At 3:43 PM -0500 6/16/99, Keith Maxwell wrote (in part:
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Religionists appear to have been left with an argument from weakness ("your
scientific way of knowing is just as irrational as our religious way").
Again, I am not suggesting they are being disingenuous when they diminish
the role of reason in science, only that their bias makes them unaware of
the implications of their argument.
Even if we concede that science has an element of faith, that does not
change the fact that by definition religion _is_ predominately faith; its
epistemology is revelation. The epistemology of science is observation and
reason. They could not be more different! The effort of religionists to
equate them is, in my view, an indication of some insecurity and doubt in
the validity of their tenets that they cannot bring themselves to admit to.
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I both agree and disagree with Keith here. I have often mentioned this
point before on the list, at which time the conversation then ceases (for
which some of our members may be thankful). The difficulty that Keith
correctly points out assumes that both approaches are doing _epistemology_.
Some religionists think so, and think religion is a better approach. I
would agree that his diagnosis is likely true of much fundamentalist
religion (muslim, christian, or jewish). But do note that it is an
empirical claim and would need to be tested itself.
However, many religious folks would disagree that religion is about truth
claims in the "correspondence with reality" sense. In Christianity, these
folks tend to be more liberal (but live in some very traditional ways, like
monasteries). In Buddhism some quite traditional approaches claim more to
be about "the way" that the practitioner (note I do not say "believer")
should "come and see." This "practice" approach in Buddhism is so strong
in some groups that they feel no tension in saying that a person can be a
"practicing" Buddhist AND a Christian. In other approaches (e.g. linda
woolf's descriptions of parts of Judaism) it is more about justice and
righteousness than empirical claims.
Although some contemporary philosophers have forgotten this, epistimology
is not the whole of philosophy (or of life). And now back to some teachig
relationship. Many of our students do not recognize these distinctions,
and come to psychology classes primarily wanting practical help with how to
act, or how to feel, or how to make meaning of their lives. Empirical
psychology has much to say about this (witness the debates about the
effects of sex with underage persons, about "recovered" memory, etc.). It
also has much to say about justice and righteousness (e.g. Rozin's work on
disgust as a moral emotion, work on attirbution of responsibility).
But if you value the fact/value distinction the way most empiricists do
(some do not, like Skinner) then you need to be able to say "science has
little to say about that." Both science (as a "world view") AND religion
(and poetry, and humanism, and communism) have much to say about this value
level of our lives.
Many students' complaints about the "boring" nature of psychology springs
from ther expectation that we will attempt to address these issues, and our
failure to do so. Doing so is dangerous and difficult. I think it is
worthwhile. And so I think our attempts to do so (by debating science and
religion on this list) are worthwhile.
Summary: truth AND meaning are important. Science is much better at one.
We haven't even mounted an argument about whether religion is better at the
other.
-Chuck
- Chuck Huff; 507.646.3169; http://www.stolaf.edu/people/huff/
- Psychology Department, St.Olaf College, Northfield, MN 55057
