PRECEPTORS OF THE ADVAITHAM K RAJARAM IRS 29924 PART 13 OVINDANANDA by T. R. SUBRAMANIAM Mīmāṃsā Śiromaṇi
Among the commentators on the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śrī Śaṅkara, Govindānanda occupies a unique place. His commentary known as *Ratnaprabhā* is being carefully read by the students of Advaita. The author is profoundly influenced by the views of Padmapāda and Prakāśātman. He has had access to the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa,* a commentary on the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara by Anubhūtisvarūpāchārya, because there are many instances where he shows the influence of that work. It may be added here that Anubhūtisvarūpāchārya also is a follower of the *Vivaraṇa* school. Anubhūtisvarūpāchārya is rather devastatingly critical of Vāchaspatimiśra’s interpretation of the *Sūtrabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. Amalānanda the author of the *Kalpataru* defends Vāchaspati’s interpretation and replies to the criticisms of Anubhūtisvarūpāchārya without mentioning his name. An express identification of the reply of Amalānanda as directed against Anubhūtisvarūpa can be had in the *Ratnaprabhā.* *prakaṭārthakāraistu pāṭhaka-prasiddaḥ antodāttasvaraḥ pāribhāṣika iti vyākhyātam, tadvyākhyānam kalpataruhārair dūṣitam*.[1] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62883.html#note-e-32771> In the interpretation of the *Sūtrabhāṣya* , Govindānanda closely follows Padmapāda. The latter while commenting on the word *mithyā-jñāna* occurring in the *adhyāsabhāṣya* interprets it to mean nescience which is indeterminable and positive in nature. Vāchaspatimisra, on the other hand, interprets it to mean superimposition or erroneous cognition. *mithyājñānam adhyāsaḥ *His contention is that the author of the *bhāṣya* speaks of *avidyā* which is indeterminable and positive in the *devatādhikaraṇa.* And so in the *chatussūttrī* portion it is not necessary to refer to nescience that is positive in nature. He, therefore, maintains that there are two kinds of nescience. One is positive in nature and the other is erroneous cognition or superimposition. And the latter kind is referred to by the word *mithyājñāna* in the *adhyāsabhāṣya.* The correctness of this interpretation is substantiated by the *bhāṣya* text *—tametam evam lakṣaṇam adhyāsam paṇḍitāḥ avidyeti manyante.* Vāchaspatimiśra while commenting on this text observes that the *superimposition* of the not-self on the inner self is alone the cause of all evil, not the delution of silver, etc., hence, that alone is *nescience.* ‘*pratyagātmanyanātmādhyāsa eva sarvānartha-hetuḥ, na punā rajatādivibhrama iti sa eva avidyā*’. >From the above interpretation it would be clear that Vāchaspatimiśra considers superimposition itself to be one kind of nescience. Govindānanda, on the other hand, interprets the word *mithyājñana* to mean nescience that is positive in nature. *mithyājñānanimittah—mithyā cha tad ajñāmm* *cha........ mithyātve sati sākṣāt jñānanivartyatvam ajñānasya lakṣaṇam*. And, in this light he interprets the text *—‘tametam evam lakṣaṇam adhyāsam paṇḍitāḥ avidyeti manyante’.* He says that *adhyāsa or* superimposition is termed *avidyā* because it is an effect of *avidyā*’ *‘ākṣiptam samāhitam uktalakṣaṇalakṣitam adhyāsam, avidyākāryatvād avidyeti manyante*’. About the locus and content of *avidyā* Govindānanda’s view is not clear. Śrī Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* — *‘tadadhīnatvādarthavat* (1.4.3) points out that *avidyā* is *parameśvarāśrayā* and in it the individual souls rest. ‘*parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahāsuptiḥ, yasyām svarūpa-pratibodharahitāḥ śerate saṃsāṛṇo jīvāḥ’.* Vāchaspatimiśra while commenting on this passage holds that the individual soul is the locus of nescience and Brahman is its content. *‘jīvādhikaraṇāpyavidyā nimittatayā viṣayatayā īśvaram āśrayate iti īśvarāśrayetyuchyate na tvādhāratayā’.* Govindānanda, on the other hand, does not interpret the word *parameśvarāśrayā* and hence his view regarding the locus of *avidyā* is not known. He, however, refers to *avidyā* as *īśvare kalpitā.* From this we may take that according to Govindānanda Brahman is the locus of *avidyā.* While commenting on the *Brahma-sūtra ‘aśuddham iti chet na śabdāt*’ (3.1.25) Śrī Śaṅkara observes that the Vedic sentence *‘na himsyāt sarvābhūtāni*’ conveys a general rule (*utsarga*) and the Vedic text *‘agnīṣomīyam paśumālabheta’* sets aside the general rule *(apavāda).