On Wednesday 04 Apr 2012 20:34:02 Ian Clarke wrote: > This is the motivation behind "silent bob", something we were talking about > way back in 2002-2003.
Right. This was carried through into 0.7: 0.7 doesn't respond AT ALL unless you have the noderef so can use the outer (symmetric) encryption layer. (Strictly this is obfuscation). And also, our traffic is not identifiable by any fixed bytes. (But there may be other ways to identify it, and the below suggests that the chinese will deploy such as soon as they see us as a threat again). > > Ian. > > On Wed, Apr 4, 2012 at 2:19 PM, Matthew Toseland > <toad at amphibian.dyndns.org>wrote: > > > > > http://www.v3.co.uk/v3-uk/news/2165733/swedish-researchers-uncover-key-chinas-tor-blocking > > > > Looks like they look for a header that looks like a connection to a > > bridge, then try to do a handshake. This is surprisingly sophisticated - I > > had expected they just created thousands of gmail accounts and harvested > > all the bridges by email. > > > > Also, they appear to be able to create unidentifiable IP addresses on > > demand, meaning that the opennet protection schemes based on IP scarcity > > are not going to work. > > > > This won't work as-is with Freenet because Freenet doesn't do handshakes > > unless you have the keys. However there may be (more complicated) ways to > > identify the traffic, and the above implies they may be sophisticated > > enough to implement them. It does mean that obfuscation (stego) is > > increasingly important. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 198 bytes Desc: This is a digitally signed message part. URL: <https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/tech/attachments/20120404/513a8916/attachment.pgp>
