We've submitted a new tcpcrypt draft: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tcpinc-tcpcrypt/
Here's a summary of the changes from -10 to -11: - Several typographical/wording improvements (due to Dale Worley's second review) - A note about reneging on SACKed segments when choosing to drop due to encryption failure or spurious FIN (due to Ekr's comment) - Resumption identifiers of unexpected size are now explicitly treated the same as any unrecognized resumption identifer: they are treated as a bare TEP (i.e., invitation to fresh key exchange). This may permit some agility in how resumption is done in future. - Nonce size, previously fixed, is now determined by choice of AEAD, and "Frame ID" is zero-padded up to the nonce size (due to Ekr's comment) - Move Implementation-specific AEAD params out of IANA Considerations. There are now two AEAD tables: one in IANA giving just the identifiers (and defining the new registry), and one in the protocol section that gives length parameters and implementation requirements. - This new text in section 3.3 Key Exchange (due to an oversight): Implementations SHOULD provide an interface allowing the user to specify, for a particular connection, the set of AEAD algorithms to advertize in "sym_cipher_list" (when playing role "A") and also the order of preference to use when selecting an algorithm from those offered (when playing role "B"). A companion document [I-D.ietf-tcpinc-api] describes recommended interfaces for this purpose. - For consistency, uses of "session key" were changed to "session secret", and uses of "pre-session key" were changed to "original session secret" Please speak up if any of this causes concern, and please also see Kyle Rose's "Resumption safety" thread for discussion of that last major design question. daniel _______________________________________________ Tcpinc mailing list Tcpinc@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc