Though Mr Sekar wrote in a few words distinguishing 5th and 6th sense
,omitting the 7th sense , as a believer in all souls are equal  I beg to
differ, though, by a sense Sekar appears to be correct. Then my belief in B
G, Gajendra Moksham, Dog crying at Rajaram etc will appear as erroneously a
mistaken identity ,in what Mr Sekar concluded. Mr Sekar thinks as human;
and forgets that animals can also think as animals about the human or else
, all animals should have stayed only inside the forest and would not have
been domesticated at all. We think that the horse is run by us driving;
maybe the horse  if it refuses to0 run, which is equally feasible, then the
horse can also think; and Descarte words do apply to the animals too.   A
beacon is timing its diving; a garudan (Eagle) knows when to drive in the
neutral gear, while descending down the sky as we do while coming down the
hills. And there is an article to that effect. May read and and confer :

Do Animals Have Free Will?

Helen Steward (2015) argues that in thinking about free will, it is
essential to consider the capacities of animals.( as human too have that
capacity to vary the freewill) .

Do animals have free will? *Probably*, the answer to that question would be
agreed by most people to be a fairly obvious “no.” The concept of free will
is traditionally bound up with such things as our capacity to choose our
own values, the sorts of lives we want to lead, the sorts of people we want
to be, etc. and it seems obvious that no non-human animal lives the kind of
life which could make sense of the attribution to it of such powers as
these. But in thinking about free will, it is essential, nevertheless, to
consider the capacities of animals. Even if animals cannot be said to have
full-blown free will, animal powers of various sorts provide a kind of
essential underpinning for free will which philosophers who focus too
exclusively on the human phenomenon are forever in danger of ignoring. And
these simpler capacities are interesting enough to raise many philosophical
issues all by themselves; indeed, I would argue that they raise the most
discussed problem in this area of philosophy all by themselves. For they
are, in my view, hard to accommodate within certain conceptions of the
universe in which we live – what might be called mechanistic or
deterministic conceptions of that universe. This makes it very useful and
important to think about the simpler capacities from a philosophical
perspective. Instead of asking, as philosophers constantly do, whether free
will is compatible with determinism, we should first ask ourselves whether
even the simpler powers which constitute what I call *animal agency *are
consistent with it. And it might conceivably be that the answer to this
question is “no,” which would shed a new and interesting kind of light on
the free will debate.

What do I mean by “animal agency”? We can make a start on homing in on the
concept by saying that an agent is something which can *act*. This, though,
is not yet to say anything very clear, because it simply raises the
question what it is to be able to *act*. We sometimes use the concept of
action in a very general way – we can, for example, speak of the action of
inanimate things such as the wind or the waves, or of the action of a
chemical agent such as oxygen or water on a material such as iron when it
rusts. So it might look as though almost *everything* should count as an
agent, because almost everything can act – almost everything, that is, can
impact causally in some way on something else, given the right conditions.
But on the concept of action, I am interested in, neither the wind, nor the
waves, nor oxygen, nor water, would be allowed to count as having the power
to act. Why not?

Well, if we think about what goes on when iron rusts, for example, we might
say that oxygen and water can act on the iron. But we could surely equally
well say that it’s the iron acting on the oxygen and the water. It’s not
altogether easy to see why we should say either of these things in
preference to the other when one reflects properly on what’s occurring. There
is simply contact between different elements and compounds, and something
happens as a result. But none of the reagents involved seems truly more
active than any of the others. The distinction between activity and
passivity is hard to maintain where we are considering truly inanimate
agents – and my own view is that this is because the application of talk of
agency in the inanimate realm is an extension of a concept which derives
from, and belongs primarily to, our conceptualisation of the *animate* world.
We have borrowed the basic idea of action which has its primary application
to animals, for use in describing the more dynamic parts of inanimate
nature. But the inevitability with which these interactions in inanimate
nature occur robs the concept of action of strict and literal application
in the inanimate world. It’s not as though, when oxygen and water cause
iron to rust, we think that the oxygen or the water could do other than
they do. You put iron and oxygen and water together and rusting is simply
going to happen – it’s inevitable. Oxygen and water have the power to rust
iron, but it’s not a power they can *exercise* exactly, precisely because
it isn’t a power they can *avoid* exercising. We could say, if we like,
that inanimate entities and stuffs can *manifest* their powers – but they
cannot *exert* them. This means, in my view, that they cannot be true
agents.

