PRECEPTORS OF ADVAITHAM K RAJARAM IRS 26 9 24 PART 10
CHITSUKHA b yS. Krishnamurti Sastr iNyāya Śiromaṇi
Chitsukha is one of the outstanding āchāryas who contributed to the
development of the dialectical phase of Advaita. The background to his
distinctive contribution may be stated in brief.
>From the time of Nāgārjuna, Chandrakīrti, and Āryadeva, the Bauddhas had
taken to the use of the dialectical method of logical discussions. In the
eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries the Naiyāyikas also adopted this method,
and Nyāya authors such as Jayanta, Udayana, Vātsyāyana, and Uddyodakara
vigorously introduced than in philosophy. But though these writers utilized
the dialectical method of Nāgārjuna’s arguments, there was little attempt
on their part to develop the formal side as such of the method. It was only
the later Nyāya writers that began to devote special attention to the
dialectic as a method and develop it with rigorous attention to its form.
This they sought to do by formulating definitions for the various
categories of experience and offer criticisms with emphasis on the formal
and scholastic side of arguments. This movement, namely logical formalism,
which was steadily growing among the Naiyāyikas in the tenth and eleventh
centuries attained its culmination in the works of writers like Raghunātha
Śiromaṇi, Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭāchārya, Mathurānātha Bhaṭṭāchārya, and Gadādhara
Bhaṭṭāchārya. One notable instance of this over-emphasis on formalism and
scholasticism is the formulation of the mahā-vidyā modes of syllogism by
Kulārka Paṇḍita in the eleventh century. {KR: This para is earmarked to
prove that ADISHANKARA AND THE CITCHUSHA ARE OR CANNOT BE COMNTEMPORARIES
AS CITSHUSHA FOLLOWED THE ADVBAITHAM REFINED BY ADI SHANKARA; WHEN I SAID
THIS YOU MAY NOT UNDERSTAND; ADISHANKATA AND DHARMA KEERTHIS ARE MADE
CONTEMPORARIES OF 420 AD AND DENIED THAT ADI SHANKARA ERA AS 450 BCE ; so
by advaitha history itself it may be shown that adi shankara was not
definetely belonging to ad when citshusha his lien to adi shankaera by
generatrions are distinguishable}
The mahā-vidyā modes of syllogism were invented by Kulārka Pāṇḍita for
refuting the Mīmāṃsā arguments for the eternality of sounds and proving the
non-eternality of sounds. But if these modes of syllogism could be regarded
as valid, they would have a general application, i.e. they could be used
for proving or disproving any theory or doctrine. The special feature of
the mahā-vidyā syllogism was that it attempted to formulate definitions for
all that is knowable. Kulārka Paṇḍita’s Daśa-ślokī-imahā-vidyā-sūtra
contains sixteen different types of definitions for sixteen different types
of mahā-vidyā syllogisms. Such an attempt naturally produced a reaction on
the Advaitic doctrine that all that is knowable is indefinable and unreal,
which consequently appeared to be losing ground. In the eleventh century
and in the early part of the twelfth century writers like Ānandabodha and
his commentator, Anubhūtisvarūpa attempted to uphold the Advaitic doctrine
on logical grounds. But it was Śrī-Harsha who in the third quarter of the
twelfth century for the first time effectively refuted the entire logical
apparatus of the Naiyāyikas. With Śrī-Harsha thus began the special study
of the dialectical method among Advaitic writers—though the use of the
dialectical method in Advaita could be traced back even to āchārya Śaṅkara
who utilized it in the refutation of the Bauddha, Jaina, Vaiśeṣika, and
other systems of philosophy. Śrī-Harsha’s work was carried on by Chitsukha
in the early part of the thirteenth century, by Ānandajñāna or Ānandagiri
in the latter part of the same century and subsequently by a number of
minor writers, by Nṛsiṃhāśrama Muni in the sixteenth century followed by
his pupil Nārāyaṇāśrama, and by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the seventeenth
century.
The formal criticisms of Śrī-Harsha produced a new awakening among the
Naiyāyikas who began to devote their whole attention to perfecting the
formal accuracy of their definitions and methods to the utter neglect of
the development of the content of their philosophy. This naturally enabled
the Naiyāyikas to employ their tools successfully in debates. But as a
result of this it became essential for Advaitins also to master the methods
of this new formalism for the defence of their own views to the neglect of
new creations in philosophy. Thus in the history of Advaita dialectic we
can find two stages. In the eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries,
when the controversies of the Advaitins were mainly with the Bauddhas,
Mīmāṃsakas, and Naiyāyikas, the element of formalism in the Advaita
arguments was at its lowest, and the arguments were based largely on the
analysis of experience from the Advaita standpoint and its general approach
to philosophy. But in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the controversy
was largely with the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools and was based on
considerations of logical formalism more anything else. For the most part
criticisms were nothing more than criticisms of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika
definitions. From the thirteenth century onwards the Advaitins’ attack was
directed against the followers of Rāmānuja and later of Madhva, who,
themselves adopting the method of dialectic, were strongly criticizing the
arguments of the Advaitins. But this change of target for the Advaita
writers meant little change in their strategy. The method of dialectic had
attained such an importance that though the Vaiṣṇava critics brought many
new considerations into the controversy, the dialectical method never lost
its high place in the argument of the Advaita thinkers.
When we consider the place of Chitsukha in the history of Advaita against
this background, we find that he was one of the pioneers of dialectical
Advaita. Chitsukha flourished in the early part of the thirteenth century.
He was a pupil of Gauḍeśvara āchārya, also called Jñānottama. (This
Jñānottama was a saṃnyāsin, and is the one who wrote Nyāya-sudhā and
Jñāna-siddhi, and is different from the Jñānottama [miśra] who wrote a
commentary on Sureśvara’s Naiṣkarmyasiddhi). Chitsukha wrote a commentary
on Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭārakāchārya’s Nyāya-makaranda and also on Śrī-Harsha’s
Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya and an independent work called Tattva-pradīpikā or
Chitsukhī. In the Tattva-pradīpikā he quotes Udayana, Uddyodakara,
Kumārila, Padmapāda, Vallabha (Līlāvatī), Śālikanātha, Sureśvara,
Śivāditya, Kulārka Paṇḍita, and Śrīdhara (Nyāya-kandalī). This work has
been commented on by Pratyagbhagavān (A.D. 1400) in his Nayana-prasādinī.
In addition to these Chitsukha produced a work called
Vivaraṇa-tātparya-dīpikā and an index to the adhikaraṇas of the
Brahma-sūtra, called Adhikaraṇa-mañjarl, and wrote a commentary on the
Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, called Bhāṣya-bhāva-prakāśikā, a commentary
on the Pramāṇamālā of Ānandabodha, and a commentary on Maṇḍana’s
Brahma-siddhi, called Abhiprāya-prakāśikā.
The writer with whom Chitsukha is intimately connected is Śrī-Harsha.
Śrī-Harsha lived probably during the middle of the twelfth century- His
most important work is the Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya, In this he refutes all
the definitions of the Nyāya system by which it justifies the reality of
all that is known, and tries to show that the world which is experienced is
purely phenomenal, having only relative existence based on practical
grounds. The essence of Śrī-Harsha’s dialectic is this. The reality of the
tilings one defines depends upon the unimpeachable character of the
definitions; but all definitions are faulty, as they involve the fallacy of
argument in a circle (chakraka); and hence the real nature of things can in
no way be defined. Our world of experience consists of knower, known, and
knowledge. None of these can be defined without reference to the rest. On
account of this relativity, it is impossible to define the reality of any
of these. The only reality is the self-luminous Brahman of pure
consciousness.
A characteristic feature of Śrī-Harsha’s refutation is that while he showed
that the formal definitions of the categories put forward by the Nyāya were
faulty, he did not attempt to show that the concepts involved in those
definitions were impossible. The way in which a concept is presented may be
faulty, but this does not mean that the concept itself is false. If the
concepts representing the world appearance are to be shown as false, they
must themselves be analysed and shown to be fraught with such inherent
contradictions that, in whatever way they are defined, they will not be rid
of these contradictions. Iśrī-Harsha does not seem to make any deliberate
attempt to do this. This deficiency is made good by Chitsukha.