* Vāchaspatimiśra observes that each of the two Vedic texts is a valid *pramāṇa.* And, one *pramāṇa* cannot contradict the other *pramāṇa* which is equally valid. So we cannot say that the Vedic text *‘agnīṣomīyam paśum ālabheta’* sets aside the import of the Vedic text *‘na hiṃsyāt sarvā bhūtāni*’. In fact the scope of each of the texts differs and so there arises no question of the one contradicting the other. The Vedic text *‘na hiṃsyāt sarvābhūtāni* imposes a prohibition with reference to killing of animals *out of desire.* The Vedic text *‘agnīṣomīyam paśum ālabheta’* permits killing of an animal *in a sacrifice.* Thus the scope of each of the Vedic texts differs and there is no relation of *utsarga* and *apavāda* between the two. Govindānanda accepts this interpretation. *‘vastutaḥ tasya rāgaprāptahimsāviṣayatvād vaidhahiṃsāyām apravṛtteh*’[2] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62883.html#note-e-32772> There is a discussion whether the Upaniṣadic text ‘*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*’ (that) conveys the sense of injunction with reference to *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana,* and if so what kind of injunction is admitted. This is discussed in the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra’—* *‘sahakāryantara-vidhi pakṣeṇa tṛtīyam tadvato vidyādivat’.* *Anubhūtisvarūpa* in his *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* holds that there is *apūrvavidhi. Prakāśātman* in his *Vivaraṇa* maintains that there is *niyamavidhi.* And, Vāchaspatimiśra maintains that there is no injunction at all. Anubhūtisvarūpa in the *Prakaṭārthavivaraṇa* while commenting on the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* referred to above criticises Vāchaspati as one who does not know the import of the *Sūtra* - *bhāṣya.* Govindānanda holds that there is *apūrvavidhi;* and he observes that some commentators who do not know the import of the *bhāṣya* on the *sūtra* say that there is no *vidhi* at all. *‘etat sūtrabhāṣyabhāvānabhijñāḥ sannyāsāśramadharmaśravaṇādau vidhirnāstīti vadanti.* This charge is levelled against Vāchaspatimiśra. As regards the nature of the individual soul, he admits the well-known theory of *pratibiṃbavāda* advocated by Padmapāda. While commenting on the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra ‘ābhāsa eva cha’* (2.3.50), Govindānanda observes that the consciousness reflected in *avidyā* and its effects such as intellect, etc., is the individual soul.[4] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62883.html#note-e-32774> And, while commenting on the *bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra*, *‘tadadhīnatvādarthavat*’ (1-4-3), he says that the plurality of the limiting adjunct accounts for the plurality of the individual souls. *‘buddhyādyupādhibhedājjīvāḥ’*[5] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62883.html#note-e-32775> Govindānanda is an able commentator of Śaṅkara like Vāchaspatimiśra, Prakāśātman, and Amalānanda. On crucial points he differs from Vāchaspatimiśra, and in this he is very much influenced by Anubhūtisvarūpāchārya. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx SANKHAPANI *by *B. Balasubramanian M.A., PH.D. In the Indian philosophical tradition, the part played by a commentator is valuable and significant. His work is not merely one of interpretation and exposition of the original but also of throwing fresh light on the deeper significance of the text he is commenting on. Thus, the commentary becomes as valuable as the original. By offering a novel interpretation, by placing the text in an entirely new perspective, the commentator makes a “break through”, striking a new line of thinking which becomes in course of time a new school or tradition. Herein lies the significance of the work of a commentator. The literature on Advaita Vedānta abounds in innumerable original and independent treatises as well as commentaries. The *Brahmasiddh* which is the earliest among the works of the *siddhi-literature* is one such valuable and original treatise on the Advaita; and there is an elaborate commentary on it written by Śaṅkhapāṇi. Professor Kuppuswami Sastri, the learned editor of the *Brahmasiddhi,* points out that we do not have any definite information about Śaṅkhapāṇi excepting that he was a Nambudiri Brahmin of Malabar. We do not know whether he wrote any other work in addition to his commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi.