On Tue, 08.10.13 22:29, Schaufler, Casey (casey.schauf...@intel.com) wrote:
> > On Mon, 07.10.13 10:30, Kok, Auke-jan H (auke-jan.h....@intel.com) wrote: > > > > > > Hi, > > > > the patches look OK. I dont' have a system with smack support at > > > > hand, but I tested them on Fedora, and didn't notice any adverse > > > > effects. > > > > I you've tested them with smack, then they should be applied, imo. > > > > > > Thanks, I just applied them myself - I just wanted to give folks a bit > > > of time to read and test - so thanks for doing so! > > > > Hmm, the patches as they are merged now try to mount the SMACK version > > of /run and /dev/shm also in containers. Will this work? > > So long as the cgroup filesystem propagates the xattrs to and from the real > filesystem it won't be a problem. If the cgroup filesystem is not doing that > there will be a problem. I can't parse this. > > So far (at least for SELinux) we tried to turn off all security layers in > > containers, since the policies are not virtualized. > > I don't know what you mean by "virtualized" in this context. Well, unlike for example the PID namespace stuff where the PIDs are virtualized there is no scheme where the SMACK enforcement could be virtualized, so that an OS container could install its own SMACK policy, and so that SMACK labels from the container are different things even though they share the same name with labels from the host. (I mean, I am not saying this would be even desirable...) Lennart -- Lennart Poettering - Red Hat, Inc. _______________________________________________ systemd-devel mailing list systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