In his Tattva-pradīpikā Chitsukha not only furnishes, like Śrī-Harsha, a
refutation of the Nyāya categories, thereby defending the doctrine of
Advaita, but also gives us a very keen analysis and interpretation of some
of the more important concepts of Advaita-Vedānta. Thus Pandit Harinātha
Śarmā in his Sanskrit introduction to the Tattva-pradīpikā speaks of this
work as being not only a defence of the philosophy of Advaita but also an
exposition and interpretation of it:
‘advaita-siddhānta-rakṣako’py ūdvaita-siddhānta-prakāśako vyutpādakaś cha’.
The work is written in four chapters. In the first chapter Chitsukha deals
with the interpretation of the Advaita concepts such as self-revelation
(sva-prakāśatva), the nature of the self as consciousness (atmanaḥ
samvid-rūpatva), and the nature of ignorance as darkness. In the second
chapter he refutes the Nyāya categories such as difference, separateness,
and quality. In the third chapter he deals with the possibility of
realizing Brahman and how release comes through knowledge. In the fourth
chapter he deals with the nature of the ultimate state of liberation. The
first two chapters form the major portion of the work, and the third and
fourth are much smaller in size. This may be taken as itself an indication
of the main purpose of the work which was on the one hand to defend Advaita
by the refutation of the Nyāya system and on the other to expound and
interpret the Advaita concepts.
Chitsukha owes the basis of his work to the earlier contribution of
Śrī-Harsha, and the kinds of Nyāya categories discussed by Chitsukha are
mostly the same as discussed in Śrī-Harsha’s Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya. But
the arguments of Chitsukha are in many cases new and different from those
given by Śrī-Harsha. Chitsukha’s general approach to the refutation of the
categories is also slightly different. For, as Dasgupta says, “unlike
Śrī-Harsha, Chitsukha dealt with the principal propositions of the Vedānta,
and his refutations of the Nyāya categories were not intended so much to
show that they were inexplicable or indefinable as to show that they were
false appearances, and that the pure self-revealing Brahman was the only
reality and truth.”
{Refer to [1]: See S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.
II, pp. 46-163.} Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
ANUBHUTISVARUPA by L. Vasudeva Sarma M.A.
Anubhūtisvarūpa has been well-known in the history of grammar, if not in
that of Advaita. His Sārasvata grammar has long been in print. The identity
and the several works of Anubhūtisvarūpa in the field of Advaita have been
discussed by Dr V. Raghavan in his paper on Anubhūtisvarūpa published in
the Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Anubhūtisvarūpa
wrote mainly commentaries. All the three Prakaraṇas of Ānandabodha received
his attention and we have manuscripts of his glosses on the Nyāya-makaranda
(the saṅgraha) , the Nyā yadīpāvalī (Chandrikā) and the Pramāṇamālā
(Nibandha). Among other standard authors whose works Anubhūtisvarūpa has
commented upon are Śaṅkara, Vimuktātman, and Śrī-Harsha. On Śaṅkara’s
Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, Anubhūtisvarūpa wrote the commentary called
Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa, and on his bhāṣya on the Māṇḍūkya-kārikās of
Gauḍapāda a brief ṭippaṇa was written by Anubhūtisvarūpa; and three
manuscripts of this work are known to exist. On the Iṣṭa-siddhi of
Vimuktātman, he wrote an extensive commentary called Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivaraṇa
which is available in manuscript in the Government Oriental Manuscripts
Library, Madras. His commentary on Śrī-Harsha’s Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya also
is not printed and it is available in a single manuscript in the Big
Bhandar at Jessalamere. In the Gītā-prasthāna, Anubhūtisvarūpa made his
contribution in the form of a brief gloss on Śaṅkara's Gitiā-bhāṣya which
is still in manuscript.
Anubhūtisvarūpa for all that he wrote became a forgotten author in the
history of Advaita. But it should not be supposed that there was no trace
left at all of him in the writings of the later Advaitins. His commentaries
on Vimuktātman, Śrī-Harsha and Ānandabodha, no doubt fell into oblivion;
but his commentary on the bhāṣya of Śrī Śaṅkara on the Brahma-sūtra,
namely, the Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa was remembered in the Advaitic tradition.
