This has been an area of interest to the US Air Force for many years: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/aviation-international-news/2006-10-18/usaf-facility-tests-gps-jamming-vulnerability
-- Bill Byrom N5BB On Mon, Aug 14, 2017, at 12:46 AM, Clint Jay wrote: > Didn't someone demonstrate this using some rather expensive but 'off the > shelf' Rohde & Schwarz lab gear a year or so ago? > > > > On 12 August 2017 at 22:23, John Allen <j...@pcsupportsolutions.com> > wrote: > > > FYI, John K1AE > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: YCCC [mailto:yccc-boun...@contesting.com] On Behalf Of ROBERT > > DOHERTY > > Sent: Saturday, August 12, 2017 9:26 AM > > To: YCCC Reflector > > Subject: [YCCC] Fwd: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > As if there were not enough problems in the world ..... > > > > Whitey K1VV > > > > > Date: August 12, 2017 at 7:37 AM > > > Subject: Re: [Radio Officers, &c] Ships fooled in GPS spoofing > > attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > > > Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon > > > > > > News from: New Scientis (article reported by R/O Luca Milone – > > IZ7GEG) > > > > > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled- > > in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#. > > WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share https://www.newscientist.com/ > > article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack- > > suggest-russian-cyberweapon/#.WY6zNfZq1VA.google_plusone_share > > > > > > > > > On date: 10 August 2017 > > > > > > By David Hambling > > > > > > > > > Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest > > that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has > > learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare > > available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals. > > > > > > > > > On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland > > incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk > > had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres > > inland, at Gelendzhik Airport. > > > > > > > > > After checking the navigation equipment was working properly, the > > captain contacted other nearby ships. Their AIS traces – signals from the > > automatic identification system used to track vessels – placed them all at > > the same airport. At least 20 ships were affected > > http://maritime-executive.com/editorials/mass-gps-spoofing- > > attack-in-black-sea . > > > > > > > > > While the incident is not yet confirmed, experts think this is the > > first documented use of GPS misdirection – https://www.marad.dot.gov/ > > msci/alert/2017/2017-005a-gps-interference-black-sea/ a spoofing attack > > that has long been warned of but never been seen in the wild. > > > > > > > > > Until now, the biggest worry for GPS has been it can be jammed > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20202-gps-chaos-how- > > a-30-box-can-jam-your-life/ by masking the GPS satellite signal with > > noise. While this can cause chaos, it is also easy to detect. GPS receivers > > sound an alarm when they lose the signal due to jamming. Spoofing is more > > insidious: a false signal from a ground station simply confuses a satellite > > receiver. “Jamming just causes the receiver to die, spoofing causes the > > receiver to lie,” says consultant David Last > > http://www.professordavidlast.co.uk/ , former president of the UK’s Royal > > Institute of Navigation. > > > > > > > > > Todd Humphreys http://www.ae.utexas.edu/faculty/faculty-directory/ > > humphreys , of the University of Texas at Austin, has been warning of the > > coming danger of GPS spoofing for many years. In 2013, he showed how a > > superyacht with state-of-the-art navigation could be lured off-course by > > GPS spoofing. “The receiver’s behaviour in the Black Sea incident was much > > like during the controlled attacks http://onlinelibrary.wiley. > > com/doi/10.1002/navi.183/full my team conducted,” says Humphreys. > > > > > > > > > Humphreys thinks this is Russia experimenting with a new form of > > electronic warfare. Over the past year, GPS spoofing has been causing chaos > > for the receivers on phone apps in central Moscow to misbehave > > https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-kremlin-eats-gps- > > for-breakfast-55823 . The scale of the problem did not become apparent > > until people began trying to play Pokemon Go. The fake signal, which seems > > to centre on the Kremlin, relocates anyone nearby to Vnukovo Airport > > http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2017/01/bizarre-gps- > > spoofing-means-drivers-near-kremlin-always-airport/ , 32 km away. This is > > probably for defensive reasons; many NATO guided bombs, missiles and drones > > rely on GPS navigation, and successful spoofing would make it impossible > > for them to hit their targets. > > > > > > > > > But now the geolocation interference is being used far away from the > > Kremlin. Some worry that this means that spoofing is getting easier. GPS > > spoofing previously required considerable technical expertise. Humphreys > > had to build his first spoofer from scratch in 2008, but notes that it can > > now be done with commercial hardware and software downloaded from the > > Internet. > > > > > > > > > Nor does it require much power. Satellite signals are very weak – > > about 20 watts from 20,000 miles away – so a one-watt transmitter on a > > hilltop, plane or drone is enough to spoof everything out to the horizon. > > > > > > > > > If the hardware and software are becoming more accessible, nation > > states soon won’t be the only ones using the technology. This is within the > > scope of any competent hacker http://www.comsoc.org/ctn/ > > lost-space-how-secure-future-mobile-positioning . There have not yet been > > any authenticated reports of criminal spoofing, but it should not be > > difficult for criminals to use it to divert a driverless vehicle > > https://www.newscientist.com/article/2142059-sneaky- > > attacks-trick-ais-into-seeing-or-hearing-whats-not-there/ or drone > > delivery, or to hijack an autonomous ship. Spoofing will give everyone > > affected the same location, so a hijacker would just need a short-ranged > > system to affect one vehicle. > > > > > > > > > But Humphreys believes that spoofing by a state operator is the more > > serious threat. “It affects safety-of-life operations over a large area,” > > he says. “In congested waters with poor weather, such as the English > > Channel, it would likely cause great confusion, and probably collisions.” > > > > > > > > > Last says that the Black Sea incident suggests a new device capable > > of causing widespread disruption, for example, if used in the ongoing > > dispute with Ukraine. “My gut feeling is that this is a test of a system > > which will be used in anger at some other time.” > > > > > > > > > 73’s > > > webmaster > > _______________________________________________ > > YCCC Reflector mailto:y...@contesting.com > > Yankee Clipper Contest Club http://www.yccc.org > > Reflector Info: http://lists.contesting.com/mailman/listinfo/yccc > > > > > > > > --- > > This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. > > https://www.avast.com/antivirus > > > > _______________________________________________ > > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > > To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/ > > mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > > and follow the instructions there. > > > > > > -- > Clint. > > *No trees were harmed in the sending of this mail. However, a large > number > of electrons were greatly inconvenienced.* > _______________________________________________ > time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com > To unsubscribe, go to > https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts > and follow the instructions there. _______________________________________________ time-nuts mailing list -- time-nuts@febo.com To unsubscribe, go to https://www.febo.com/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/time-nuts and follow the instructions there.
