Nonetheless, without a layer of mixnet routing, various attacks on
freenet, mostly correlation attacks, are far too easy for us to be
comfortable.

On Wed, Dec 07, 2005 at 05:01:30PM +0000, Michael Rogers wrote:
> Hi Joe,
> 
> Onion routing refers to the fact that each Tor message is wrapped in 
> several layers of encryption, like the layers of an onion. The sender 
> chooses the route in advance and encrypts the message once for each node 
> along the route, starting with the last. Each node removes a layer of 
> encryption to reveal the address of the next node, and forwards the 
> message to the revealed address.
> 
> Onion encryption is supposed to prevent the node next to the sender and 
> the node next to the recipient from colluding to discover whether the 
> sender and recipient are communicating, because the nodes can't tell 
> they're handling the same message. However, in a low-latency system like 
> Tor it may be possible for nodes to tell whether they're part of the 
> same route by comparing the timing and throughput of the routes they 
> belong to, so the benefit of onion encryption for low-latency 
> communication is debatable.
> 
> The biggest problem with onion encryption is key distribution: the 
> sender needs to know the public key of every node along the route in 
> order to onion-encrypt the message. Tor handles this by using a small 
> number of directory servers to distribute keys, thus creating a central 
> point of failure.
> 
> Freenet doesn't use onion encryption, so nodes along the route know 
> they're handling the same message, but this isn't as much of a problem 
> in Freenet as it would be in Tor - as Ian pointed out, Tor uses a 
> client/server architecture so it's easy to distinguish the sender and 
> recipient from nodes that are merely forwarding the message, but Freenet 
> is peer-to-peer and therefore it's hard to tell whether a request 
> originated from the previous node or whether it was forwarded on behalf 
> of someone else.
> 
> There's a longer (though by no means comprehensive) survey of 
> anonymising networks in my literature review:
> 
> http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/mrogers/literature-review.html
> 
> Cheers,
> Michael
> _______________________________________________
> Tech mailing list
> Tech at freenetproject.org
> http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech

-- 
Matthew J Toseland - toad at amphibian.dyndns.org
Freenet Project Official Codemonkey - http://freenetproject.org/
ICTHUS - Nothing is impossible. Our Boss says so.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 189 bytes
Desc: Digital signature
URL: 
<https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20051207/b5fac16d/attachment.pgp>

Reply via email to