Even in this case his real identity was lost and he was remembered only as
Prakaṭārtha-kāra or the author of the Prakatārtha.
To begin with, Anubhūtisvarūpa is very critical about Vāchaspatimiśra.
Amalānanda-Vyāsāśrama wrote in the later part of the 13th century his
Kalpataru on the Bhāmatī of Vāchaspati-miśra; and without mentioning the
name of Anubhūtisvarūpa he defended Vāchaspati against his criticism. The
reference in Amalānanda’s work could easily be identified as one to
Anubhūtisvarūpa. An express identification of the reply in Amalānanda as
directed against the Prakaṭārtha-kāra is to be had in the Ratnaprabhā of
Govindānanda
Appayya Dīkṣita, the most noteworthy and versatile writer among the later
Advaitins makes more than one reference to Prakatārtha-kāra in his
Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha.
The above references have been pointed out to show that some of the
criticisms and specific views of our author had not been completely
forgotten.
Date of Anubhūtisvarūpa
Śrī-Harsha on whose Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya, Anubhūtisvarūpa has commented
flourished in the middle of the 12th Century A.D. Amalānanda, the
commentator on Vāchaspati’s Bhāmatī, replies, without mentioning the name,
to Anubhūtisvarūpa’s criticisms of Vāchaspati. At the end of his Kalpataru,
Amalānanda mentions that he wrote under the Yādava King of Devagiri, Kṛṣṇa,
(1248-1259 A.D.) and his brother Mahādeva. So we may take Anubhūtisvarūpa
as having flourished between the middle of the 12th Century and the first
half of the 13th Century.
Anubhūtisvarūpa’s important contribution to Advaita lies in his view
regarding avidyā. In Advaita, the supreme lord, the individual soul, and
the phenomenal world are but the appearances of the transcendent Reality,
Brahman. The principle that accounts for this seeming diversification of
Brahman is avidyā or māyā.
Some Advaitins draw a distinction between māyā and avidyā. Bhāratītīrtha in
the Pañchadaśī distinguishes avidyā, the impure-sattva-predominant prakṛti
from māyā, the pure-sattva-predominant prākṛti. The former is the adjunct
of the Lord. In the Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha, however, Bhāratītīrtha
follows the Vivaraṇa tradition of not making any difference between māyā
and nescience (avidyā) Anubhūtisvarūpa closely follows the Vivaraṇa school
and he does not make any distinction between māyā and avidyā. He holds that
the beginningless, indeterminable primal cause of beings which is present
in the pure consciousness is māyā. The limited innumerable parts of māyā
are endowed with the concealing and revealing powers and are called ajñāna.
Thus Anubhūtisvarūpa by referring to ajñāna or avidyā as the parts of māyā
considers them to be identical
As regards the locus and content of māyā or avidyā, Anubhūtisvarūpa’s view
is not very clear. He closely follows the Vivaraṇa school. This school
maintains that Brahman, the pure consciousness is the locus and content of
māyā or avidyā. Anubhūtisvarūpa says that māyā is present in or associated
with pure consciousness as such. From this we may take that according to
Anubhūtisvarūpa Brahman itself is the locus and content of māyā or avidyā.
As regards the nature of the supreme lord and the individual soul there is
difference of opinion between the two main post-Śaṅkara Advaita schools —
the Vivaraṇa and the Bhāmatī. According to the former view, the individual
soul is the reflection of consciousness in avidyā, and consciousness that
serves as the original is the Supreme Lord. This view is known as
pratibiṃba-vāda. According to the Bhāmatī view, consciousness delimited by
māyā is the individual soul and the consciousness which is not delimited by
māyā is the Supreme Lord. Anubhūtisvarūpa follows the pratibiṃba-vāda. He,
however, makes some improvement on it.