* Of the four commentaries known to have been written on the *Brahmasiddhi,* Śaṅkhapāṇi’s commentary appears to be the latest. The *Tattva-samīkṣā* by Vāchaspatimiśra is the earliest commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi*; but no manuscript of this commentary has so far been found. Chitsukha who lived in the 13th century wrote a commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* called *Abhiprāyaprakāśikā.* Ānandapūrṇa who lived in the 14th century wrote his commentary called *Bhāvaśuddhi.* So Śaṅkhapāṇi whose commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* appears to be the latest must have lived after Ānandapūrṇa. Śaṅkhapāṇi’s commentary on the *Brahmasiddhi* is elaborate and exhaustive, clear and lucid. It is obvious that Śaṅkhapāṇi who is greatly influenced by Vāchaspati closely follows the *Tattvasa-mīkṣā.* In the presentation of ideas and the elucidation of problems, he follows the same method adopted by Vāchaspati in his *Bhāmatī.* It is said of Vāchaspati that “he always tries to explain the text as faithfully as he can, keeping himself in the background and directing his knowledge of the subject to the elucidation of the problems which directly arise from the texts and to explaining the allusions and contexts of thoughts, objections and ideas of other schools of thought referred to in the text .”[ <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32777>This is equally true of Śaṅkhapāṇi. His commentary is replete with objections and answers to them, rebuttals and rejoinders. Let us discuss in this paper Śaṅkhapāṇi’s treatment of the Bhāṭṭa view of *bhedābheda* which he exposes to scathing criticism following very closely the arguments stated in the *Brahmasiddhi*.[3] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32778> According to the Mīmāṃsā of the Bhāṭṭa school, the generic attribute *(jāti)* is in the individual object (*vyakti*). Though the generic attribute and the individual object are undoubtedly different from each other, they are not totally different. They are, according to them, different while being the same. If they were entirely different, they should be separable; but they are not, as admitted even by the Vaiśeṣikas. Not only this: if they are absolutely different, the one cannot be equated with the other, and there should be no identification of the two by placing them in co-ordination. Just because they are not totally different, it should not be said that they are absolutely the same. In the proposition, “This is a cow,” the individual object is referred to by the word “this” and the generic attribute by the word “cow.” If the generic attribute and the individual object are identical, then like “*hasta*” and “*kara*”, “this” and “cowness” would turn out to be synonyms.[4] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32779> They are not, however, synonyms. Thus, the generic attribute and the individual object are not totally different; nor are they absolutely the same. They are different, while being the same. The relation between them is identity in difference *(bhedābheda*). We can restate the standpoint of the Bhāṭṭas in this way. Every object is of the nature of the generic attribute and the individual object *(sāmānya viśeṣātmatakam ekaṃ, vastu*); it is a universal-particular. Since the relation between the generic attribute and the individual object is one of difference-cum-identity, the object is of the nature of both identity and difference. The conception of a thing in this doctrine is that of a one-many *(ekaṃ-dvyātmakam).*[5] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32780> Following Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahmasiddhi* , Śaṅkhapāṇi argues that this way of looking at an object as a one-many does not satisfy the demands of reason. To say that an object is of the nature of both identity and difference is to bring together two incompatible factors in the same place and therefore is patently self-contradictory. A cognition which relates to incompatible factors in the same thing is *ipso facto* erroneous. The cognition of an object to the effect, “This is a post or a man”, is erroneous because it relates to incompatible elements in the same thing.[6] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32781> The cognition of an object in the dual form (*dvyātma-kam*) as a universal-cum-particular is on a par with the dubitative cognition *(saṃśaya-jñāna).