>Jeff, while I agree with Levy's initial point about the problem of
>reification, his distinction between so-called "event theories" and
>construct theories seems unnecessarily confusing, and potentially
>misleading. What he terms event theories, in my view, are empirical
>assertions not formally organized, nor intended as theories in themselves.
>As he himself notes, if verified they then cease to exist as theoretical
>statements but become facts. I consider them best understood as general
>research questions or empirical statements.
> He then speaks of Construct theories (actual theories these) as not
>really capable of being "proven." This "p" word is taboo in my methods
>classes for reasons he would probably agree with. But he presumes that
this
>is accurate about construct theories! and thus sets up a straw-man
argument,
>for science does not consider theories proven absolutes, but rather
>organized frameworks that account for facts as known, with propositions to
>develop and extend our knowledge (i.e. generate further empirical
>questions). When he begs the questions about his Construct theories---that
>is, that they require Proof, he then quickly states that of course, they
are
>not capable of meeting such a criterion. What does he argue for next?
>Utility. Scientific utility in furthering knowledge or usefulness in
>explaining the facts? Unfortunately, no. He now means that such theories
>must be social relevant, or practically useful. While we all may applaud
>such ganz Amerikanisch value, such meanings of utility ignore the most
>valuable function of scientific theory--namely, providing the better fit
>with the facts! In other words, Levy ends up arguing for a kind of
>post-modern conception of theory evaluation where accuracy and generation
of
>objective knowledge is neatly ignored (not argued against, but presumed
>irrelevant)! No wonder our scientific colleagues consider psychology a
sham
>science. If theory development should only meet the criteria of utility,
>and utility means mundane usefulness, then surely, if people feel good
about
>it, or psychologists can find some way to confirm is potential application
>(regardless of its truth value), then it satisfies Levy?! Humbug! Unlike
>Levy, I argue that Correctness IS an important criterion of a scientific
>theory.
> I tell my students that a good scientific theory accounts for, helps
>explain the facts and leads to its own revision with the development of new
>propositions that garner new knowledge. I usually point to Piaget's ideas
>as having had this kind of "utility" in that his theory promoted new
>knowledge while also being revised considerably. Scientific theories are
not
>accurate just because they are proposed, but they should be proposed in
ways
>to facilitate their empirical demise or revision. The theory of natural
>selection best accounts for the facts of evolution, though it is revised
and
>being critically investigated by serious scientists. It IS the correctness
>of a theory that provides for its potential utility in science, and there
>are reliable criteria by which such correctness can be judged; such as the
>fit with more basic principles, the development of testable predictions
that
>are supported, integration/explanation of new findings, etc.
Psychologists
>don't usually confuse Event theory with Construct theory. Psychologists
>like Levy, seem confused about science itself. Just my .02, Gary
>Peterson
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: Jeff Ricker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>To: TIPS <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Date: Wednesday, October 27, 1999 5:07 PM
>Subject: Can theories be true?
>
>
>>We have had this discussion before on TIPS: can theories (explanations
>>of something) ever be considered "true," or are they only more or less
>>"supported" by evidence. Levy (1997) makes a distinction between two
>>kinds of theory--event theories versus construct theories--that might
>>help us to address this question better in our courses. An event theory
>>is an explanation of a particular set of related occurrences (such as
>>"why does Bill usually laugh at Tom" or "did human beings evolve from
>>ape-like creatures"), whereas a construct theory is an explanation of a
>>particular idea that integrates a large number of occurrences (such as
>>explanations of happiness or evolution). In other words, an event theory
>>is an explanation of something tangible whereas a construct theory is an
>>explanation of an intangible. Thus, event theories can be true or false
>>whereas construct theories cannot be thought of in this way "because the
>>explanations are, in themselves, intangible abstractions" (p. 10). In
>>other words, with regard to construct theories, "although the phenomena
>>under investigation may be observable, their underlying explanations are
>>not" (p. 10). Because of the difference between the two kinds of theory,
>>event theories should be evaluated in terms of their accuracy (their
>>truth), whereas construct theories should be evaluated in terms of their
>>utility (their usefulness for some set of goals--typically the
>>prediction and control of observations).
>>
>>The moral for Levy is this:
>>
>>"[W]e create nothing but conceptual (not to mention methodological)
>>havoc for ourselves when we confuse these two types of theory. In
>>particular, we must be especially careful not to reify Construct
>>Theories by treating them as if they were Event Theories.... For
>>instance, because we can neither prove nor disprove directly the
>>existence of the unconscious, it is inappropriate to ask wehether
>>Freudian theory is true or false.... One very unfortuante consequence of
>>this confusion is that the field of psychology is teeming with outdated
>>and empirically unsupported theories that have long overstayed their
>>welcome. Why do such theories persist? Perhaps the most important reason
>>is that they have never been directly disproven, which most people take
>>as evidence for their veracity [I would say, "for their POSSIBLE
>>veracity"]. Could it be that these theories are, in fact, true? Not once
>>we realize that they are, by and large, Type C [Construct} Theories and
>>thus are not _capable_ of being proven or disproven.... They should be
>>judged, instead, solely in terms of their usefulness (or lack thereof),
>>an endeavor that is all too rare." (p. 11)
>>
>>Levy is making here a simple and straightforward distinction that seems
>>to me to be correct; and the implications of this distinction are very
>>important. But it is a distinction, I think, that many of us forget when
>>we talk about theory-testing in our courses. Well, at least I do; and so
>>I offer this discussion to those of you who tend to make the same
>>omissions as I do.
>>
>>Jeff
>>
>>Reference: Levy, D. A. (1997). _Tools of critical thinking: Metathoughts
>>for psychology_. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
>>
>>--
>>Jeffry P. Ricker, Ph.D. Office Phone: (480) 423-6213
>>9000 E. Chaparral Rd. FAX Number: (480) 423-6298
>>Psychology Department [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>>Scottsdale Community College
>>Scottsdale, AZ 85256-2626
>>
>>"The truth is rare and never simple."
>> Oscar Wilde
>>
>>"[T]he more outrageous the myth, the more likely...that large
>>numbers of people will cleave to it."
>> Paul Kurtz
>>
>>
>
