A Musharraf in the making?
It is true to pattern that Kayani is the man at the helm of affairs in a
Pakistan hemmed in from all sides by a host of problems — it fits in nicely
with its history
SUMIT GANGULY
Ngee Ann Kongsi Professor of International Relations at the Rajaratnam
School of International Studies in Singapore.
General Ashfaq Kayani, the chief of staff of the Pakistan Army, is much in
the news these days. Senior foreign diplomatic officials make it a point to
consult with him when in Islamabad. He has just renewed the term of the ISI
chief, Shuja
Pasha, and he has recently commented at length on Pakistan’s role and
interests in Afghanistan. His presence in the political limelight is nothing
short of intriguing. After all, Pakistan has a legitimately elected
government and is ostensibly a functioning democracy. More to the point,
barely a year ago, a host of commentators had blithely argued that he would
prove to be the model for an apolitical general.
Alas, those hopes and expectations have been sadly belied. Even as early
as December 2008, his clout was evident. In the wake of the horrific
Lashkar-e-Taiba spearheaded attack on Mumbai, President Asif Ali Zardari
had offered to send the ISI chief to New Delhi for discussions about the
attack. Within hours, however, Army Headquarters countermanded Zardari and
the trip was called off. Since then the putatively apolitical general has
become steadily more visible in the political arena.
To any informed observer of Pakistan his increasingly public role in the
country’s politics should come as no surprise. Since the first coup under
self-styled Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub Khan, the country has established a
rather lopsided pattern of civil-military relations. Even when civilian
governments assumed power they lived under the long shadow of the military.
Only in the aftermath of the disastrous 1971 war when the military
establishment was justly discredited, thanks to their ineptitude and
brutality in East Pakistan, did they recede to the barracks to briefly lick
their wounds. Such an interregnum, of course, was shortlived. Thanks to
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s feckless ways the military again reasserted itself
under General Zia-ul-Haq, and Bhutto was sent to the gallows.
During Zia’s regime the accretion of military power was nothing short of
breathtaking. Thanks to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan assumed
the status of a “front-line” state and played a pivotal role in supplying
the mujahideen with American military and logistical assistance. Sadly, the
Ronald Reagan administration in its relentless and justifiable quest to
dislodge the Soviets from Afghanistan ignored the many unsavoury aspects of
Zia’s regime. Lavished with American economic and military largesse and free
of any external pressures for domestic restraint, Zia expanded the reach and
scope of the military across Pakistan’s state and society. The military’s
tentacles spread from running municipal functions to heading up educational
institutions.
Even when Zia died in a mysterious plane crash and democracy was
restored, the military did not relinquish its political role altogether.
Along with a very powerful presidency it remained one of the key pillars of
power in Pakistan. The end of the Nawaz Sharif regime and General Pervez
Musharraf’s ascent to power saw a further diminution of civilian authority
in the country and the commensurate expansion of military power. Once again,
as during the Afghan war years, the Bush administration proved to be quite
indulgent of the Pakistani military’s expansion of its domestic role. The
exigencies of relying on Pakistan to overthrow the Taliban regime inAfghanistan
and to pursue al-Qaeda in the region proved to be of far greater
significance than nudging Musharraf to cede political authority.
Is the Pakistani state then doomed to this tragic and desultory cycle of
periodic transitions to democracy and then a return to military rule? The
forces of path dependence, as institutional economists have explained, will
probably rule the day. The early choice of institutional pathways set states
on particular courses which are extremely difficult to radically alter.
Consequently, in the absence of concerted and sustained external pressures
for fundamental and structural reforms, there is little reason to believe
that the bloated military establishment will, of its own accord, shrink its
role in Pakistan’s politics and society.
Given this infelicitous past, General Kayani’s increasing assertiveness
is entirely unsurprising. In the wake of the London conference which gave
Pakistan a disproportionate role in shaping Afghanistan’s future, the
Pakistani military apparatus believes that it enjoys the imprimatur of the
international community to play a more overt role in shaping Pakistan’s
critical foreign and security policy choices. Quite frankly, all that has
really changed is that it no longer feels it must quietly manipulate its
civilian marionettes from the shadows. Now General Kayani and his associates
can stand tall and determine the moves of their pliant charges with the
skill of master ventriloquists and puppeteers.
*ASHFAQ PARVEZ KAYANI
**Born: April 1952 in Rawalpindi district *
***Belongs to one of the largest clans, Gakhar Rajputs in Jhelum in Punjab *
***Initially went to Jhelum local cadet college, but was later admitted to
the army’s military academy in Kakul **His father too served in the Pakistan
army, as naib subedar, so Kayani was, literally, born to his job **In August
1971, Kayani was commissioned into the army and joined the Baloch regiment *
*Graduate of Army colleges in Quetta and Islamabad, and General Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth in the US **Married with two children, Gen
Kayani is president of the Pakistan Golf Association and an avid
golfer **Director
General of Military Operations during the India-Pak stand-off in
2001-02 **Became
DG-ISI in 2004 **2007: Named successor to Musharraf as army chief*
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