INDIAN LOGIC PART 7          21 2 23 SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS:

SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

Any study of logic is intimately connected with the language in which it is
conducted. Needless to say, the Indian "logicians" did not use symbols,
formulae, or axiomatic constructions in an artificial or formal
language. Indian
logical theories were discussed primarily in Sanskrit, and the structure of
the Sanskrit language figures prominently here.



This fact has created some problems of interpretation, for it is extremely
difficult, though not impossible, to transfer the philosophical and logical
problems from the narrow confines of Sanskrit to the modern philosophical
audience in general.

It is commonplace in logic to talk about the analysis of propositions. In
the context of logic in Sanskrit, we have to talk about the analysis of
Sanskrit propositions. A Sanskrit proposition is what is expressed in a
Sanskrit sentence. It will appear that the analysis proposed by the early
Sanskrit writers would not be entirely

unfamiliar to one accustomed to the usual subject-predicate analysis of
modern or traditional Western logic, nor is it unrelated to it. However,
the logical as well as grammatical analysis of Sanskrit Sentences presents
some significant contrasts with the usual subject predicate analysis.
Unless these points of contrast are noted, it will be difficult to
appreciate fully some of the concerns of the Sanskrit logicians.



A sentence in Sanskrit is regarded as the expression of a "thought" or what
is called a cognitive state (jnana), or, to be precise, a qualificative
cognitive state (visishta-jnana). A simple qualificative cognitive state is
one where the cognizer cognizes something (or some place or some locus, as
we will have to call it) as qualified by a

property or a qualifier. It is claimed by most Sanskrit writers that to say
that something or some place is qualified by a qualifier is equivalent to
saying that it is a locus of some property or "locatable." As I have
discussed elsewhere (Matilal 1968, 1971), a qualificative cognition is
actually to be thought of as a propositional cognition or a judgement. In
this and subsequent sections, we will investigate how

the Indian analysis of the structure of such states relates to Western
analyses of the subject-predicated distinction.



A proposition, in its basic form, is usually explained by Western writers
in terms of what we call a predication. A simple or atomic proposition is
thus better understood as involving the - "basic combination" - of
predication. This expression "basic combination" was once used by W. V.
Quine (1960: 96). The idea was sharpened by

P. F. Strawson (1974). Strawson explains the structure of the so-called
basic combination of predication as (1) a combination of (2) a subject and
(3) a predicate, and said that it lies at the focal point of our current
logic. He has further claimed that: [i]f current logic has the significance
which we are inclined to Attach to it, and which our contemporary style of
philosophizing in particular assumes, then it must reflect fundamental
features of our thought about the world. (1974: 4) The claim may be too
strong. For all we can say is that the said structure reflects primarily
the basic way in which we are accustomed to think about the world. We might
be trained and then be accustomed to think about the world in a different
way, but in that case our language would not admit a predominantly
subject-predicate

structure. This is at least conceivable. In Jonathan Swift's Gulliver's
Travels, three professors of the School of Languages at the Grand Academy
of Lagado, were trying to work on a project that would shorten the academic
discourse by leaving out, among other things, "verbs and participles,
because in reality all things imaginable are but nouns" (p. 219, 1919
edn.). The point is that while a project need not

be a radical or outlandish as this one, even a slightly different proposal
may appear odd or queer to our readers today who are well-accustomed to
modern quantificational logic as well as the subject-predicate analysis of
the basic sentences.

The "current" logicians generally agree that the basic predication may best
be pictured in the neutral logical schema "Fa." It represents a combination
of a singular term or a (proper) name and, to use Quine’s terminology, a
general term or a predicate, a combination which forms a sentence. By
"general term" are meant such

grammatical terms as substantives, adjectives, and verbs. (Even names or
so-called singular terms can by systematically reparsed as predicates by
following the Russellian trick of representing them as descriptions.
However, this part of Quine's proposal is controversial and may be ignored
for the moment). Verbs, according to Quine, may be regarded as the
"fundamental form" of predication, and the adjectival and the nominals
(substantives) may be assimilated into the "verbals." In other words, such
phrases as " ... is an F" and". .. is F" are mere stylistic varieties of
the verb form" ... Fs." Predication, then, is illustrated indifferently by
"Mama is a Woman," "Mama is big," and "Mama sings" (1960: 96).