He holds that pure consciousness when reflected in ajñāna or avidyā which
is a part of māyā is the individual soul. And the consciousness that
transcends māyā is the śuddhachaitanya. The parts of māyā which are termed
ajñāna are innumerable. And, since the consciousness reflected in ajñāna is
the individual soul and since there is a plurality of ajñāna, there are
many individual souls.
Anubhūtisvarūpa maintains the distinction of released and bound souls thus:
In the case of an individual soul who has attained to the knowledge of
Brahman, his ajñāna which is the part of māyā is annihilated and thereby he
is released. The universe which is the transformation of māyā continues to
exist; but the released soul is not attached to it, just as a blind man
cannot see the colour although it exists. Māyā would be annihilated only
when all its parts are annihilated, that is when all the individual souk
attain to the knowledge of Brahman.
Appayya Dīkṣita in his Siddkāntaleśa-saṅgraha in the very first topic
expounds the view that the injunction as regards the study of Vedānta,
reflection, and meditation contained in the Upaniṣadic text that ‘Ātman is
to be seen, heard, reflected on and meditated upon’ is an apūrva-vidhi;
and, this is the view of Anubhūtisvarūpa
It may be added here that the author of the Vivaraṇa maintains that there
is niyama-vidhi, while Vāchaspatimiśra holds that there is no injunction at
all.
Anubhūtisvarūpa flourished in an age when post-Śaṅkara Advaita had to
contend against the Bhedābheda-vāda of Bhāskara and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
Anubhūtisvarūpa attacked bitterly Bhāskara who opposed the philosophy of
Śaṅkara. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists hold several categories all of which
are not acceptable to the Advaitins. And, they form the target of attack
for Anubhūtisvarūpa. By refuting the two schools mentioned above,
Anubhūtisvarūpa rendered a solid service to the cause of Advaita.
{Refer to:Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita, p. 229.}
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AMALANANDA Rajesvara Sastri Dravid Mahāmahopādhyāya
Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita, the most noteworthy and versatile Advaita scholar, in
the beginning of his work Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha observes:
“Victorious is the auspicious birth-destroying discourse (the Sūtrabhāṣya),
which issues forth from the blessed lotus face of the Bhagavadpāda, has for
its sole purport the non-dual Brahman, and is diversified a thousand-fold
on reaching the (numerous) ancient preceptors (who expounded it), in the
same way as the river (Gaṅgā), which issuing from the feet of Viṣṇu, is
diversified on reaching different lands”
Ancient preceptors of Advaita who wrote commentaries and treatises on the
Sūtrabhāṣya, of Śaṅkara with a view to determine its import were keen on
establishing the unity of the self. And, in order to establish this, they
advocated several theories which differ among themselves. All these
differing theories, however, pertain only to the empirical stage, and hence
they do not in any way stultify the non-dual nature of the self. Sureśvara,
well-known as the author of the Vārtikas, states that by whichever theory
one attains to the knowledge of Brahman that theory must be taken to be the
best; and there are many theories within the fold of Advaita.
Among the manifold theories explored and expounded by the ancient
preceptors, the theories advocated by Vāchaspatimiśra in his commentary,
Bhāmatī, on the Sūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkara are prominent His work is
traditionally known as the Bhāmatīprasthāna. He wrote treatises on the six
orthodox darśanas, and was well-versed in Nyāya, Mīmāṃsa and Vyākaraṇa. The
word prasthāna etymologically derived means a work by which is determined
(sthīyate-nirṇīyate) beyond all uncertainty (prakarsheṇa) the import of the
Sūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkara. The work Bhāmatī determines beyond all uncertainty
the import of the Sūtrabhāṣya of Śaṅkara and hence it is called a prasthāna.
The views set forth in the Bhāmatī are difficult to understand and, in
order to favour the earnest students of Advaita, Śrī Amalānanda wrote a
commentary on it by name V edāntakalpataru. Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita in his
Parimala on the Vedāntakalpataru says that the latter gives room, like the
aerial car of Puṣpaka, to the manifold theories set forth by wise men. We
shall now set forth briefly some unique features of the Kalpataru in the
interpretation of the Bhāmatī on the Chatussūtrī portion of the Sūtrabhāṣya.
