On Thu, Jul 17, 2014 at 07:51:25PM +0100, Etienne Dechamps wrote: > Using StrictSubnets *and* strong ADD_SUBNET authentication still doesn't > prevent a node in the middle from intercepting your communications, because > you have to trust something at some point. For example the middle node could > intercept and change the public keys that transit through it. > > That said, I guess this works if you assume that two nodes that want to > ensure security will exchange their public keys out-of-band in a secure > manner to make sure middle nodes can't fiddle with them. Furthermore, it > also implements an opportunistic "SSH-style" security model where it won't > protect against tampering the first time you ask for a public key using the > graph, but it will prevent any further attempt to tamper with it once a node > has it saved (similar to how SSH host fingerprints work). Which is kinda > cool, all things considered.
It's exactly as you say. You do need to trust something, and if you
don't pre-exchange keys tinc will do it once automatically. It never
allows a known public key to be changed without manual intervention.
--
Met vriendelijke groet / with kind regards,
Guus Sliepen <[email protected]>
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