Stuart McKelvie wrote:
>Dear Tipsters,
>
>Buddy Grah wonders about introspection in modern cognitive
>psychology. Paul Smith has drawn attention to Nisbett and Wislon's
>seminal work. I would like to add the following.
>
>Classical introspection as practiced by Wundt and Titchener is not
>used today. However, if introspection is more broadly concevied, it
>has continued in one form or another since Watson officially
>rejected it in 1913 (Boring, 1953; see also Bakan, 1954). Following
>Nisbett and Wilson, the modern question is: "To what do we have
>introspective access?" In particular, "Do we have any introspective
>access to mental processes as distinct from content?" There is a
>lively debate about this, based largely on criteria set up by Nisbett
>and Wilson. For an excellent coverage of these matters, see Farthing
>(1992, Chapters 3 and 7).
>
>If introspection is verbal reporting of the contents of conscious
>experience, we may be able to say that some of this
>information is part of the causal process. For example, the
>experience of vivid visual imagery has consequences for behavior.
I think Paul's example of "thinking aloud" protocols is a good example
of an introspective technique being used in mainstream cognition.
Now my question is: To what _extent_ are introspective techniques being
used in mainstream cognition and is if fair to characterize mainstream
cognition as a movement that relies on introspection as _its method_?
While we might find good examples of introspective techniques such as
Paul's, it seems to me that mainstream cognition relies more heavily
on other methods.
For that matter, I am not sure that I disagree with Tulving's (1989)
assertion that mainstream cognition has largely ignored consciousness
(despite claims to the contrary). It seems to me that cognitive
psychology has primarily been concerned with understanding mental
operations rather than consciousness. Furthermore, it seems as if
it has relied more on "objective" methods in its attempt to do so.
Since mental imagery was brought up, let me use it as an example.
Our understanding that mental imagery has consequences for behavior
has largely been been inferred from research using memory performance,
response time, and brain activity. Rarely if ever is the participant
in the research asked about the phenomenal experience of the mental
image. That, of course, doesn't mean that one could not ask about the
phenomenal experience, it just doesn't seem to be done (frequently).
Well thanks for reminding me of the Nisbitt and Wilson reference. I
think I will revisit it.
Tulving, E. (1989). Memory: Performance, knowledge, and experience.
European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 1, 3-26.
Buddy Grah
Dep't of Psychology
Austin Peay State Univ.
Clarksville, TN 37044