The medieval philosopher Duns Scotus distinguished between what he called
one-way powers and two-way powers, and this distinction helps with
explicating the conception of agency which gives rise to this verdict. Lots
of things have one-way powers. Copper sulphate has the power to dissolve in
water, my car has the power to move at 70 miles per hour under certain
conditions, green plants have the power to photosynthesise in sunlight. But
these are all just one-way powers, because given the right conditions,
copper sulphate can’t do anything *but *dissolve in water, my car can’t do
anything but accelerate to 70mph, green plants can’t do anything but
photosynthesise.

Whereas it seems that in our ordinary thinking, we attribute to some sorts
of things in the world a rather different sort of power – the power to do
something *or not*, which is the type of power the medievals called a *two-*way
power. For example, I now have the power to raise my arm. I could do it.
But I also have the power not do it. It is up to me to settle whether my
arm will go up within the next second or not. Either thing appears to be in
my power at this very moment – to act or to refrain from acting. In this
respect, then, I seem not to be like a bit of copper sulphate or a car or a
green plant. What *I *do seems *not* to be entirely determined by the
circumstances in which I find myself. What I do seems also to be dependent
on *me* and on whether or not I *exercise *my power of action. And this
gives the distinction between activity and passivity proper purchase. I am
active, but the air which I move as I raise my arm is passive – because it
is me and not the air that is the true source of the movement, its
instigator. This isn’t just a matter of the source of the movement being
internal to my body. It is a matter of what happens being *up to me* – a
crucial idea in our conceptual scheme, the idea of an entity which has the
power to make things go one way rather than another, even holding the
conditions in which it finds itself fixed. And the concept of agency I want
to utilise is closely associated with this idea of a two-way power – the
power to do something *or not. *Only those things which possess two-way
powers count as agents in my sense.

In a moment, I shall turn to consider an important challenge that might be
mounted to the idea that the concept of agency I have tried to describe is
a coherent one. But supposing for the moment we accepted that the
distinction between one-way and two-way powers was a legitimate and
interesting one, an obvious question rears its head. So far, I have put
plants and inanimate things on the non-agent side of the divide. I have put
human beings on the side of the agents. But what about non-human animals?
Where do they go? Do they have two-way powers?

*A very familiar way of thinking* about animal nature returns the answer
“no” to this question. There is a long tradition in the history of
philosophy of separating ourselves off from the other animals – of trying
to argue that we are nobler or better or more important than they are in
some very fundamental respect. It was always part of Christian doctrine
that human beings were uniquely close to God, being made, indeed, in his
image, and in the seventeenth century, Descartes gave this Christian view a
metaphysical underpinning by insisting that human beings were to be
distinguished completely from the other animals because only humans were
possessed of souls. The movements of mere animals, Descartes insisted in
his *Passions of the Soul*, could all be explained by means of purely
mechanistic principles:

“It seems reasonable, since art copies nature, and men can make various
automata which move without thought, that nature should produce its own
automata much more splendid than the artificial ones. These natural
automata are the animals.”

Like others in the seventeenth century, Descartes was very impressed by the
technological innovations of his age – particularly clockwork. He seems to
have been especially struck by a statue of Neptune which stepped forward
and threatened with a waving trident those who approached it as they
stepped unwittingly on a button, which he mentions several times in
different writings. The thought naturally occurred to him, as it did to
many others in the seventeenth century, *that animals might just be
actuated by a biological sort of clockwork* – and hence that they did not
require truly *psychic* powers to explain their functioning. But what is
interesting, I think, is that this *seventeenth *century philosophical view
of non-human animals as basically a biological sort of clockwork has lasted
in some quarters with surprisingly little alteration well into the
*twenty-first*. The only really *major *change which has taken place in
philosophical orthodoxy since then is that we human beings tend not to be
any longer accorded the privileged status that Descartes insisted upon,
because very few Western philosophers now accept the existence of an
independent immaterial entity called the soul. And as a result, it has been
argued by many that Descartes’ basically mechanical conception of animality
must be extended also to human beings. We, as well as the other animals,
must be conceived of as complex mechanisms, the interactions of whose parts
is sufficient to explain the functioning of the whole.

