On Sat, Oct 24, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Florian Teply <use...@teply.info> wrote:
> Am Wed, 21 Oct 2015 22:54:15 -0700 > schrieb Rob Seaman <sea...@noao.edu>: > > > The Network Time Foundation (through Harlan Stenn’s hard work) has > > already released a patch synchronized with the publication of the > > referenced paper from Boston University: > By the way, if you're running a public facing instance (client or server) the patches in 4.2.8p4 and 4.3.76 are incomplete and don't fix the worst potential problem. If you're concerned about the rate limiting attacks the current best practice is to firewall and disable rate limiting. There are follow-up patches floating about if you want to attempt to resolve the problem locally In my opinion, it would be interesting to know if other implementations > are affected as well. > Any implementation that does spoof-able rate limiting can be attacked. I don't see any mention of that in the OpenBSD conf file nor any mention in the ntimed on github. > But if I read that article on ars technica correctly, it looks like it > is something inherent to the ntp protocol itself and the definitions it > makes. > There are various programs that can exchange packets with an Network Time Foundation (NTF) ntpd (ntimed, openntpd, chrony, sntp etc. etc.) but that don't implement the many many features in the NTF versions. Perhaps that's why none of those programs call themselves ntpd. Interested parties can follow this on the ntp-pool and ntp-hackers lists. _______________________________________________ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.