INDIAN LOGIC PART 9 24223 KR IRS

7 PROPERTIES: LOCUS AND LOCATEE



I have been suggesting that a "property-location "model best suits the
arguments and inference-patterns studied in Sanskrit. What is this model?
As we have noted, to some extent it appears to be similar to the imaginary
language called the "language without particulars," or "feature-placing"
language, which was described by Strawson (1959). He has also pointed out
the limitations of such a language. The

Sanskrit logicians' language is not exactly the same, there being important
differences which will be noted presently. It is not clear, however,
whether, in virtue of these differences, the language studied and developed
by the Sanskrit logicians would overcome the alleged difficulties faced by
feature-placing languages. First, a terminological problem: using the word
"property" as a translation of the Sanskrit word "dharma" has rather
unfortunate consequences for the word "dharma" has a wider extension than
the word "property," and also has many non-logical connotations. But the
situation need not be regarded as hopeless. "Dharma" sometimes means not
only abstract properties or universals but also concrete

features, that is, the particular features of some object or locus.





"Dharma" and "dharmin" constitute a pair in Sanskrit that is equivalent to
the pair "locatee" (or the locatable) and "locus" (location, which may be a
place or a time or even an abstract object). What Strawson called a
"feature" would be a locatee on this view. A particular property is not a
"property-particular," but a locate (or a locatable) can be a particular in
the sense of being a unique characteristic of a singular locus: for
example, sky-hood belonging to the sky, and the sky only. The particular
feature of a person would be her unique dharma or a locatee of which she is
the locus. However, dharmas in Sanskrit include not only qualities like
color and shape, attributes like the motion of a moving body, abstract
universals like

pot-hood or cow-hood, but also the concrete substantial masses like the
particular body of water or fire, or even such concrete objects like a post
or a rock! It is the last two groups of dharma or locatee that would call
for some explanation. It would be very difficult to call them "properties,"
if we followed the conventions of the English language. That is why I have
chosen terms like "locatee" or "the locatable." Consider the following
sentences:

(1) There is black ice on the road.

(2) There is fire on the hill.

(3) There is a pot on the ground.

These three would be transformationally equivalent to:

(4) The road has black-ice on it, or, the road IS black-ice possess.

(5) The hill is fire-possessing.

(6) The ground is pot-possessing.

The expressions (4)-(6) clearly underscore the locus-locatee model by
combining two particulars, if we rephrase them as:

(7) Some black-ice is located on the road.

(8) Some (body of) fire is on the hill.

(9) Some (indefinite) pot is on the ground.

Here the left-hand side gives the locatees and the right-hand side the
loci. This is not a language without particulars, rather a language with
particulars only, the universal element being implicitly present only in
the relational factor - the combiner of locus and locatee. The Sanskrit
linguistic intuition would allow us to call the three elements, black-ice,
fire, and a pot, dharmas of their respective loci (dharmins). But we cannot
call them properties, according to the ordinary linguistic intuition of
English. For it is counter-intuitive to call a pot a property of the ground
on which it is present. Let us see why.



     The logical language in Sanskrit was obviously influenced by the
grammatical analysis of the Sanskrit language. This is a thesis which
scholars like Staal and Faddegon formulated, though they never cited any
cogent argument in its favor. Certain grammatical operations are
particularly relevant here: namely, use of the location suffixes and the
reciprocal use of the possessive suffixes. We can say, "There is a pot on
the ground" (= bhatale ghatal?) which is equivalent to "The

ground (is) pot-possessing"(= ghatavadb hutalam). This equivalence in
Sanskrit is much like the equivalence between passive and active
constructions in English. The expression" pot-possessing is a bit odd, and
sounds artificial in English due to the paucity of possessive suffixes in
English. One may think of "health" and "healthy" or

"wealth" and "wealthy," but these are rare. On the other hand, "ghatavad"
(= pot-possessing) seems as common in Sanskrit as "sweet" or "blue", or
other such adjectival expressions.



    A predicate expression, in the canonical notation of Quine, is
syntactically akin to a verb since it combines the double function of
specifying a general concept and a propositional combination. If a
predicate expression is taken to be a sortal, then it is syntactically akin
to a common noun. The nominal "man" or "pot" specifies a general

concept that supplies the principle of individuating the particulars it
collects. Analogically, we may speak of the predicate expressions of the
Sanskrit logicians as syntactically akin to the adjectival. Adjectives are
usually found without articles or plurals, although there are certain clear
cases of adjectives that specify sortal universals, or to use Quine's term,
terms which "divide their reference", for

example the term "spherical." Adjectives and mass terms (feature-words) s
hare some grammatical properties. However, the received opinion has been
that we will be better off by assimilating the adjectives into general
terms, whose paradigms are sortal-terms. The grammar of our adult language
provides us with the mechanism of deriving an abstract property from each
adjectival. This is as much true of a natural language like Sanskrit as it
is of English and Latin. Thanks to the predominance of

