Vidyabhusana,S,S C. (1921), A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Medieval
and Modern Schools, Calcutta: Calcutta University.
Xxxxxxxxxxx Bimal Krishna Matilal
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"LOGIC" IN WHAT SENSE?
"Logic" I shall here understand to be the systematics study of
informal inference-patterns,
he rules of debate, the identification of sound
inference vis-a-vis sophistically argument, and similar topics. One may feel
somewhat apologetic today to use the term "logic" in the context
of classical Indian philosophy, for "logic" has acquired a very
specific connotation
n modern philosophical parlance ever the less, the list
supplied in the openings sentence is , I believe, a legitimate usage
of the term,
especially when its older senses are taken into account. s. C.
Vidyabhusana,S monumental ut by now dated, work A History of Indian Logic
(1921), has misled many non-Sanskritic or both he,
and scholars such as H. N. Randle and T. Stcherbatsky, used such terms as
"Indian logic" and "Buddhist logic" when their intention
was to write about the theory of pramana as or accredited means of knowing
in general, perhaps with particular emphasis upon the
specific theory of anumana, inference considered as means of knowing. I
have chosen not to follow the same path; instead, I shall
take "logic" in its extended and older sense in order to carve out a way
for my own investigation. I shall use the traditional sastras and
try to explain their significance and relevance to our modern discussion of
the area sometimes called "philosophical logic. " I shall
include much else besides, as the initial list shows, but will try to remain
faithful to the topic of logic, debate, and the study of
inference. I . M. Bochenski included a separate albeit sketchy chapter called
"The Indian Variety of Logic," in his great work A History of
Formal Logic (1956).
This will, perhaps, be enough to justify my use of the term "logic" when I
am trying to cover similar ground. Logic as the study of the form of
correct arguments and inference patterns, developed in India from the
methodology of philosophical debate. The art of conducting a philosophical
debate was prevalent probably as early as the time of the Buddha and the
MahavIra (Jina), but it became more systematic and methodical a few hundred
years later. By the second century BC, the intellectual climate in India
was bristling with controversy and criticism. At the center of controversy were
certain dominant religious and ethical issues. Nothing was too sacred for
criticism. Such questions as: "Is there a soul different from body?", "Is
the world (taka) eternal?", "What is the meaning, goal, or purpose of
life?", and, "Is renunciation preferable to enjoyment?",
were of major concern. While teachers and thinkers argued about such
matters, there arose a gradual awareness of the characteristics or
patterns of correct - that is, acceptable and sound - reasoning, and concern
about how it differs from the kind of reasoning that is
unacceptable.
2 A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF LOGICAL ISSUES IN INDIA: DEBATE AND LOGIC
Logic developed in ancient India from the tradition of vada vidya, a discipline
dealing with the categories of debate over various religious,
philosophical, moral, and doctrinal issues. There were several vada manuals
available around the beginning of the Christian era. They
were meant for students who wanted to learn how to conduct debates
successfully,
what tricks to learn, how to find loopholes in the
opponent's position, and what pitfalls to be wary of. Of these manuals, the
one found in the Nyayasutras of Aksa pada Gautama
(Circa 150 AD) is comparatively more systematic than others. We shall hence
follow it in this introductory exposition.
Debates, in Aksa pada’s view, can be of three types: (i) an honest debate
(called vada) where both sides, proponent and opponent, are
seeking the truth, that is, wanting to establish the right view; (ii)
a tricky-debate
(called jalpa) where the goal is to win by fair means or
foul; and (iii) a destructive debate (called vitanda) where the goal
is to defeat
or demolish the opponent, no matter how. This almost
corresponds o the cliche in English: the good, the bad and the ugly. The
first kind signals the employment of logical arguments, and use of
rational means and proper evidence to establish a thesis. It is said that the
participants in this kind of debate were the teacher and the
student, or the students themselves, belonging to the same school.
The second was, in fact, a winner-takes-all situation. The name of the
game was wit or intelligence. Tricks, false moves, and unfair
means were allowed according to the rules of the game. But if both the debaters
were equally clever and competent, this could be kept within
the bounds of logic and reasoning. Usually, two teachers of different schools
would be participants. This used to take place before a board
or jury called the madhyastha (the mediators or adjudicators) and a chairman,
usually a king or a man with power and money who would
organize the debate. The winner would be declared at the end by the consensus
of the adjudicators.
The third type was a variety of the second type, where the winner was
not supposed to establish his own position (he may not even have
had a position) but only to defeat the opponent using logical arguments or
as the case was, tricks or clever devices. It was explicitly
destructive and negative; hence philosophers like Vatsyayana (circa 350 AD)
denounced this form of debate in unambiguous language.
Again, a clever and competent opponent might force the other side into
admitting a counter-position (“If you deny my thesis “p”, then you
must admit the thesis not-p; therefore, please establish your thesis"), and
if the other side yielded, the debate was decided in favour of the
former, or it would turn into the second form of debate. The notoriety of
the third type was universal, although some
philosophers (for example, Nagarjuna, Srlharsha) maintained that if the
refutations of the opponent were done on the basis of good reason
and evidence (in other words, if it followed the model of the first
type, rather
than the second type) then lack of a counter-thesis, or non-establishment of
a counter-thesis would not be a great drawback. In fact, it could be made
acceptable and even philosophically respectable.
That is why Gauda Sanatani (quoted by Udayana; see Matilal, 1986: 87)
divided the debates into four types: (i) the honest type
(vada), (ii) the tricky type (jalpa), (iii) the type modelled after the
trickytype but for which only refutation is needed, and (iv) the type
modelled
after the honest one where only the refutation of a thesis is needed. Even
the mystics would prefer this last kind, which would end with a
negative result.
Apart from developing a theory of evidence (pramana) and argument
(tarka) needed for the first type of debate, the manuals
go on to list a number of cases, or situation-types, where the debate will
be concluded and one side will be declared as "defeated" (or
nigraha-sthiina, the defeat situation or the clinchers). The Nyayasutras lists
22 of them. For example, (a) if the opponent cannot understand
the proponent's argument, or (b) if he is confused or (c) if he cannot reply
within a reasonable time limit - all these will be cases of defeat.
Besides, these manuals identify several standard "false" rejoinders or jati
(24 of them are listed in the Nyayasutra), as well as some
underhand tricks (chala) like equivocation and confusion of a metaphor for
the literal. Now we may survey the type of logical
theorizing that arose out of the study of debate in India. KR IRS 15
2 23 Part 1 end
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