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======================================= LAFS Nuts And Bolts Party, 2014-06-02 ======================================= in attendance: Zooko (scribe), Daira, dreid (sort of present) topic: the Heartbleed Detection Patch (#2215 and #2222) https://github.com/tahoe-lafs/tahoe-lafs/blob/b521ff0b33aaa3aff0431ff1944bc3fad4923101/src/allmydata/util/check_pyopenssl.py https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/2222 https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/2215 https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/2215#comment:14 Daira doesn't agree with Zooko that Tahoe-LAFS should ignore OpenSSL version numbers and do solely the active test. She doesn't agree because she doesn't trust the active test to be accurate in both no-false-positives and no-false-negatives directions. In particular, the current test code, run against the current OpenSSL (v1.0.1g) from her Debian-derived Linux distro, finds that OpenSSL emits *no* heartbeat responses at all, even in response to well-formed (non-attacking) heartbeat queries. What gives? Did Debian compile heartbeat support out of OpenSSL? Here's some text that Zooko wrote into a potential new README.rst file for the potential new "heartbleed-detector" tool. This text is not (yet‽) true. heartbleed-detector -- see if your pyOpenSSL comes with the heartbleed vulnerability ==================================================================================== heartbleed-detector uses pyOpenSSL to test its openssl implementation for heartbleed. It does this by actually attempting to exploit the heartbleed bug (i.e., it sends 1-byte heartbeat message along with a bogus "payload length = 4096"), so we do not expect it to give false negatives nor false alarms. That is: if it prints out "THIS OPENSSL LIBRARY IS VULNERABLE TO HEARTBLEED." then we are pretty confident that the vulnerability really is present in that particular OpenSSL library (i.e., the OpenSSL library returns a buffer containing more than one byte of data in the payload). If it prints out "This OpenSSL library is not vulnerable to heartbleed.", then we are pretty confident that the vulnerability really is absent from that particular OpenSSL library (i.e. either it ignores the heartbeat request, or it returns a buffer containing exactly one byte of data in the payload). If it doesn't print out either of those things, then there is a different bug, either in heartbleed-detector, in pyOpenSSL, or in OpenSSL, so please open a bug report and paste in whatever traceback or other output it produced. heartbleed-detector has been tested with pyOpenSSL v0.13 and v0.14. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev@tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev
