Dear Tails Dev Team,
I hope this message finds you well. I am writing to seek clarification
regarding the Tor Browser's default homepage setting to redirect users
to the Tails website.
While I understand the importance of providing users with easy access to
resources and support, I have some concerns about the potential risks
associated with this configuration. Specifically, if the Tails website
were ever compromised or taken over, it could potentially serve
malicious content to users, undermining the security and privacy that
Tails aims to provide.
Additionally, I am concerned that every time the Tor Browser is loaded,
it makes a request to the Tails website. If Tails is already pinging the
site for some kind of anonymous telemetry to round up total boots, this
could raise the possibility that the Tor circuit could fingerprint a
Tails user, which would be counterproductive to the privacy goals of the
Tails project.
It would also be greatly beneficial if users utilizing the persistent
storage feature could turn off the homepage, essentially setting it to
the "about:tor" page, similar to the default configuration of the Tor
Browser Bundle (TBB). This would enhance users privacy and security that
are concerned about this by implementing some kind of silder in the
persistent storage settings.
Could you please provide insight into the rationale behind the
redirection to the Tails website and the telemetry feature? What
measures are in place to mitigate the risks associated with both?
Thank you for your attention to this matter. I appreciate your
commitment to user security and look forward to your response.
Best regards,
Dave
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