Matthew Toseland wrote: >> The inserter has a practically unlimited number of attempts to >> insert a KSK that the attacker hasn't already squatted, by >> inserting redirects to the same data (it's not necessary to >> reinsert the data) and turning the keys of the redirects into KSKs. >> > > It's not unlimited, unless you want each requestor to fetch all the > attacker's redirects, and the content they point to, first. That can > be limited *to a degree* by implementing enforced checksums at the > top block metadata.
The inserter knows when an insert has succeeded, and only gives the successful KSK to other people, so the requesters only need to try one key. >> Each KSK is unguessable in advance by the attacker, who can only >> squat them by seeing the redirect being inserted and inserting >> KSK at sha1/hash_of_the_key_of_the_redirect before the inserter does. > > Basically it's the classic KSK war, just like with chat, assuming the > attacker can guess the content. The attacker inserts once for each > slot; everyone fetching it fetches all the slots, multiplying his > effort. They only request the successful one, so the squatted ones fall out of the network. Cheers, Michael