Some of those who embrace the mechanistic picture would therefore argue
that the distinction I have been trying to draw between true agents, which
have two-way powers, on the one hand, and non-agents, possessors merely of
one-way powers, has simply been rendered redundant by the progress of
modern science*. We now know, it might be said, that our own actions are
produced by neural firings which in their turn are produced by further
neural firings, or by changes in the concentrations of various brain
chemicals, or by similar physiological events. And these changes which go
on inside us and which determine what actions we will perform are just the
realisations of the one-way powers of things like chemicals and cells.*

And so it might be inferred that it must just be an illusion to suppose
that humans have any genuine two-way powers – that I possess, for example,
as I earlier asserted I did, the power right now to raise my arm and also
not to raise it. If I don’t actually raise it, it might be said, that just
means the causal conditions necessary for making my arm go up weren’t there
in my brain immediately beforehand. Holding prior conditions fixed, these
people would argue, it simply isn’t true that either thing could happen. On
this view, then, there really *is*, at bottom, no such distinction as the
agent/non-agent distinction I have tried to characterise. Rather, the whole
of the universe, including humanity itself, is basically an enormous
mechanism, and the agent/non-agent distinction is either unfounded, or must
be characterised in some different way (for example, by differentiating the
deterministic causes of actions from the deterministic causes of other
sorts of events, perhaps by saying that they are “mental” causes, and
hoping that this will do the trick. For various reasons I can’t go into
here, it won’t).

Now, some other philosophers, of course, have resisted this mechanistic
outlook. They are sure it must be wrong because it just seems so obvious to
them that we have two-way powers – that I am able, for example, right now,
in these precise present conditions, to raise my arm and also not to raise
it. It just seems preposterous to them to deny that we are agents in this
full and robust sense. They have stood up for what they call libertarian
free will. But on the whole, they have been disinclined to suppose that any
animals other than human ones might possess this special capacity. Only
humans have generally been accorded the status of free willed entities,
even by those philosophers who have been inclined to insist that the idea
of free will is not just an enormous confusion.

These two camps – let us call them *mechanists* and *free willists*, just
to have convenient names - now represent two of the main position’s
philosophers tend to take with respect to the metaphysics of agency. Either
agency must be regarded as a special variety of deterministic causal
mechanism, or humans are a special exception to the normal workings of the
natural world. But surely neither of these positions is at all attractive.
The mechanists, on the one hand, seem to present us with a deeply
non-intuitive conception of ourselves as creatures completely in the grip
of electrical and chemical reactions in our parts, which looks, on the face
of it as though it might require extraordinarily radical revisions on our
everyday world view. This vision of our place in reality seems to turn us
into mere *arenas* for the playing out of chemical and electrical
reactions, all of which are determined, in their turn, by preceding
reactions of the same sort. The free willists, on the other hand, seem
still to be insisting on the old Cartesian differences between ourselves
and absolutely everything else in nature – something which, in a
post-Darwinian age, it’s hard to feel comfortable with. What I want to
suggest, therefore, is that we need an alternative to both views. And the
key to finding an answer lies with the question I raised earlier – namely,
what we are to say about where non-human animals fit into the picture.

It becomes much easier to accept the existence of the interesting
phenomenon I call agency once we allow that it might be much more widespread
than the free willists have tended to suppose, and that it characterises a
large number of non-human animals, not just ourselves. It becomes easier
because it no longer looks as though the view just amounts to a sort of
special pleading for the human species. Rather, one might argue that the
development of a robust conception of agency constitutes serious
recognition of the surely indubitable specialness of certain modes of
functioning that appear to be present throughout much of the animal kingdom.