"have" verbs in English or Latin, use of abstract singular terms derived
from adjectives or nouns does not sound odd in such languages. Thus "a is
f' or "this mango is sweet" can be easily rephrased as "haziness" or "this
mango has sweetness. In Sanskrit the "have" verb is usually missing. But
the use of genitive and locative suffices makes a smooth transition from
the adjectival to the abstract

singulars possible, for example:

(10) pato nila/:; (= The cloth (is) blue)

(11) patasya nilimii (asti) (= The blue colour of the cloth is there)

(12) pate nilam (asti) (= There is blue colour in the cloth).

Although these are equivalent, (11) seems to particularize the general

concept "blue color," that is, the locatee. The most common form of the
substantive suffix in Sanskritistva or -tii (comparable to English "-ness"
or "-hood"). This mechanism of substantification turns both adjectival and
nominalism into words

expressing the so-called abstract locatable. And a locatee-word can easily
be turned into an adjectival by the use of possessive suffixes, -vat, -mat
and -in . Sanskrit logicians use this double mechanism of substantivizing
and possessive suffixes to assimilate the usual subject predicates
sentences in to their locus-locatee model. Thus:

(13) The mango is sweet becomes

(14) The mango is sweetness-possessing.

Remember the manoeuvre from (4)-(6) to (7)-(9). Can we do the same
manoeuvre in (14)? (14) would then be:

(15) (There is) sweetness-possessing-neins st he mango, or

(16) (There is) sweetness in the mango.

We are back to the locus-locatee model, where here the locus = the mango,
and the locatee = sweetness-possessing-ne=s sweetness. So far very few
would object to the equation - sweet-ness-possessing-ness = sweetness Can
we generalize it? Can we say:

(17) x-possessing-nes=s x? Sanskrit logicians argue that the two operations
- use of possessive suffix and substantification- are reciprocal to each
other. Hence,

(18) x + vat + tva = x, (tadvattva1!1 tad eva). If we accept this, then we
have to allow such equations as:

(19) Fire-possessing-nes=s fire.

(20) Pot-possessing-nes=s p ot or (a pot?).



  This means that as locatees or dharmas, it does not make a difference
whether we say "fire-possessingness or "fire." On the other hand,
ontological worries notwithstanding, one may call pot-possessingness a
property of the ground, but not "pot" or a pot. But as locatees, dharmas,
there is not much difference! That is, at least, the claim by the Sanskrit
logicians. The Sanskrit grammarians who discuss the

meaning of the suffixes such astva and -vat, would support such
conversions. The oddity of this claim must be explained further. The
expression "pot-possessing" is an adjectival or what Strawson calls a
g-word. Hence it is on a par with "sweetness-possessing We may accept
"sweetness-possessingness” being conveniently abbreviated as, or equated
to, "sweet-ness," for both denote in some sense, abstract properties. But
(19) and (20) do not seem to be acceptable equations

because not only is a pot or fire a "concrete" object (as in "a pot is
blue" or "fire burns") but even their predicative use ("This is a pot" or
"This is fire") introduces a sortal universal, a concept, that applies to
an object that the subject term is supposed to identify. The proposal of
the Sanskrit logicians seems to be one for a third use of such terms,
distinct from "pot" in the subject place or the predicate

place. The word in (20) introduces a locatee -a non-particular potty
feature of some locus. The word "fire" in (19) then introduces a locatee -a
fiery feature, or fire-presence. We may recall here that Quine has remarked
that the feature-words or the mass terms have the "hybrid air of abstract
singular terms." We may substitute

"genuine" for "hybrid," for a locatee such as fire may be a quasi-abstract
entity. The word "pot" in (20) may then be regarded as indicating a potty
substance or pot-presence to bring it closer to fire, a feature as in (19).
We have thus clarified what the Sanskrit logicians meant by dharma and
dharmin, the locatee and the locus. We may translate dharma as "property"
only out of politeness. But to do justice to such

cases as (19) and (20), we may use "locatee" or "the locatable." This
category of the locatee seems to include not only general attributes, but
also abstract and quasi-abstract entities. If the expression" pot" seems
awkward we may make it "pot-presence. "In fact, what I call the
presence-range and absence-range of such locatees or dharmas would be more
useful in the formulation of the rules of inference in this language.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Thatha_Patty" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/thatha_patty/CAL5XZoogvzApz4isM%2B%2B9LNEyY4mh_hCVRviSXVeGjNMPeP7f0Q%40mail.gmail.com.

Reply via email to