Tobias Ulmer wrote on Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 02:36:43AM +0100:
> I've got a bunch of "users" with no password/no way to log in, just to
> keep services tidy and separated. Some of these have to connect to ssh
> servers, therefore they require a .ssh/known_hosts. /etc/security thinks
> this is a security risk and complains about it every night...
I think the basic idea makes sense.
The file name still in use for backward compatibility,
".ssh/authorized_keys2",
is obviously missing form the patch, though.
Reading /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh/pathnames.h, i found no other file
name missing from the patch, but it would be nice if one of the
OpenSSH hackers could confirm this.
In case i receive an OK and no objections, i plan to put the
following in after unlock:
Index: security
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/etc/security,v
retrieving revision 1.88
diff -u -r1.88 security
--- security 3 Jun 2009 14:45:39 -0000 1.88
+++ security 21 Feb 2010 10:28:14 -0000
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
printf("Login %s is off but still has a valid shell and
an entry in /etc/skey.\n", $1);
if (system("test -d "$9" -a ! -r "$9"") == 0)
printf("Login %s is off but still has valid shell and
home directory is unreadable\n\t by root; cannot check for existence of
alternate access files.\n", $1);
- else if (system("for file in .ssh .rhosts .shosts .klogin; do
if test -e "$9"/$file; then if ((ls -ld "$9"/$file | cut -b 2-10 | grep -q r)
&& (test ! -O "$9"/$file)) ; then exit 1; fi; fi; done"))
+ else if (system("for file in .ssh/authorized_keys
.ssh/authorized_keys2 .rhosts .shosts .klogin; do if test -e "$9"/$file; then
if ((ls -ld "$9"/$file | cut -b 2-10 | grep -q r) && (test ! -O "$9"/$file)) ;
then exit 1; fi; fi; done"))
printf("Login %s is off but still has a valid shell
and alternate access files in\n\t home directory are still readable.\n",$1);
}
if ($3 == 0 && $1 != "root")