Like us, I want to suggest, many animals have two-way powers. They are of
course driven to do certain of the things they do by instinct (as are we) –
but this is not in the least inconsistent with the admission that they have
two-way powers. Instincts govern animals, as they govern us, in a *general *way
– setting a specific range of goals, aims and behaviours, but often leaving
it up to the animal itself to settle many of the precise details of where,
when and how those goals will be pursued. More complex animals have greater
freedoms in this respect than less complex ones – a dog, for instance, can
decide whether to urinate now, or to run after the stick which has just
been thrown for it instead; a spider seems likely to be far more narrowly
constrained. But still, even a spider might be able to decide whether here
or there is a better place to build its web, to take this or that route to
a particular place, etc. There is evidence, indeed, that certain spiders
possess quite remarkable abilities – for instance, there is a wonderful
account of some observations made in the rainforests of north-eastern
Australia of the jumping spider, *Portia*, by Stim Wilcox and Robert Jackson.
This spider preys on other spiders, and Wilcox and Jackson describe an
occasion on which, having tried and failed to tempt a second spider out of
the centre of its web by means of various strategies, *Portia* disappears
from view for about an hour and finally reappears on a rock projection,
high above the web of the target prey spider. She then lets herself down
from the rock projection, and swings in on a thread to eat her prey. What
seems remarkable about this account of *Portia’s *behaviour is the
potential it suggests for forward planning, for spatiotemporal awareness,
for the maintenance of intention over a significant amount of time, and in
the absence of continuous perception of the desired object. Clearly,
*Portia’s* general goal – to catch and eat spiders – is instinctively
given; but equally clearly, I should argue, the choice of means to this end
in a given case is settled by *Portia*, on the spot, in a manner sensitive
to the affordances of the environment in which she finds herself.

Agency, then, should be regarded neither as an illusion, nor as the
peculiar possession of a single species. Rather, it is a power which
characterises biological entities of a certain degree and type of
complexity, an evolutionary innovation of quite extraordinary importance,
which develops as creatures emerge which have a range of complex and
sometimes competing goals. Such creatures may need to utilise perceptually
acquired information from a number of sources in order to solve problems,
to which there is not necessarily any unique best answer, about how to
distribute themselves and their efforts through space and time, in pursuit
of their ends. Agential powers are nature’s way of solving these problems;
and we need to understand them, and the metaphysics they require, before we
have any hope of finally resolving the question whether or not we humans
could possibly have free will.

HELEN STEWARD IS PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND ACTION AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS AND AUTHOR OF *A METAPHYSICS FOR FREEDOM* (OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2012).  KR  IRS  15223