* When we say, “This is a cow,” our cognition relates to the generic attribute which is the element of *anuvṛtti* and the individual object which is the element of *vyāvṛtti;* it is in the form of the generic attribute and the individual object, and so it is dual in nature. In the same way, the dubitative cognition, “This is a post or a man,” is dual in form in so far as the same object is cognised as a post and a man. There is co-ordination between the generic attribute and the individual object. Similarly in the dubitative cognition referred to above, there is co-ordination between post and man, the two forms of the object. Since the two are on the same footing, Śaṅkhapāṇi insists on the application of the same logic to both. If the dubitative cognition is declared to be erroneous on the score that it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing, the cognition of an object as a universal-particular must also be dubbed erroneous for no other reason than that it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing. If the Bhāṭṭas are bent upon treating the cognition of an object in the dual form of universal-cum-particular as valid, let them equally treat the dubitative cognition of an object which is in the dual form as valid. They are not, however, prepared to adopt this unwelcome position. In other words, the cognition of an object in the dual form of generic attribute-cum-individual object cannot be but invalid.[7] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32782> It may be argued that the comparison between dubitative cognition and the cognition of an object as a universal-particular is not sound as there is an important point of difference between the two. In the one case we cognise an object as a universal *and* a particular. The object is of the nature of both. Our cognition testifies to the combination of two forms in the same place. In other words, our judgment in this case is *conjunctive.* In the case of dubitative cognition, there are alternative predications. The object, we say, is either a post or a man, and not both a post and a man. The dubitative cognition is expressed in a *disjunctive* proposition. Since the judgment is conjunctive in the one case and disjunctive in the other, the two cannot be placed on the same footing. It is true that there is no simultaneous predication of two forms; but the two forms can be predicated of the object alternatively: that is to say, it is a post in one state and a man in another state. If it be said that an object cannot be one thing now and something else at a different time for the simple reason that its nature is determined in one way by the causal conditions responsible for its genesis,[8] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32783> Śaṅkhapāṇi demands consistency in the Bhāṭṭa argument and insists on the application of this s *t* andard to the Bhāṭṭa conception of the object. How can that which is a generic attribute at one time be an individual object at a different time? If an object is “one” (*ekam*) at one time, how can it be “dual” (*dvyātmakam*) at a different time? If it is inconsistent to say that an object which is in one form now is in a different form at a different time, it is also inconsistent to say that an object which is “one” at one time is “dual” at a different time. In another way also it may be argued that the identical treatment meted out to dubitative cognition and the cognition of an object as generic attribute-cum-individual object is not justifiable, as there is a fundamental difference between the two. Dubitative cognition is declared invalid, not because it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing, but because it is sublated by a subsequent cognition which is valid. There is first the dubitative cognition like “This object is a post or a man;” subsequently, let us say, we are in a position to determine the nature of the object and say that it is only a post and not a man. The dubitative cognition which is earlier becomes erroneous since it is sublated by a valid cognition which arises subsequently. But there is no such sublation in the case of our cognition of an object as both generic attribute and individual object; hence it is valid in spite of the fact that it relates to two incompatible factors in the same thing. According to this argument, (i) dubitative cognition is declared to be erroneous not because of the incompatible factors it refers to in the same thing; (ii) but it is declared to be invalid, because it stands contradicted by a subsequent cognition which is valid; and (iii) in spite of the incompatibility between the generic attribute and the individual object, the cognition of an object as of the nature of both is valid, since it is not sublated subsequently. It may, therefore, be argued that there is no parity between dubitative cognition and the cognition of an object as both generic attribute and individual object.