It's probably time to talk about it. Yes, we are now distributing signed packages. A lot of people have probably noticed because there was a key mismatch on at least one batch of signed packages.
Obviously, we haven't finished testing yet. Don't read too much into that. "Signed packages" just mean you can use an insecure medium, such as ftp, to download packages: if the key matches, it means the package hasn't been tampered with since it was signed. The cryptographic framework used to sign packages is called signify(1), mostly written by Ted Unangst, with a lot of feedback from (mostly) Theo and I. The signing framework in pkg_add/pkg_create is much older than that, if was written for x509 a few years ago, but signify(1) will probably be more robust and ways simpler. In particular, there's no "chain-of-trust", so you keep complete control on the sources YOU trust. Signatures should be transparent in use: the package is opened, the packing-list signature is checked, and then files are checksummed while extracted against the packing-list embedded checksums (there are provisions to ensure any dangerous meta-data is also encoded in the packing-list as @mode/@user/@group annotations. So, barring problems, you shouldn't even notice signatures.