On Wed, 15 Feb 2023 at 04:12, 'N Sekar' via iyer123 <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Thanks Sri Mani
>
> Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
> <https://go.onelink.me/107872968?pid=InProduct&c=Global_Internal_YGrowth_AndroidEmailSig__AndroidUsers&af_wl=ym&af_sub1=Internal&af_sub2=Global_YGrowth&af_sub3=EmailSignature>
>
> On Wed, 15 Feb 2023 at 15:51, APS Mani
> <[email protected]> wrote:
> A beautiful summary, Mr Sekar.  Thanks for the thought.   Mani
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 15, 2023 at 2:55 PM 'N Sekar' via iyer123 <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
> Thanks Sri. Sridharan for a very informative write up.
>
> Only Humans have a choice of Action. Animals are programmed by Nature and
> have no choice; for example, a Tiger cannot choose to be a vegetarian nor a
> Cow choose to eat meat - (that we Humans, in order to increase the yield
> (both of its milk and its flesh), feed it forcefully things a cow would not
> normally eat is another matter altogether.
>
> Choice always creates a dilemma.  How we use this choice determines what
> kind of life we will live, both now and in the hereafter. Choice is a Boon
> and a Bane at the same time. Given the choice of selecting  such a simple
> thing as a dress material, we spend hours agonizing what to select and what
> to leave out, only to brood over later whether we have made the right
> choice; and our tendency to think what will others think of our choice adds
> to the headache.
>
> Another oft quoted example is when we go to a restaurant we go through the
> menu and finally order what we would like to eat after consultations with
> the waiter, only to rue our decision when we see the person sitting next to
> us eating something we would like to have ordered.
>
> In a way, having no choice is a Blessing. Not for nothing it is said "
> Grass is always Green on the Other Side". We can't both be here and also on
> the other side.
>
> N Sekar
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 15, 2023 at 06:36:20 AM GMT+4, Narayanaswamy Iyer <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>
> Dear folks
>
> One visible witness to ants' (superior?) intelligence is their
> construction and maintenance of anthills, corresponding to our high-rise
> residential condominiums.
>
> The anthills are made from fine sand, clay, dirt, and twigs.  Ants may
> even use seeds that sprout and grow to form hills, and work as a great
> camouflage.
>
> Formica ants, Yellow Meadow ants, Fire ants, Harvester ants, Argentine
> ants, Allegheny ants, and Texas Leafcutter ants build these marvels of
> advanced construction, ranging from one inch to more than 10 feet high.
>
> Inside, there are many tunnels connecting chambers of various sizes.
> These are used as nurseries, food stores, places of rest for worker ants,
> and so on.
>
> Ants build hills to keep their queen and larvae safe.  They choose places
> like between tree roots, under stones, under tree logs, etc.
>
> Allegheny ants take one year to build one foot.  The largest ant colony
> in Hokkaido, Japan, stretches over 13 miles and 670 acres.  These are
> Argentine ants.  Billions live in them in co-operating nests.
>
> Most anthills survive from one to 30 years.
>
> Formica ants build the biggest anthills.  As tall as 8.2 feet, and up to
> 65 feet in circumference.
>
> S Narayanaswamy Iyer
>
> On 15 Feb 2023, at 8:51 AM, 'gopala krishnan' via iyer123 <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
> Very informative sir
> Gopalakrishnan
>
> On Wednesday, 15 February, 2023 at 12:09:14 am IST, 'venkat giri' via
> iyer123 <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>
> *Respected Sir/s**,*
> *                                         Human beings are bipedal, which
> means that they walk on two legs.* *Animals are quadrupedal, or
> four-legged*. *Except for aquatic creatures and snakes, all animals walk
> on four legs. Humans can communicate with one another because they have
> a'special language' to use*.
> *                             Humans are highly social creatures who often
> live in complicated social systems made up of several cooperating and
> competing groups, ranging from families and kinship networks to political
> states. Human interactions have resulted in the development of a
> diversified collection of values, social conventions, and rituals that
> underpin human society.. Curiosity and the human drive to comprehend and
> control the environment, as well as to explain and manage occurrences, have
> fueled the development of science, philosophy, mythology, and religion,
> among other fields of study.*
>                                            *A human brain weighs 1.2
> kg.The size of the brain in ANIMALS varies according to the animal’s size.
> For example, a blue whale’s brain weighs 6.90 kilogrammes, whereas an
> earthworm’s brain measures 170-180 micrometres in diameter.Humans can think
> about certain things and are motivated by their instincts, intellect and
> logic.Animals  on the otherhand are incapable of reasoning and are simply
> motivated by their instincts.Humans can communicate with one another
> because they have a’special language’ to use.On the other hand, animals
> communicate with one another, but they do not have a common language. They
> are deficient in the expressive power of human language.*
>
> *                                             Humans have a variety of
> techniques of surviving and subsisting. However,Animals are entirely
> reliant on nature. and as a result, they lack any alternative means of
> survival.*
>
>
>
> *<1676395463518blob.jpg>*
> *Like mammals, ants can drink using two different methods…licking and
> sucking.Licking is accomplished much like a dog lapping up water. *
> *The  ant probably drinks about 6-8 microliters of water in a single
> sitting.**The ant uses the labium for drinking, and it's basically the
> ant equivalent of the human tongue. Ants do not drink just to quench their
> immediate thirst. They also take water back to their colony to store it for
> future use. Therefore, when they find a good source of water, they will
> leave a scent trail to attract other ants, and they will all keep coming
> back for more.*
> *It is science of ants to co-operate and divide the share of water equally
> among them and give everyone its right.*
> *WILL  WE HUMAN BEINGS DO THIS...?????*
> *               Ants are capable of remarkable feats of coordination. They
> can forge complex paths through the jungle, build sophisticated structures,
> and adapt foraging patterns to fit their environment. They do it through
> simple interactions, just touching antennae. When many ants are in a small
> space, they meet often and tend to take a convoluted path that keeps them
> stuck in one place. When few ants are in a large space, they don’t meet
> that often. They stretch out their paths and cover more ground. Ants lose
> water just being outside and meandering around. *
> * Ants are great organisers as communities."They are very important for
> nutrient cycling, decomposition processes, plant seed dispersal and the
> perturbation of soil.""Most ants are actually highly beneficial, even to us
> humans. Ants transport, remove, recycle and eat, ORGANIC MATTER. In fact,
> ants are so essential for the smooth working of biological processes .*
> *                                        Much to learn from them. .This is
> the type of co-ordination we needed amongst people during COVID-19.Not only
> Covid in every situation.There is no other way to freedom but thro' unity
> and co-ordination.*
> *-------*
> *Regards*
> *V.Sridharan*
> *Trichy*
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *ALAS...IF HUMAN BEINGS COULD REALISE THIS!*
>
>
> *ng.*
>
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