On Sun, 18.05.14 15:49, Nis Martensen (nis.marten...@web.de) wrote:
> The spelling police is on guard :)
>
> Patch attached.
Thanks! Applied!
> >From 935238b9af1580464b95021a2bddc55036984546 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Nis Martensen <nis.marten...@web.de>
> Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 15:43:18 +0200
> Subject: [PATCH] fix spelling of privilege
>
> ---
> NEWS | 2 +-
> README | 2 +-
> man/systemd.exec.xml | 2 +-
> src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4 | 2 +-
> src/core/load-fragment.c | 2 +-
> src/core/load-fragment.h | 2 +-
> src/nspawn/nspawn.c | 2 +-
> src/systemctl/systemctl.c | 2 +-
> src/timesync/timesyncd.c | 6 +++---
> 9 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
> index f90d7f8..cee62b1 100644
> --- a/NEWS
> +++ b/NEWS
> @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ CHANGES WITH 211:
> directory's lifetime is bound to the daemon runtime and that
> the daemon starts up with an empty directory each time. This
> is particularly useful when writing services that drop
> - priviliges using the User= or Group= setting.
> + privileges using the User= or Group= setting.
>
> * The DeviceAllow= unit setting now supports globbing for
> matching against device group names.
> diff --git a/README b/README
> index 4e2f996..0031fac 100644
> --- a/README
> +++ b/README
> @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ USERS AND GROUPS:
>
> The NTP daemon requires the "systemd-timesync" system user and
> group to exist. During execution this network facing service
> - will drop priviliges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
> + will drop privileges (with the exception of CAP_SYS_TIME) and
> assume this uid/gid for security reasons.
>
> WARNINGS:
> diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
> index 22f0768..3f27d13 100644
> --- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
> +++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
> @@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@
> <literal>/</literal>, i.e. must refer
> to simple directories to create or
> remove. This is particularly useful
> - for unpriviliges daemons that cannot
> + for unprivileged daemons that cannot
> create runtime directories in
> <filename>/run</filename> due to lack
> of privileges, and to make sure the
> diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
> b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
> index 21bccbb..4f8a2dd 100644
> --- a/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
> +++ b/src/core/load-fragment-gperf.gperf.m4
> @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ $1.Capabilities,
> config_parse_exec_capabilities, 0,
> $1.SecureBits, config_parse_exec_secure_bits, 0,
> offsetof($1, exec_context)
> $1.CapabilityBoundingSet, config_parse_bounding_set, 0,
> offsetof($1, exec_context.capability_bounding_set_drop)
> $1.TimerSlackNSec, config_parse_nsec, 0,
> offsetof($1, exec_context.timer_slack_nsec)
> -$1.NoNewPrivileges, config_parse_no_new_priviliges, 0,
> offsetof($1, exec_context)
> +$1.NoNewPrivileges, config_parse_no_new_privileges, 0,
> offsetof($1, exec_context)
> m4_ifdef(`HAVE_SECCOMP',
> `$1.SystemCallFilter, config_parse_syscall_filter, 0,
> offsetof($1, exec_context)
> $1.SystemCallArchitectures, config_parse_syscall_archs, 0,
> offsetof($1, exec_context.syscall_archs)
> diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c
> index 14c194b..25a3905 100644
> --- a/src/core/load-fragment.c
> +++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c
> @@ -3029,7 +3029,7 @@ int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(
> return 0;
> }
>
> -int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(
> +int config_parse_no_new_privileges(
> const char* unit,
> const char *filename,
> unsigned line,
> diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.h b/src/core/load-fragment.h
> index 242fd27..9ef9caa 100644
> --- a/src/core/load-fragment.h
> +++ b/src/core/load-fragment.h
> @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int config_parse_address_families(const char *unit, const
> char *filename, unsign
> int config_parse_runtime_directory(const char *unit, const char *filename,
> unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char
> *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
> int config_parse_set_status(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned
> line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int
> ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
> int config_parse_namespace_path_strv(const char *unit, const char *filename,
> unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char
> *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
> -int config_parse_no_new_priviliges(const char *unit, const char *filename,
> unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char
> *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
> +int config_parse_no_new_privileges(const char *unit, const char *filename,
> unsigned line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char
> *lvalue, int ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
> int config_parse_cpu_quota(const char *unit, const char *filename, unsigned
> line, const char *section, unsigned section_line, const char *lvalue, int
> ltype, const char *rvalue, void *data, void *userdata);
>
> /* gperf prototypes */
> diff --git a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
> index 6be4dca..9d9238f 100644
> --- a/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
> +++ b/src/nspawn/nspawn.c
> @@ -3057,7 +3057,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
> fds = NULL;
>
> /* Wait until the child reported that it is ready with
> - * all it needs to do with priviliges. After we got
> + * all it needs to do with privileges. After we got
> * the notification we can make the process join its
> * cgroup which might limit what it can do */
> eventfd_read(child_ready_fd, &x);
> diff --git a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
> index 6e98c05..a99759f 100644
> --- a/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
> +++ b/src/systemctl/systemctl.c
> @@ -5923,7 +5923,7 @@ static int systemctl_parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[])
> {
>
> case 'r':
> if (geteuid() != 0) {
> - log_error("--recursive requires root
> priviliges.");
> + log_error("--recursive requires root
> privileges.");
> return -EPERM;
> }
>
> diff --git a/src/timesync/timesyncd.c b/src/timesync/timesyncd.c
> index 19e6d67..6e63e34 100644
> --- a/src/timesync/timesyncd.c
> +++ b/src/timesync/timesyncd.c
> @@ -1141,7 +1141,7 @@ static int manager_network_monitor_listen(Manager *m) {
> return 0;
> }
>
> -static int drop_priviliges(void) {
> +static int drop_privileges(void) {
> static const cap_value_t bits[] = {
> CAP_SYS_TIME,
> };
> @@ -1152,7 +1152,7 @@ static int drop_priviliges(void) {
> gid_t gid;
> int r;
>
> - /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilige dropping to PID 1
> + /* Unfortunately we cannot leave privilege dropping to PID 1
> * here, since we want to run as user but want to keep te
> * CAP_SYS_TIME capability. Since file capabilities have been
> * introduced this cannot be done across exec() anymore,
> @@ -1231,7 +1231,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
>
> umask(0022);
>
> - r = drop_priviliges();
> + r = drop_privileges();
> if (r < 0)
> goto out;
>
> _______________________________________________
> systemd-devel mailing list
> systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
> http://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/systemd-devel
Lennart
--
Lennart Poettering, Red Hat
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