[9] <https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book/preceptors-of-advaita/d/doc62884.html#note-e-32784> The issue that has now to be decided is whether the invalidity of dubitative cognition is due to the fact that it relates to incompatible elements in the same thing or to the fact that it stands contradicted by a subsequent cognition which is valid. Śaṅkhapāṇi answers that it is due to the former and not to the latter, if we are able to determine the nature of the object in one way after getting the doubtful cognition, it is undoubtedly true that the subsequent valid cognition sublates the earlier doubtful cognition and renders it invalid. But what are we to say when we are not in a position to determine the nature of the object? It is not always the case that dubitative cognition is followed by a determinate cognition which is valid. If it is not followed by a determinate valid cognition, are we to say that the object is a post in one state and a man in a different state? But it has already been pointed out that an object cannot be one thing now and something also at a different time. So the invalidity of dubitative cognition should not be decided by the test of contradiction by a subsequent valid cognition to which it is exposed; but it should be decided solely on the ground that it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing. If so, irrespective of the fact whether there is contradiction by a subsequent valid cognition or not, the cognition of an object as universal-cum-particular must be declared to be invalid, since it relates to incompatible factors in the same thing like dubitative cognition. There is another reason also to show that the cognition of an object as both generic attribute and individual object is not different from dubitative cognition. We know how in the case of silver-shell illusion the cognition of silver is invalidated by the subsequent cognition of shell which is powerful. There is, on the Bhāṭṭa view, the cognition of the object as “one”; there is also the cognition of it as “dual”. Of these two cognitions which are opposed to each other, whichever is powerful — whether the cognition of oneness or that of duality — will take the field by sublating the other. In that case, the object cannot be “one” *(ekam*) as well as “dual” *(dvyātmakam)* in nature. If it be said that both the cognitions are of equal strength with the result that neither can score a victory over the other, it is undoubtedly a case of doubt. So, the Bhāṭṭa view of the object as a one-many is not satisfactory. The Bhāṭṭas bring in the relation, of difference-eum-identity in order to explain the relation between the generic attribute and the individual object, and so it is incumbent upon them to give definition of difference and of identity. Difference, the Bhāṭṭas could say, is mutual exclusion or mutual non-existence *(anyonyābhāva).* Identity or non-difference could be defined in the opposite way: it is absence of mutual exclusion or mutual nonexistence. In the light of these definitions we have to examine the generic attribute and the individual object. The question that has to be answered by the Bhāṭṭas is this: are the generic attribute and the individual mutually exclusive or not? If they are mutually exclusive like a pot and a cloth, then they are admittedly not one. The Bhāṭṭas are, therefore, at perfect liberty to say that the generic attribute and the individual object are different; but they cannot say that they are also the same. In order to establish their sameness or identity, the Bhāṭṭas could fall back upon the other definition and argue that the generic attribute and the individual object are not mutually exclusive, because by being placed in co-ordination they are cognised as non-different. In that case, it could be said that they are one. In short, the Bhāṭṭas could say either that the generic attribute and the individual object are different or that they are identical; but they could not say that they are both identical and different. So the conception of a thing as a one-many does not hold good. