On 03/25/2012 01:57 PM, Maxim Kammerer wrote: > On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 17:40, intrigeri <intrig...@boum.org> wrote: >>> Could you please share a Privoxy configuration you trust to be safe >>> using with Tor? > > I still don't understand why would anyone trust Tor developers to > correctly configure Privoxy. > E.g., on > https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorFAQ#WhydoweneedPolipoorPrivoxywithTorWhichisbetter: > "it needs to see the entire page to parse it, before sending it on to > the browser". >
The first part of the FAQ is the most important: "Why a HTTP proxy at all?" > This incorrect remark can mean only one thing: whoever wrote that > sentence didn't read the manual. For a decent configuration, see > src/etc/privoxy in Liberté's git, which includes Referer/Host header > rewriting for .exit notation support, for instance. > It's a wiki. Feel free to update it? I looked at your config ( https://github.com/mkdesu/liberte/blob/master/src/etc/privoxy/config ) and it looks like the following: confdir /etc/privoxy logdir /var/log/privoxy actionsfile match-all.action # Actions that are applied to all sites and maybe overruled later on. # Ad-blocking is done in browsers nowadays, and removing # page blocking and content manipulation from Privoxy makes # it more robust (e.g., for cables communication). # actionsfile default.action # Main actions file # actionsfile user.action # User customizations # filterfile default.filter # Main filters file filterfile user.filter # User filters file logfile privoxy.log listen-address 127.0.0.1:8118 toggle 1 enforce-blocks 0 buffer-limit 4096 forward-socks5 / 127.0.0.1:9050 . forward-socks5 check.torproject.org 127.0.0.1:9050 . forward-socks5 torcheck.xenobite.eu 127.0.0.1:9050 . forward-socks5 .onion 127.0.0.1:9050 . forward-socks5 .exit 127.0.0.1:9050 . forward .i2p 127.0.0.1:4444 forward .i2p:443 127.0.0.1:4445 forward *AAAA/ 127.0.0.1:4444 forward *AAAA:443/ 127.0.0.1:4445 forward 127.0.0.1/ . forward localhost/ . forward liberte/ . # forward 192.168.*.*/ . forwarded-connect-retries 2 accept-intercepted-requests 0 keep-alive-timeout 5 socket-timeout 300 # EOF It seems like your config tampers with the requests pretty heavily and the support of .exit should probably be disabled. I also think it is dangerous to support both i2p and Tor with the same privoxy config. It seems like it should be possible to construct a single webpage that attempts to link i2p and Tor usage via HTTP and thus fingerprints the user as using Liberté... No? If I was going to make your config more generic, I'd probably remove the filters to reduce the attack surface and to simply make it an HTTP shim: #Begin confdir /etc/privoxy logdir /var/log/privoxy logfile privoxy.log listen-address 127.0.0.1:8118 toggle 1 enforce-blocks 0 buffer-limit 4096 forward-socks4a / 127.0.0.1:9050 . forward-socks5 / 127.0.0.1:9050 . forward-socks5 .onion 127.0.0.1:9050 . forwarded-connect-retries 2 accept-intercepted-requests 0 keep-alive-timeout 5 socket-timeout 300 #EOF All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ tails-dev mailing list tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev
