On Thu, Dec 16, 2010 at 08:14:06AM -0700, Bob Beck wrote:
> > Why not? An attacker can, after all, brute-force your password on a
> > machine of his choice. Silently decreasing the number of rounds on older
> > architectures surprises the user in a way that can lead to password
> > compromise ("My password was brute-forced because I used it on a sparc?!
> > I would have been fine on amd64? Huh? What happened to 'secure by
> > default'?!")
>
> > .. and I only use new machines...
>
> And that is exactly my point. By your logic let's switch you to a
> 2^25 round blowfish on you dumbass. you'd be incredibly secure.
>
> Show me colin percivals' peer reviewed paper about this new scheme,
> and where it has been compared to bcrypt. then go read neil's paper
> on the subject please.
My message was too emotional, and for that I apologize. Sorry.
I share your concern for the newness of scrypt, and in fact I edited out
a sentence to that effect. With respect to the paper: are you talking
about "A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme" by Niels Provos and David
Mazihres? If not, my Google-fu failed me and I would, honestly,
appreciate a pointer to said paper.
Joachim
