Iain Learmonth: > Hi, > > On 20/03/2020 15:30, sajolida wrote: >>> In Tails' threat model it is assumed that adversaries monitor the default >>> bridges provided by the Tor Browser, and that our users want to avoid >>> detection of that, so we are not interested in adding the default bridges >>> to Tails >> >> We're not offering the default bridges in Tails also because it's >> impossible right now to store your bridge configuration in the >> Persistent Storage. > > Maybe I've overlooked something obvious, but could you use Moat? > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/bridgedb.git/tree/README.rst#n391 > > This would use meek to fetch the bridges, but then you have non-default > bridges for the rest of the session. It can be automated as part of the > Tor start-up, but you do need to solve a CAPTCHA.
Nothing is preventing us except more work. :) Essentially, Tails only allows the tor process to talk clearnet as part of its Tor enforcement [1], which makes this a bit trickier than in less locked down environments that Tor Launcher is designed to run from. But it indeed looks like also adding Moat support (and making it the default, I think) is the way for us to go, so thanks for the reminder! :) Cheers! [1] https://tails.boum.org/contribute/design/Tor_enforcement/ _______________________________________________ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