Śrī Śaṅkara in his adhyāsabhāṣya states, ‘After imposing on each the nature
and the attributes of the other through non-discrimination of each from the
other in the case of attributes absolutely distinct among themselves as
also of the substrates absolutely distinct among themselves, there is this
natural empirical usage like, “I am this”, and “this is mine”, coupling the
true with the untrue, with its cause in the illusory cognition’
The Bhāmatī on this passage is as follows: The true is the intelligent
self; the untrue are the intellect, the sense-organs, the body, etc.;
coupling (mithunīkṛtya) these two substrates; coupling means yoking
(yugalīkṛtya),
Although the word mithunīkṛtya is interpreted in the sense of yugalīkṛtya,
yet the intended sense is not clear. A doubt naturally arises whether this
yugalīkaraṇa means the relations of contact, etc., or a unique kind of
relation.
Amalānanda in the Kalpataru explains the word “yugalīkaraṇa ” .thus: The
manifestation of the substrate and the object superimposed is yugalīkaraṇa.
“yugalīkaraṇam nāma adhiṣṭhānāropyayoḥ svarūpeṇa buddhau bhānam.”
This definition has one difficulty. Yugalīkaraṇa is the cause of
superimposition. And, it is interpreted to mean the manifestation of
substrate and the object superimposed. The latter, therefore, necessarily
precedes superimposition. But, before the first superimposition of mind on
the self, when one gets back to waking state from deep sleep or at the time
of first creation when the cosmic dissolution is over, the manifestation of
the substrate and the object superimposed, that is, mind, is not possible.
For, it is admitted that at the time of dissolution or deep sleep mind
merges in its cause that is, avidyā. Hence it must be held that the latent
impressions arising out of the manifestation of the substrate and the
object superimposed (mind) before the dissolution or deep sleep is the
cause of the superimposition of mind on the self when one gets back to
waking state from deep sleep or at the time of the first creation when the
cosmic dissolution is over. Yugalīkaraṇa thus comes to mean the latent
impressions arising out of manifestation of the substrate and the object
superimposed. The manifestation of the substrate and the object
superimposed is superimposition. Hence yugalīkaraṇa means the latent
impressions of the earlier superimposition.
Yugalīkaraṇa, therefore, means the latent impressions of the earlier
superimposition which has for its content the substrate and the object
superimposed and whose form is identical with the form of the succeeding
superimposition.
adhyāsasamanākāraḥ adhiṣṭhānāropyaviṣayakaḥ
pūrvabhramasaṃskāraḥ yugalīkaraṇamityarthaḥ.
It has been said that yugalīkaraṇa means manifestation of the substratum
and the object superimposed. From this it should not be understood that
there is the manifestation of the substrate and the superimposed object as
distinct entities. According to Advaita, error is not admitted without a
substratum. What is superimposed is unreal. And it has no existence
independent of the substratum. Substratum is the limit of sublation. And by
its knowledge, the knowledge of the superimposed object is sublated or at
least taken to be not valid. So when it is said that there is manifestation
of the substratum and the object superimposed, it must be understood that
the two are manifest as a blend or a unified whole.
Now it might be objected thus. The manifestation of substratum and the
object superimposed as a unified whole is error or superimposition. It is
the cause of later superimposition. The knowledge of the substratum is
independently the cause of the knowledge of the substratum of the later
superimposition. Similarly the knowledge of the superimposed object is
independently the cause of the knowledge of the superimposed object of the
later superimposition. One need not hold that the form of the earlier
superimposition or its latent impression as such is the cause of the later
superimposition and must correspond to the form of the later
superimposition.
This objection is not valid. One does not have the erroneous cognition in
the form of ‘I am the body’ (aham dehaḥ) although there exists the
knowledge ‘aham’ and ‘dehaḥ’ separately. The reason is that there is no
such previous knowledge and so no such latent impression which could lead
to the superimposition in the form of ‘I am the body’. On the other hand,
there is the superimposition in the form of ‘I am a man’, and this is
caused by the previous superimposition or its latent impression in the form
of ‘I am a man’. Hence the form of the later superimposition corresponds to
the form of the earlier superimposition or its latent impression. And, the
earlier superimposition or its latent impression by having a form similar
to that of the later superimposition is the cause of the later
superimposition. Hence yugalīkaraṇa means earlier superimposition or its
latent impression.
