On Wed, Nov 01, 2006 at 09:04:43PM +0100, bbackde at googlemail.com wrote: > A user can run clients in a VM or on another box for exactly this > reason (some users do this right now). This way bad clients cannot > read more files than their own, and they cannot read node config > files. The only way to do bad things is the FCP2 interface. And their > must be a way to prevent those kind of dangerous kind of access, at > least via an option in the node (the most easy way to do it. Only > requires to ensure an unfaked node). > > true?
Maybe. What would you suggest? The easiest thing is a simple password necessary for dangerous operations. But then, what operations are dangerous? Some more than others! Is running unknown clients in a VM common? > > On 11/1/06, toad <toad at amphibian.dyndns.org> wrote: > >Bad clients can read (and write!) all your files anyway. Secure plugins > >have been proposed but will be significant work. > > > >On Wed, Nov 01, 2006 at 08:32:36PM +0100, bbackde at googlemail.com wrote: > >> Ok I understand. But its not easy for users to separate good from > >> faked freenet clients. > >> > >> Maybe all clients should sign their binary code in the jar file to > >> enure its unchanged. And maybe there is some way to provide a > >> certificate to the node. Then the freenetproject people could check > >> the code of clients apps and give them a certificate that is hardcoded > >> in the freenet node. Only apps that have this certificate are allowed > >> to connect to the node if the user configured the "high security > >> mode". > >> Updating the node together with new clients is not too much work and > >> is acceptable for users. > >> > >> I don't know about the details of signed java code,... > >> > >> Maybe this would be a good item for the todo list (on > >> bugs.freenetproject.org)? > >> > >> On 11/1/06, toad <toad at amphibian.dyndns.org> wrote: > >> >You are wrong. Anyone with access to FCP can already: > >> >- Upload arbitrary files which the node can access. > >> >- Read your node reference, your peers and your config > >> >- Add or remove peers > >> >- Change config options > >> >- Write to arbitrary non-existent files which the node can access > >> > > >> >It has been suggested that a simple password or a full > >> >username/password login might be useful. Nothing was ever really agreed > >> >or implemented. > >> > > >> >So be careful who you let have FCP access! > >> > > >> >On Wed, Nov 01, 2006 at 07:36:48PM +0100, bbackde at googlemail.com wrote: > >> >> Is it true what I see, is each FCP2 client now able to retrieve the > >> >> private DSA key from the node, the key that uniquely identifies your > >> >> node??? > >> >> > >> >> Do you think this is a nice feature? Someone could hack some existing > >> >> open source application, provide them to some incautious users and > >> >> send their private DSA key to some big brother for analysis??? > >> >> > >> >> I don't want to accept this without an important reason. I have no > >> >> idea what a client could do with this private key, except to send it > >> >> to some big brother. > >> >> > >> >> Or am I wrong? > >> > > >> > > >> >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > >> >Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (GNU/Linux) > >> > > >> >iD8DBQFFSPACA9rUluQ9pFARAn/OAJ4uWpvQzVJ+AZY3dIANIkcAeHRsCgCfUiEP > >> >TiZxr4+gbS4u+0iU7tM6JdM= > >> >=ao4L > >> >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > >> > > >> > > >> >_______________________________________________ > >> >Tech mailing list > >> >Tech at freenetproject.org > >> >http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech > >> > > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Tech mailing list > >> Tech at freenetproject.org > >> http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech > >> > > > > > >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > >Version: GnuPG v1.4.5 (GNU/Linux) > > > >iD8DBQFFSPpMA9rUluQ9pFARAttWAJ96NdhGKQgkMuZRcMsLU26W3vuaMwCfcjvT > >vBdp6Ce0esREBFPdt5kKAWo= > >=gIIZ > >-----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > > > >_______________________________________________ > >Tech mailing list > >Tech at freenetproject.org > >http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Tech mailing list > Tech at freenetproject.org > http://emu.freenetproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tech > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 189 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20061101/98d728e6/attachment.pgp>