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx LAKṢMIDHARA *by *P. Therugnanasambandam M.A., L.T. Lakṣmīdhara, the author of the *Advaitamakaranda,* a *prakaraṇa* work on Advaita Vedānta, has to his credit two other works, namely, a commentary on *Śrīmad Bhāgavata* and *Bhagavannāmakaumudī* dealing with *nāmasaṃkīrtana* as a means of attainment of *puruṣārthas* and with the meaningfulness of the Purāṇas. This is evident from the author’s own statement in the latter work which is as follows: *yena bhāgavatavyākhyā kṛtāmṭtatarangiṇī advaitamakarandaścha so’karonnāmakaumudīm* Since *Bhagavannāmakaumudī* is commented upon by Anantadeva Bhāratī who lived in the 17th century, Lakṣmīdhara could not have flourished later than this period. Brahmānanda Bhāratī, the author of the *Puruṣārthaprabodha* has commented upon the work of Bhāratītīrtha, guru of Śrī Vidyāraṇya who lived towards the dose of the 14th century A.D. Lakṣmīdhara is quoted by Brahmānanda Bhāratī in his commentary on the *Vākyasudhā,* and hence the author may be placed in the early half of the 15th century. It is suggested by the editor of the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts of the Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal Library (Vol. XIII, No. 7635) that Lakṣmīdhara was the disciple of Anantānanda Raghunātha Yati and that after taking the order of sannyāsa he was known as Krishnendra as is made out by a manuscript of *Advaitamakarandavyākhyā* (No. 7641). Sri S. Srikantha Sastri states that Lakṣmīdhara was the son of Simhala, sister of Śrī Vidyāranya, and that he was probably identical with the natron of the Kannada Poet Madhura in the time of Devarāya I (1406 A.D.). *Iṣṭarthakalpavallī,* a commentary on *Anargharāghavanāṭaka* refers to the fact that Lakṣmīdhara, the commentator came to be known as Rāmānandāśrama when he became a sannyāsin. He is described there as Mīmāṃsādvayapāragah and son of Yajñeśvara and Sarvāmbikā of Charakuri family in Guntur district. He is also credited with the authorship of *Śrutiranjam,* a commentary on *Prasannarāghava* and *Ṣaḍbhāṣāchandrikā,* a Prākrit grammar, and a few other works. But whether this Lakṣmīdhara who flourished in the court of Tirumalaraya of Vijayanagar (1567-1575 A.D.) is identical with Lakṣmīdhara, the author of *Advaita-Makaranda* as claimed by the editor of the Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts of the Tanjore Sarasvatī Mahal Library (Vol. XII, p. 5102), needs examination, as the above information regarding his parentage, name of preceptor, name in sannyāsāśrama, names of works and the period in which he lived does not agree with the information contained in other manuscripts and printed work of *Advaitamakaranda.* The author himself in the colophon to *Bhagavannāmakaumudī* gives the name of his father as Narasiṃha and of his guru as Anantānanda Raghunātha. In the same work he mentions his other two works that have already been referred to. >From the above facts it appears that Lakṣmīdhara, the author of *Advaitamakaranda,* son of Narasimha and disciple of Anantānanda Raghunātha assigned to the 15th century by the editor of Vani Vilas publication is different from the Lakṣmīdhara of Cherukuru family who flourished in the court of Tirumalaraya of Vijayanagara in the later half of the 16th century. The work bears a felicitous name, *Advaitamakaranda,* which as the author himself describes towards the end of the work, is sweet like the honey collected from the autumnal lotus *(Śara-dāmbhojasaṃbhṛta),* capable of delighting the bees, viz., those learned in the śāstras *(vidvadbhṛngāḥ*). ‘ *Advaitam*’ is *Brahman* and *‘makaranda’* is *rasa,* and the title gives the subject-matter of the work, the nature of Brahman, that is identical with *rasa, ‘raso vai saḥ’.* The nature of Brahman can be known only by *‘anubhava’* as the sweetness of honey is experienced only by one who tastes it and not by one who listens to an exposition about its nature. The work contains twenty-seven verses dealing with the nature of *Brahman* that is not different from the soul. These verses are commented upon by *Svayaṃprakāśayati,* disciple of Kaivalyānanda Yogīndra, in a lucid and authoritative manner. The author invokes the blessing of his *iṣṭadevatā* Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the Blissful and Eternal (*anantānanda Kṛṣṇa),* a term which can be taken to make an oblique reference to his teacher Anantānanda Raghunātha, though the commentator takes it only as a *devatānamaskāra* presumably because he was not aware of this fact, being separated by several centuries from the period of the author. The central thesis of this work is *‘brahmaivāham’.* The scriptural statements *‘aham brahmāsmi’, ‘ānandaṃ brahma’;* etc., find effective support in the reasoning contained in the second verse of this work. The non-difference of the soul and *Brahman* is often challenged by the realists on the ground of perceptual testimony like *‘wham īśvaraḥ’.