In the adhyāsa-bhāṣya Śaṅkara says: There is this natural empirical usage
like ‘I am this’, and ‘This is mine’. The Bhāmat ī on this passage is as
follows: ‘When there is cognition of what is superimposed, there is the
superimposition of what was formerly seen, while that cognition itself is
conditioned by superimposition; thus, (the defect of) reciprocal dependence
seems difficult to avoid. To ibis he says: “natural”. This empirical usage
is natural, beginningless. Through the beginninglessness of the usage,
there is declared the beginninglessness of its cause—superimposition.
Hence, of the intellect, organs, body, etc., appearing in every prior
illusory cognition, there is use in every subsequent instance of
superimposition. This (process) being beginningless, like (the succession
of) the seed and the sprout, ‘there is no reciprocal dependence; this is
the meaning’.
>From this it is dear that the empirical usage, its cause, that is,
superimposition, and its cause, earlier superimpositions or the latent
impressions—all these are beginningless like a stream. Amalānanda explains
the concept of beginninglessness in the following verse:
tadākṛtyuparaktānām vyaktīnāmekadhā vinā
anādikālāvṛttiḥ yā sā kāryānāditā matā.
Earlier superimpositions or their latent impressions are beginningless in
this sense that there always exists the relation of time to either of
these. In the same way, adhyāsa or superimposition is beginningless in the
sense that superimposition or its subtle form is always related to time.
Similarly, empirical usage is beginningless in this that empirical usage or
its subtle form is always related to time.
Some hold that this series of superimpositions or their laten t impression
is avidyā. And they cite the following texts from the Sūtrabhāṣya to
substantiate their contention.
One text is:
“Wise men consider the superimposition of this nature to be avidyā”;
and the other text is:
“It is for the removal of this cause of evil, for the attainment of the
knowledge of the oneness of the self, that all the Vedāntas are commenced”
On the basis of these texts, some conclude that the Bhāmatī which speaks of
two kinds of nescience in the invocatory verse is not true to the view of
the Sūtrabhāṣya.
In order to remove this misapprehension the Kalpataru states that one kind
of nescience which is beginningless and positive in character is explained
in the devatādhikaraṇa; and the other kind is the series of latent
impressions arising from previous erroneous cognitions. Between these two
kinds of nesdence, the one that is explained in the devatādhikaraṇa is
well-known in the Advaita literature to be the mūlāvidyā, primal nescience.
Now two questions arise, one as to the nature of nescience and another as
to its primal nature. Nescience is that which has undifferentiated
consciousness alone as its content (viṣaya). And it is avidyā in the sense
that it is removable by the intuitive knowledge of Brahman. Or, we may say
that it is avidyā in the sense that it has the characteristic of veil i ng
the true nature of Brahman. And this characteristic of veiling the true
nature of Brahman is present both in the mūlāvidyās and the tūlāvidyās. It
is a jātiviśeṣa; and it gives rise to the empirical usage ‘I do not know’.
Its primal nature consists in this that it is the material cause of the
superimposition of the body, the senses, etc., by veiling the true nature
of the substratum. The phrase “material cause of erroneous cognition
(bramo’pādāna)” occurring in a Kalpataru passage conveys the sense that
mūlāvidyā is the material cause of superimposition by veiling the true
nature of the substratum.
Now an objection may be raised. The superimposition of the body, senses,
etc., is like a continuous stream and so the earlier superimposition is the
cause of the succeeding one. When such is the case there is no necessity to
resort to primal nescience as the cause of superimposition.
