On Fri, 24 Nov 2017 23:19:08 -0800, Jim Clark wrote:
Hi
Hi Jim and all,
As a former Paivio student, I do not recall that Anderson's
paper was taken to be definitive about the debate.
My doctoral dissertation was on spatial problem solving,
specifically, on whether the "alignment effect" (i.e., maps
aligned with or are parallel to the environment are easier
to use then misaligned or contraligned -- 180 degrees out
of alignment) could be obtained if one created a 2-diminensional
visual mental representation of a simple path that one walked
through while blindfolded (subjects never saw the path so they
had to construct a visual mental image from knowledge of
how they walked, which direction(s) they faced, and so on) --
this is literally compared to real maps -- relative to the creation
of a 3-D mental image of the same path under the same learning
conditions, the subject imagines the path on the floor in the space
of the room where he/she participating -- hence I called this the
"imagined terrain" to distinguish this representation from the
"cognitive map". My prediction was if we divide the subject's
representation of space into 3 components [(a) the viewer or
the subject's mind's eye, (b) the representation of space constructed
from one's experience of the space, either 2D or 3D, and
(c) the viewer's relationship to the representation of the space:
{{1) a person with a cognitive map has a fixed view of the map
which is imagined in front of one, perpendicular to the floor --
this fixed view dyad can have a variable relationship to the
environment which produces the alignment effect while
(2) the subject with the imagined terrain "sees" the mental
representation of the environment as synonymous with the
space -- the relationship between mental representation and
the environment is fixed but this dyad has a variable relationship
to the viewer and, most importantly, cannot give rise to an alignment
effect as defined for the cognitive map]. An additional manipulation
was that in experiment 1 subjects were told to learn the paths they
walked as best they could and the type of mental representation
used was determined from a post-experiment interview while
in Experiment 2 subjects in one group were explicitly told to create
a 2-D mental visual image while the other group was told to
create a 3-D mental visual image of the path on the ground around
them).
The results from experiment 2 was very clean while the results
from experiment 1 were less so but the alignment effect was
found only for people instructed to create cognitive maps but
not for imagined terrains, indeed, average absolute error between
where the subject pointed toward a target and the true direction
to the target was about the same (statistically equivalent) under
the aligned and contraligned test conditions. Anyone wanting
more details (which I doubt) are available in my dissertation
which -- last I checked -- is available for free on the Proquest
dissertation database (which incorporates the old Dissertation
Abstracts International database); look for Palij (1984).
I wasted a lot of space above in order to show which side
of the imagery argument I fall on: I believe in the psychological
reality of visual mental images, that different mental images
of the same information have different properties that affect
behavior, and different visual mental images can be thought of
as implying different types of knowledge or at least perspectives
of the same information -- spatial knowledge of an environment
or a space consist of these and additional representations of the
space including motor programs for moving about the space.
That being said, Pylyshyn's argument that all cognitive knowledge
is represented in an abstract cognitive code (some form of
Language of Though) or neural code or some combination is
hard to refute. We should all be in agreement that any analog
representation such as a real physical picture of a scene or a
map or sound and music on vinyl records or wax canisters
can be transformed (recoded) into a digital representation
which will have different degrees of fidelity to the original source
(e.g., music on CDs sound somewhat different relative to music
from vinyl records -- and I don't mean the buzzing and popping --
which occurs because some perceivable aspects of the sounds
are lost in the recoding unless one uses a digitalization transformation
that incorporates this additional information though perhaps at the
cost of much large "file size" for the digital representation).
The reason that there should be universal agreement on this point
is that computers do this all of the time. We usually use the
final digitalized product, namely, music CDs, DVDs, pictures,
movies, etc., but I am sure that some folks have used a scanner to
convert printed text or images into electronic format(s) or other
devices
that convert the sound from cassette tapes or vinyl records into
electronic format(s) on a computer. Both representations are
possible but operate in different computations systems (analog
computation vs digital computations). The question is which
does the mind (or for reductionist materialists, the brain) use?
Pylyshyn's argument points out the problems associated with
the use of analog mental representations, especially in his paper
"What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain" which asks the
question of what process operates on analog visual mental
images (i.e., the "Mind's eye") and is there a special system
of analog interpretation, manipulation, and storage (i.e. the
Mind's Brain) that is different from the cognitive system(s) (or brain
systems) used for information with abstract (e.g., digital)
representation
(e.g., the rules of syntax and the deep structure of sentences)?
So, computer science tells us that we can digitalized an analog
world (analog representations appear to be too primitive or too slow
to work with; any who used a "slide rule" [for the younger folks who
say "slide what?" see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slide_rule ),
it makes sense that the computational system of the nervous system
would create information representations from the senses in a digital
form that are optimal for neurons to use. The psychological question
is whether analog-like images can emerge from the neural activities that
retain properties of real world objects we perceive like maps, sconces,
animals, etc.? A person concerned with parsimony would argue that
simpler theories are better (but given that Chomsky may have given
up on parsimony as a criterion for evaluating theories as his own
theory of syntax continues to grow and grow and ...) and that cognitive
systems would operate more efficiently if all information is abstract
(or some form of digitalization) rather than having two or more systems
for processing analog representations (in addition to vision and
audition
there is taste and smell and so on). Should we give up on parsimony?
Kosslyn and others have argued that visual mental images may operate
through the abstract cognitive code by using the same brain areas
involved
with visual perceptions to create visual simulations of perceptions that
emerge as higher level representations of neural activity. A neat
explanation
except, as Pylyshyn point out, not all of the empirical evidence
supports
this position. So, if cognitive psychologists operate like other
people,
the confirmation bias will kick in and we select which evidence best
supports
one's theory until a better theory is develops eliminates the two
warring
sides. For a tutorial on a relevant phenomenon, namely, the nature of
color vision, see the following article which may be describe the
situation
for the analog vs abstract imagery debate as well as whether
consciousness
is real or epiphenomenal; see:
Turner, R. S. (1993). Vision Studies in Germany: Helmholtz versus
Hering.
Osiris, 8, 80-103.
-Mike Palij
New York University
m...@nyu.edu
------------- Original Message --------------
Paivio and Pylyshyn were both at U of Western
Ontario when I was there, which made for some interesting classes and
seminars.
More broadly, I would think that scientists should be quite skeptical
about
claims that we cannot ever understand some phenomenon at a pretty deep
level,
whether it be imagery or consciousness. My main quibble with too many
contemporary researchers on consciousness is that they act as though
there was
no research or reflection on the topic prior to the availability of
sophisticated brain imaging.
Finally I take some issue with Michael's characterization of the proper
attitudes toward scientific theories. Yes, they are always provisional
and
subject to refutation and modification, but we hardly want students to
be too
dismissive of them. So interpretation of "over invest" must be
communicated
carefully. Same for how theories develop . in some cases theories are
replaced,
but they also may be modified or subsumed under broader theoretical
frameworks
(e.g., Newton's laws?). They might also be prematurely dismissed before
the
underlying mechanisms are understood (e.g., continental drift and
tectonic
plates). Students also need to appreciate that nominally different
theories,
especially those at different levels (molecular, molar) might actual
reflect
the same underlying mechanism. What especially needs to be emphasized
with
students is the importance of continuing empirical research to evaluate
and
strengthen our understanding of psychological phenomena.
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