On 10/8/14, intrigeri <intrig...@boum.org> wrote: > Jacob Appelbaum wrote (08 Oct 2014 12:19:57 GMT) : >> What are the parameters you'd like to be tested? That is - what would >> count as a bug? Do we have a security model of what should be readable >> by a given app? Or writable by a given app? > > We don't have any such thing specified yet. The idea was to get *some* > minimal AppArmor support in and working first, so this call for > testing is more about whether I broke anything, than about checking > that the AppArmor profiles are actually efficient security-wise. >
Understood. > However, don't hesitate moving forward and trying to escape the > confinement profiles to access things we clearly don't want to allow, > e.g.: > > * none of these applications should be allowed to access files in > ~/.{gnupg,ssh}/ That seems wise - It may make sense to simply say that Pidgin can only open .purple, a network link and so on. The "and so on" part is difficult - how do we deal with sharing files? Do we only allow files from ~/Persistent/Documents/ or from somewhere else? File path based access restrictions are... well, I don't feel great about AppArmor for this kind of stuff. I think will still improve on the status quo though. What happens when there is a hard link? > * especially, file access via alternate paths specific to Debian Live > systems, e.g. > /live/persistence/TailsData_unlocked/{gnupg,openssh-client} > ... should be tested > Ok. I'll give it a spin. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.