intrigeri wrote:
I suppose that they are chosen to be reliable enough for Tor Browser
users outside of Tails. And Tails users being 1% of Tor users [1]
maybe
that's no problem.
In practice, I would bet that you're probably right. Note that we lack
Anyway, the meeting minutes don't make it clear, but this alone wasn't
the only reason why we decided to postpone this topic: security
reasons [1] weighted a lot IIRC, combined with the fact that no good
way to warn users (without scaring them needlessly, and without
teaching them to click through warnings) was proposed yet.
All in all, the whole thing seems hard, problems have been identified
3 months ago, and nobody has showed up to work on solutions since
then, so postponing felt the right thing to do (at least to me).
While this wouldn't solve all concerns, I'd be happy to set up some
obfs3/obfs4 bridges for the Tails default.
best,
Griffin
--
“Sometimes the questions are complicated and the answers are simple.”
― Dr. Seuss
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