* The commentator clearly brings out that there is no possibility of either the *bāhya* or *mānasa* type of perception relating to the soul as it is formless and beyond even the reach of mind. That the soul is indestructible is established by the author after examining the several ways in which destruction of a thing can be brought about. According to Bauddhas, a thing is destroyed by itself *(svato nāśaḥ).* Secondly, a thing is destroyed by contact with something else as a pot is destroyed by a stick. Thirdly, a thing is destroyed when its substratum ceases to exist as the colour of a cloth when the cloth is destroyed. The first is countered by the ‘pratyabhijñā’ that everyone experiences in forms like ‘yo’aam *suptaḥ svapnam adrākṣam sa eva idānīm jāgarmi’.* The second type of destruction also is not possible because the soul is all-pervasive and impartible. The third type of destruction also is inconceivable because there is no substratum for the soul. It is only *guṇa, kṛyā, jāti,* etc., that have an *āśraya* or substratum and the soul is not any of these. That the knowledge of the universe is rendered possible only by association with an intelligent being is elucidated by the analogy of a pot, the existence of which is cognised only in the presence of light, The author sets forth how the state of wakefulness, dream, and sleep pertain to the ego *(ahaṃkāra)* and not to the soul, the witness (*sākṣī*) of those states. The commentator cites the *vyāpti,* the invariable concomitance *‘yo yajjānati na sa taddharmavān’* in dissociating the soul from the sixfold transformation, viz., origin, existence, growth, change, decay, and cessation. *Kartṛtvam, sākṣitvam,* etc., are only apparent attributes, the soul in reality being attributeless. On the validity of *karmakāṇḍa* of the Veda that speaks about sacrifices and heaven, the author as an Advaitin can only concede a lesser degree of reality to such things, *Brahman* being the ultimate Reality. As Dr S. Radhakrishnan observes, “In later Advaita the comparison of the world to a dream has been stretched to the breaking point.” *Advaitamakaranda* says, ‘In this protracted dream which the world is, projected in that great sleep of ignorance reading the self, flash forth the glimpse of paradise, emancipation, and so forth.’ The distinction of *‘bhogya*’ and ‘*bhoktā’* is held to be a sort of fictitious superimposition on the intelligent soul which is none other than *Brahman.* Any change noticed in the universe is of no consequence so far as their *adhiṣṭhāna,* the *Brahman,* is concerned in the same way as the waves on the surface of the ocean do not produce any the least effect on the deep and calm ocean, their substratum. As Bharatītīrtha puts it ‘Let the cloud of nescience break and pour the rain of universe. There is neither loss nor gain to the ether of consciousness’— *‘māyāmegho jagannīram varṣatveṣa yathā tathā chidākāśasya no hāniḥ na vā lābhaḥ iti sthitiḥ.* *Sattā* (existence) is not an attribute of soul, says the author because there is no reality besides the soul which being one, cannot be supposed to have *sattā* as its attribute in the same way as there can be no *‘nabhastva’* in *‘nabhas’,* space being one. *‘Chit’* (knowledge) is not an attribute of soul but is the very nature of it. The knower and knowable are the same because the soul is self-luminous. ‘*Ānanda*’ is not an attribute of soul but is the very nature of it. *Rasa* is equated with that. In fact *Sat, Chit* and *Ānanda* are not mutually exclusive aspects of *Brahman,* though the terms denote different meanings primarily; the one is non-different from the other and the whole is understood in their secondary sense, one ‘*Sacchidānandaghana.*’ The author concludes by reiterating the non-difference of the soul and Brahman by alluding to the *mahāvākya ‘tattvam asi’* which conveys the grand truth of the Advaita, viz., the soul that is divested of the obsession about the remoteness of perception of *Īśvara,* the delimited nature of the soul and māyō-ridden diversity of worldly phenomena is that Brahman. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx K RAJARAM IRS 29924 END OF PART TO BE CONTD -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Thatha_Patty" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to thatha_patty+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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