Yes the "direct onion services" are a very good feature for the Tahoe + Tor combo... especially with regards to how most people would like to use tools like Tahoe-LAFS to transfer largish amounts of data. Furthermore if/when we release Tahoe+Tor integration I'd like to write a short little release note about not abusing the Tor network's resources.
And on a related topic: I hope Tor Project gets the funding they need to fix the Tor hidden services design to provide stronger anonymity guarantees. On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 11:12 PM, meejah <mee...@meejah.ca> wrote: > Brian Warner <war...@lothar.com> writes: > >> But is that.. useful? Safe? You aren't hiding the server's address.. I >> guess you're making life easier for clients who want to come in via Tor >> (we could make them prefer the onion address, and avoid exit nodes), but >> it'd be slower than the usual tor-to-the-public-IP exit-node style. Who >> would it protect? > > .onion addresses are self-authenticating if this helps? > Also, Tor has been talking about "direct onion services" (i.e. non- > hidden "hidden service") and possibly adding support for single-hop > circuits on the service-side (since the server isn't trying to > hide). So, 2 fewer hops. > > See: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2555 > and: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-April/008625.html > > -- > meejah > _______________________________________________ > tahoe-dev mailing list > tahoe-dev@tahoe-lafs.org > https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev@tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev