Mundane questions asked as above are either diplomatic or commercial in
attitudes today, especially among the corporate background youths as well
as the elders. Many ancient ancestors including the vedas and the
Upanishads and Birthrhari like had set in relevant questions to ask. There
is one PRASHNOPANISHAD WHERE q & a ONLY IS THE UPANISHAD: "That seer said
to them ; as yet, live another year in tapas, Brahmacharya and faith ; then
ask us questions as you please and if we know, we shall, indeed,
explain all to you.  Those among the Brahmins and the rest who follow only
what is done, as Islttam (sacrifices) and pfa lam (pious acts) and not what
is not made, i.e. 9 nothing eternal, attain the world of the moon, i.e. 9
the world of food, a portion of the lord of creatures, who is both food and
eater, the worlds of the moon being in the nature of one made, i.e., not
eternal. Which, among the senses divided into intellectual and active, manifest
their glory outside. Who again of these is the greatest, i.e., the most
important of these which are in the nature of cause and effect. what form
of yours, lodged in speech moves the mouth of the speaker, what in the ear,
what in the eye, and what united with the mind
acts as volition, etc., make that passive, i.e., quiet. If the identity of
the knowable and knowledge is conceded, it is mere word to say that the
knowable is distinct from knowledge, and that knowledge is not
distinct from knowable,
as is the statement that vahni (fire) is distinct from agni (fire), though
agni is not distinct from vahni. If knowledge is distinct from the
knowable,* the statement is inappropriate, that where there is no knowable,
there is no knowledge. Nor can it be said that where there is no knowable
there is no knowledge, as it is not perceived ; for, they concede that in
sleep knowledge exists. It is well-known that Vaindsikas admit the
existence of knowledge even in sleep. But the existence of a knowable is
also ad*mitted. If it be said that in that case, knowledge is knowable by
itself, we say * no '; for, the distinction between knowledge and knowable
exists then. As the knowledge which perceives the non-existence of all
things is distinct from the non-existence of the things themselves, the
distinction between knowledge and knowable is inevitable even then ; and a
hundred Vaindsikas cannot get over this objection and make knowledge itself
a knowable, as surely as they cannot revive a dead man. It may be objected
that, according to our theory, one knowledge has to be known by another and
so on without limit. We answer 'no': for, all things can be classified as 1
knowledge ' and * knowable,' and those that are not Vaindsikas concede only
a two-fold classification of 4 knowledge ' and 'knowable/ and do not
admit a third
knowledge, which perceives the other knowledge* It may be contended, if
knowledge could not know itself, there can be no omniscience."   lIFE IS
NOT A MIRAGE KR IRS 231222

On Thu, 22 Dec 2022 at 21:19, Rangarajan T.N.C. <[email protected]>
wrote:

> https://storycorps.org/participate/great-questions/
>

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