This objection does not hold good. Primal nescience serves a two-fold
purpose. One is that it conceals the specific nature of the substratum of
superimposition. There arises the superimposion of silver in the nacre only
when the specific nature of the substratum, that is, the consciousness
delimited by nacre is not manifest. It is an invariable rule that
non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum is the most
important cause of superimposition. The phrases like vivekāgraha, and
asaṃsargāgraha refer only to the non-manifestation of the specific nature
of the substratum. When there is the manifestation of the specific nature
of the substratum, there does not arise superimposition. The chief reason
for this is that there is the absence of the cause of the superimposition,
that is, non-manifestation of the specific nature of the substratum. Thus,
only when there is the nonmanifestation of the specific nature of the
undifferentiated consciousness, could the superimposition of mind, etc., on
the self arise. And, the non-manifestation of the specific nature of Ātman
is caused only by mūlāvidyā. In this sense it is the cause of the
superimposition of mind, etc., on the self and the relation of the self on
the mind, etc.
Another purpose is served by mūlāvidyā. It is the transformative material
cause of the superimposition of the body, senses, etc. It is thus: The
superimposition of the body, senses, etc., has a transformative material
cause, because it is an existent effect, like pot, etc. Thus is assumed
only one transformative material cause with reference to all
superimpositions. It is similar to the Naiyāyika position that only one
omniscient being, that is, God, is inferred to be the efficient cause of
the entire universe. The Upaniṣadic text ‘māyām tu prakṛtim vidyāt māyinam
tu maheśvaram’ affirms avidyā to be the primal cause of the universe.
Although Madhusūdanasarasvatl and Brahmānandasarasvatī established the
validity of the Advaitic truth by adopting the Navya-nyāya method, yet it
must be noted that they adopt the line of arguments of the Kalpataru and
other commentaries. And this is evident from this that both the writers
often refer to the views of the Kalpataru in their works.
There is a bhāṣya text which is as follows:
“There is begun respectful enquiry into the Vedānta texts whose auxiliary
is reasoning not inconsistent therewith and whose purpose is liberation”.
The Bhāmatī on this passage is as follows:
“The enquiry, into the Vedānta is itself reasoning; other reasoning which
does not conflict therewith such aś is mentioned in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and
the Nyāya-sūtras in discussing the authoritativeness of the Veda, of
perception, etc., serves as auxiliary”.
The Kalpataru on the above passage comments that the Nyāya-śāstra, Smṛtis,
etc., are said to be ‘reasonings’ (tarkāḥ) in this that they are
auxiliaries to the understanding of the import of scripture.
Thus the Navya-nyāya terminology also must be taken to be ‘tarka’ and it is
part and parcel of the Vedāntamīmāṃsā. And the later Advaitic writers
adopted the Navya-nyāya method in their works in order to achieve logical
precision.
Amalānanda at the end of the Kalpataru says that he wrote the work under
the Yādava king of Devagiri (the present Doulatabad)—Kṛṣṇa and his brother
Mahādeva (1247-1260 A.D.). Hence Amalānanda flourished in the middle of the
13th century.
In the beginning of the Kalpataru on the third chapter of the Brahma-sūtra,
Amalānanda gives his name as Vyāsāśrama.
“śrīmad vyāsāśramasya prativadanamadāt karṇayugmam viriñchiḥ ”.
In the beginning of the Kalpataru, Amalānanda says that he is the disciple
of Śrī Anubhavānanda.
“yathārthānubhavānanda-padagītam gurum namaḥ ” .
He further states that Śrī Ātmānanda-yati is his grand-preceptor.
“ātmānandayatīśvaram tam aniśam vande gurūṇām gurum.”
And his vidyāguru is Sukhaprakāśa, the disciple of Chitsukha.
“prodyat-tāraka-divya-dīpti-paramām vyomāpi nīrājyate,
gobhīrasya sukhaprakāśaśaśinam tam naumi vidyāgurum ”.
Amalānanda lived in Nasik-trayambaka-kṣetra. In the Samanvayādhikaraṇa
there occurs the following verse in the Kalpataru.
“asti kila brahmagiri nāma girivaraḥ
trayambakajaṭājūṭakalanāya vinirmitā
pāṇḍureva paṭī bhāti yatra godāvarī nadī.”
While commenting on this, Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita states that our author who
lived in Nasik-trayambaka-kṣetra composed his works. Apart from the
Kakpataru on the Bhāmatī , Amalānanda wrote Śāstradarpaṇa an exposition on
the Brahma-sūtra.
K RAJARAM IRS 26 9 24
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