sydney Philosophy Seminar Series, one on Wednesday July 31, and another on Thursday Aug 1.
--- Wednesday’s speaker is Sukaina Hirji, (University of Pennsylvania) The title of Sukaina’s talk is "Resentment and Repair". Here is an abstract for the talk: Sometimes when we forgive someone who has hurt us, it is because we have good reasons to change our outlook on the wrongdoer. Perhaps the person who wronged us offered a sincere apology, they found a way to make amends or, we have decided, they have suffered enough. The person who wronged us has done something to make things right. Other times, when we forgive someone, it feels more like a gift, something we offer freely, without judging that the wrongdoer has earned it. Maybe we are tired of being burdened by our anger, or we believe in unconditional love and kindness, or we have simply ceased to care about the offense. In this paper, I articulate one way that we give up our resentment against someone who has hurt us that does not fit either of these models. The argument will have consequences for thinking about when we ought to forgive, and more generally, for thinking about the limits of Strawson’s participant stance as it has been traditionally conceived. The seminar will take place at 3:30pm on Wednesday July 31 in the Philosophy Seminar Room (N494). --- Thursday’s speaker is David Enoch, (Oxford and Hebrew University of Jerusalem) The title of David’s talk is "Why isn’t (purely) epistemic autonomy of value?". Here is an abstract for the talk: In the practical domain, there are some decisions such that it’s more important that the agent make them herself than that they make the best decision. (Think, for instance, about choosing a romantic partner). In such cases, it seems like a rational agent may insist on making the decision themselves, fully recognizing that if they let someone else decide for them, the decision may be (otherwise) better. In the epistemic case, though, there doesn’t seem to be an analogue of this phenomenon. If I wonder whether p; it seems to me when I consider the first-order evidence that p; but I recognize that my chances of getting to a true belief regarding p are much higher if I rely on you instead; and you say that not-p – well, in such a case it seems a belief in p is never epistemically justified. This paper is my (tentative, and not systematic) attempt to think through this disanalogy between the role of autonomy in the epistemic and practical domain. The seminar will take place at 3:30pm on Thursday Aug 1 in the Philosophy Seminar Room (N494). --- Enquiries about the seminar series can be directed to ryan....@sydney.edu.au Ryan Cox Associate Lecturer in Philosophy Discipline of Philosophy School of Humanities University of Sydney ryan....@sydney.edu.au
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