Michael English: > Yes, waiting for block confirmations is an easier way to protect against > an out-of-date bitcoin balance than manually connecting to a trusted > onion server. I still hold my opinion that the Electrum networking > settings are the best way to protect against DoS, but it unnecessarily > complicated for little risk. I actually recommended that we document > block confirmations in March of this year when we first installed > Electrum in Tails: > “For my documentation, I already explained the concept of a > double-spending attack to you. In the case of the Electrum DoS attack, > the double-spend would be a 0 confirmation transaction. The solution is > to wait for block confirmations to make sure that you actually have the > money. Remember: 'An SPV node cannot be persuaded that a transaction > exists in a block when the transaction does not in fact exist. The SPV > node establishes the existence of a transaction in a block by > requesting a merkle path proof and by validating the proof of work in > the chain of blocks.'”
I think I remember this from March. But at that time I didn't know that Electrum presented you clearly transactions as unconfirmed or confirmed. I'm not using Electrum myself, so in this case I need a lot of insight and guidance as I can't really figure out things myself. Thanks for your help, and I'm glad we made it in the end! _______________________________________________ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