Strawson analyses the "basic propositional combination" as a tripartition
of function, as I have already noted. This is represented by a simple
symbolism "ass (i c)," where "i" represents a particular, "c" the concept
specification and "ass ( )" the propositional combination. The former two
underline the duality, that, following Strawson, we may still call the
subject and the predicate, while the isolation of the

third element is important to capture the function of presenting the
particular and the general concept as assigned to each other in such a way
as to have a propositional combination. In our "ground level"
subject-predicates sentence, the third function is usually associated with
the second. Hence the predicate is usually a verb or a "verbal phrase,"
that combines syntactically the concept-specifying element and the
indication of propositionality.



This dual role of our ordinary predicate phrases must be recognized, even
if we try to maintain Quine's strictures against the predicate-term being
accessible to quantifiers or the variables of quantification. Apart from
worries about ontological commitment to abstract (in Quine's words,
intentional) properties, there does not

seem to be any good reason why we cannot quantify over the
predicate-properties which are denoted by singular abstract terms such as
"sweetness" or "singing."



Now, in the Indian context, the basic combination is not called a
proposition. It is a structured whole that is grasped by an atomic
cognitive event. We call it an atomic qualificative (visishta) cognition.
One element is called the qualifier while the other the qualify-and, and
their combination forms the structured whole. It can be represented by: Q
(a b) where "a" represents the qualify- and, "b" the qualifier, and "Q()"
the indication of "qualificativity." I shall be using these symbols for
convenience only, as I have done in my earlier writings (especially Matilal
1968). One can read "Q (a b)" as "a qualified by b." The similarity of this
symbolism with Strawson's "ass (i c)" may not be only superficial. As far
as the separation of the syncategorematic element of a given combination is
concerned, both agree. Both leave us open to treat the "predicate" element
as a singular (abstract) property. For the cognition of a blue pot can be
expressed either as a sentence (“This pot is blue.") or as a phrase (“this
blue pot"). Besides, our symbolism admits the following two basic rules:

(1) Q (a b) . Q (a c) ---t Q (a (b c))

(2) Q (a b) . Q (b c) ---t Q (a Q (b c)).

"Q (a (b c))" can be read as "a is qualified by both band c" and

"Q (a Q (b c))" as "a is qualified by b, and b in its turn is qualified by
c."



Qualifier versus Predicate-Property

A qualifier and a predicate-property may not always be the same, such that
we can say that there is only a terminological variation. In fact, an
Indianist would like to say that not all predicate-properties are
qualifiers nor are all qualifiers predicate-properties This is not simply
because in an expression such as "there lies the blue pot" the qualifier,
which is the blue pot, would probably not be called a predicate property.
Even if we concede this, still, in a given situation, a predicate-property
Even if we concede this, still, in a given situation, a predicate-property
that is, what the Indianist would call a vidheya dharma, may not be the
same as the qualifier property (viseshana).



    Let me illustrate this point. Suppose I wish to infer a property, s, as
belonging to a given locus, p. Naturally the inferable, for example, the
to-be-inferred property (sadhya), would be the vidheya-dharma, for example,
the predicate-property.  ccording to our basic intuition, the subject is
what is being talked about and the predicate is what is being talked about
it. Sometimes, it has been said to be a

distinction between that and what. Consider now the following two
"Propositionally equivalent" verbalized expressions, representing two
numerically different knowledge-episodes:

(a) Sound (noise is impermanent (that is, impermanence possessing.)

(b) Impermanence resides in sound (noise).

The qualifier in the first is impermanence while in the second, it is
residence-in-sound. The qualify-and in (a) is sound but in (b) impermanence
is the qualify-and. Thus, the qualifier-qualify and distinction is always
related to the structure of some knowledge episode or qualificative
cognition. However, both (a) and (b) can

alternatively, be reached as inferred conclusions, for example, as the
resulting knowledge-episodes of a process of inference. In either case, the
to-be-inferred property, that is, the predicate-property, remains the same,
impermanence. For, it does not matter whether (a) is reached or derived
from the knowledge-episode (p remise)," sound has product-hood which is
pervaded by impermanence" or (b) is reached from "product-hood which is
pervaded by impermanence resides in

sound;" in either case, it cannot be denied that impermanence is the
property we wish to establish by the inference. This may lead one to
believe that the qualifier-qualify distinction is perhaps closer to a
subject-predicate distinction conceived as based upon a grammatical
criterion (d. Strawson n 1974), though even this could be misleading.      KR
 PART 7   21   2   23

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