On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 11:14 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 8, 2015 at 5:03 PM, Stephen Kent <k...@bbn.com> wrote: > > Watson, > > > >> I have two major comments. The draft recapitulates bits and pieces of > >> the TLS 1.3 draft, but it's not clear why this is done instead of > >> citing that draft. I also don't understand what it means to support a > >> bare public key: what exactly is to be done with this key, how is it > >> distinguished from the case of X509 certificate, is there are RFC > >> already defining this feature in TLS 1.2, etc. Similar questions apply > >> to TOFU. > > > > The phrase "bare public key" (or raw public key) refers to a public key > > not embedded in a cert. The term has been used in several IPsec RFCs, > e.g., > > 5386 > > and 6701. The intent is to define a standard way to convey a public key > > w/o any implied authentication. Are you asking for additional > clarification > > for how such keys are used in 1.3? > > Then the sentence containing that phrase should say as in RFC wxyz. I did try to do this. The current text says: "The client MUST also include a ServerCertTypeExtension containing type "Raw Public Key" [RFC7250], " And then later "The server's certificate. If the client offered a "Raw Public Key" type in ServerCertTypeExtension this message SHALL contain a SubjectPublicKeyInfo value for the server's key as specified in [RFC7250]." But maybe it's not explicit enough. I'll try to make it clearer in a future version. If you have a wording suggestion, that might help. > > > > You can look at RFCs 7435 and 7469 for discussions of TOFU. > > I know what TOFU is, but are we going to require host keys to remain > the same eternally to support it? This implication should be drawn > out. Likewise, are we going to disconnect when keys change, or require > a signal to the application, etc This is a good question. I don't really have an answer to this, actually. Generally, TCPINC is intended to work in an unauthenticated setting with authentication left out of scope. At present, as defined in TCP-ENO, there is a "session id" which you can bind externally, but there's no definition of how, and this represents another option for something you could bind externally. I wonder if the WG needs to have some non-normative discussion about ways to bootstrap up from unauthenticated modes to authentication. -Ekr > > > > I have not read TLS 1.3 yet, but I would anticipate that the two cases > you > > cite > > are explicitly intended to accommodate non-cert based key management, > e.g., > > in support > > of OS. > > > > Steve > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Tcpinc mailing list > > Tcpinc@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc > > > > -- > "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". > --Rousseau. > > _______________________________________________ > Tcpinc mailing list > Tcpinc@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc >
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